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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This study attempts to set out in detail some of the factors and influeuces 
affecting portfolio decisions. In particular it attempts to outline the 
factors affecting portfolio selection decisions in an investment manage~ent 
organisation. Influences on share selection such as the need for 
diVersification in portfolios, the desire to buy marketable stocks and the 
use of sector selection - a technique for selecting shares by their industry 
characteristics - as well as a variety of institutional factors are 
discussed at some length. Specific factors involved in investment analysis, 
such as intrinsic value analysis, and methods of portfolio evaluations are 
also considered. With this basis it 1S then possible to investigate more 
fully the value and usefulness of one of the managers decision rules. 
The technique investigated - sector selection - was on the one hand, felt 
by the investment managers to be a central and important part of their 
portfolio construction techniques contributing significantly to the 
performance of their portfolios, whilst on the other hand it was believed 
by the author, on the basis of preliminary observations, to be of rather 
less consequence. To resolve this conflict a multi-stage analysis 
(discussed below) was devised to provide empirical evidence as to the 
theoretical validity and practical usefulness of the technique. 
Two objectives may be seen to be behind the stUdy.l Tne first is to 
provide more information about some of the principles that the investment 
managers appear to consider. The need for such information is well 
documented. Thus Lintner{64} writes 
"f . •.. urther research wlll have to build up a much greater store 
of detailed institutional knowledge than we now have, and it 
will also have to fill in and build our knowledge of how 
portfolio choices are made by every major investor group in 
every market." 2 
1. To understand how these objectives arose it is necessary to consider the 
historical antecedents of the study. It was originally conceived with 
Clarkson's {16} heuristic approach to portfolio selection in mind. 
Clarkson investigated the investment of trust funds held by a bank, 
utilising a heuristic model written as a computer program to simulate 
the procedures of the trust investment officer in selecting particular 
portfolios. The model was based on the rules of thumb which guide 
the decision maker from the original input of information about the 
client, the securities markets and the economy, to the choice of 
particular portfolios. The investment officer's preference list of 
80 stocks was taken as given. The list was "previouslY selected" 
outside the model with few changes to it being made over time. Each 
stock was associated with an industry, which in turn were allied to 
particular goals such as growth. Hence the search for appropriate 
securities was narrowed to a much shorter list. Simple decision rules 
were then sufficient to ensure selection of suitable portfolios. 
It was hoped that even in a more complex situation many investment 
decisions might still be made on the basis of similar rules of thumb 
and that in consequence scope existed for the construction of a positive 
model of investment behaviour. 
Such aims were unfortunately doomed to failure. It was not found 
possible to adopt procedures of the same type as Clarkson's in order 
to narrow down the search process for securities. There was neither 
a convenient short list of 80 stocks, nor an association of particular 
industries with specific goals. It. was not even clear that one could 
select securities on the basis of their industry characteristics. It 
soon became evident that rules which could be stated rigorously and 
applied mechanically were unlikely to be distilled from a study of the 
managers' behaviour. The importance and relevance of several of the 
managers' avowed basic principles were open to argument, and what they 
actually did appeared at times to bear little relation to what they 
claimed to do. 
2. Underlining corresponds to Lintner's italics. 
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The second objective is to make some strides towards a positive t~eory of 
investment. To this end one of the rules that the investment managers 
claim to use is examined to see if this assertion may be verified empirically. 
The validity and usefulness of the rule is also considered. Although it 
would have been interesting and possibly beneficial to consider several 
other elements of the managers' doctrine, limitations of time and resources 
prevented such extensive investigations. l 
The study divides then into two parts. Part I alms at explaining what 
the investment managers do and how they are organised to do it. It is 
based on observation, interview and explanation from the managers. No 
attempt is made to derive what they should do from normative2 portfolio 
theory3 since the interest here is not in how people ought to behave but 
4 in how they do behave. Nor is a positive theory of portfolio selection 
propounded. Considerably more work relating what they actually do, to 
what they say they do is necessary before that is possible. It may be 
that investment managers should adopt the new techniques and ideas of 
portfolio and capital market theory~5 but until they do, policies and 
1. The decision as to which rule to investigate was taken on the basis of 
the intrinsic interest of that rule to the investment managers. It 
may not in fact be the least satisfactory of their rules of thumb, 
but it was the area felt by them to be of particular importance and 
relevance in their investment decision making. 
2. Normative and positive types of analysis are interpreted here as 
differing due to the "motivation of the search for concl us ions, and in 
the use made of those that are found". In positive analysis what one 
lOOks for in a conclusion or prediction, is the possibility of testing. 
In normative analysis the purpose is to recommend to one or more of the 
persons or organisations represented in the analysis, a choice or course 
of action which can be expected to serve his or their objectives better 
than, or at least as well as alternative actions open to them (Koopmans ~ 
3. See for example Sharpe {84} and Lintner {62,63}. 
4. For a discussion of the preoccupation of economics with normative models 
see H.A. Simon {88}. 
5· For a brief sceptical look at the practicalities of portfolio theory, 
see Granger & Morgenstern {46}. At the present time portfolio theory 
is still in its infancy as regards some of the central questions of 
prescriptions based on detailed studies of existing practices as well 
as on the precepts derived from normative theory, are likely to be more 
useful than policies based simply on the latter. 
The positive theory of portfolio behaviour envisaged has much in common 
with the behavioural theories of the firm. A similar controversy as to 
its usefulness l might therefore be expected, although as Loasby{65} has 
pointed out the behavioural paradigm2 and the micro-equilibrium paradigms 
are quite different. Analogously capital market theory of which portfolio 
theory lS one of the elements 3 and a positive theory of portfolio selection 
belong to quite distinct paradigms between which it is hard to find 
criteria for jUdging. 
Part I then provides some evidence as to factors a positive theory of 
investment should consider. Inevitably the description of investment 
behaviour is not rigorous, given the conflicting views that were sometimes 
4 
1. The behavioural theories have been attacked particularly on the 
methodological criticism that it is the predictive power of a theory 
that is important and not its assumptions. See Milton Friedman {43} 
for a discussion of this methodological point and Koopmans {54} and 
Coddington {17} for objections. The latter's critique of Friedman 
would seem particularly pertinent. "But the existence of rules of 
thumb and ad hoc generalisations (such as so-called naive models) which 
yield relatively accurate predictions without providing any explanation 
of the phenomenon inVOlved, shows that, although predictive accuracy 
may be a necessary condition it is certainly not a sufficient condition". 
For specific counter arguments to the criticism relating to the 
behavioural theories of the firm see Cyert & Grunberg {27} as well as 
the main text of Cyert & March {28} . 
2. "A paradigm .•• defines the type of relationships to be investigated 
and the methods and abstractions regarded as legitimate within a 
. bl " partlcular pro em area . 
3. Available empirical evidence supports many of the ma~or implications of 
the efficient markets model and as such is in some degree consistent with 
the Sharpe & Lintner model. The results for the "market model" are 
however likely to be partially consistent with other models of equilibriu 
expected returns (Fama {37} ) so that a model with similar implications 
and more realistic assumptions might have some advantages. A positive 
theory of institutional investment behaviour might provide one of t[~e 
building blocks for such a theory. 
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expressed and its basis of personal observation.~ 
Part II can be seen as a contribution to a positive theory of investment. 
Sector selection techniques are evaluated with the aim of discovering both 
whether the investment managers use sector selection techniques and whether 
the choice of shares by their sector characteristics is a rational investL;ent 
strategy. As a first step it seemed desirable to investigate whether sector 
2 
effects do exist or not. The absence of a significant statistical difference 
between sectors would automatically have implied that the selection of shares 
for their sector characteristics was a misguided policy. In fact a 
significant difference between sectors was found overall. 
Since sector effects do seem to exist, the original question as to whether 
it is possible to say with some confidence that investment managers do use 
sector selection techniques may be investigated. If the answer is ln the 
affirmative further questions concerning the value of sector selection to 
the investment managers and the possibilities of predicting successful and 
f . " .. 3 unsuccess ul sectors lnvlte lnvestlgatlon. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The first part represents a personal view of how some portfolio investment 
decisions are made in practice. It is based on first hand experience 
gained from working for a few months in a firm of investment managers 
which, although by no means typical of all such organisations, is 
perhaps representative of some of the faster growing amongst them. 
In terms of a positive theory it is only necessary for the managers to 
think or act as if they exist. However since there was some doubt as 
to whether they did or did not act as if sector effects existed it 
seemed reasonable to look at this rather fundamental question first. In 
fact this investigation of behaviour goes further and deeper than strictly 
necessary to establish a rule which might be used as part of a descriptive 
theory of portfolio selection. It also serves to indicate the possible 
usefulness of the rule with consequent implications for present 
investment behaviour. 
Successful and unsuccessful sectors and investments are judged in this 
analysis without regard to risk. If it is, for example, possible to 
demonstrate the success of sector selection this may simply represent 
the assumption of a higher degree of risk. 
To provide some answers as to the existence of sector effects regresslon 
techniques were used to partition changes in share prices into sector, 
market and residual components. Tests of significance and estimates of 
the relative contributions made by these factors provided some data on the 
existence and importance of sector effects. 
To investigate more directly whether the managers had actually selected 
shares on a sector basis for their portfolios, the constituents by sector 
of an actual portfolio were compared with a distribution that might have 
been expected to occUr by chance, given the distribution of securities 
between sectors over the market as a whole. A significant difference 
between the actual portfolio's distribution and the market distribution 
provided some evidence that the managers do select shares on the basis of 
sectors, or some correlated technique. 
Having established that the managers did choose shares by sector, it may be 
asked whether the technique was a valuable one and rewarded the managers 
with above average investment performance. To this end an actual portf.olio, 
its constituents selected as before on the basis of sectors, was broken down 
into components such as the shares held throughout the holding period, the 
shares bought during the period and the shares sold during the period. The 
performance of these components was then compared with equivalent amounts 
invested ln the appropriate sector indices. Performance of the portfolio 
close to the sector equivalents and substantially better than the market 
over several periods might have provided prima facie evidence of the success 
of sector selection as an investment technique. 
The results of this part of the study did not support the Vlew that sector 
selection was a valuable investment teChnique. Whilst as already indicated 
sector effects were discernible, particularly for well defined, homogeneous 
sectors, and whilst the analysis of portfolios did provide evidence that 
,-
c 
the managers invested on the basis of sectors, portfolio perforwance did 
not appear to have benefited from the use of sector selection as an 
investment technique. 
The poor results achieved from the sectors selected in this fund might of 
course simply reflect unique events, such as an unusually severe bear 
market. The investigation of additional portfolios would be one means of 
providing further evidence on this facet of the study. As an alternative 
approach, the final chapter considers some studies of attempts to predict 
share prices, and their implications for forecasting sector performance. 
Taken as a whole these investigations help build up a picture of sector 
selection techniques. They provide some evidence about its value as an 
investment technique and give tentative answers to questions relating to 
the advantages of investing by sectors. In terms of steps toward a 
positive theory of investment behaviour they demonstrate that some investment 
managers do consider sector factors in making decisions, although in the 
specific case considered the empirical evidence suggested that their policy 
was fruitless because they were apparently unable to predict the successful 
sectors. 
In conclusion, the contribution of part I may be seen as the outlining of 
factors relevant to the construction of a positive theory of investment. 
By no means all the points brought up are likely to be essential to such a 
theory, but it does provide a basis for further research and investigation. 
The investment behaviour of investment managers as well as of a wide range 
of institutions with similar activities does not appear to have been studied 
previously in the U.K. 
Overall the maln contribution of this thesis must be seen in terms of its 
exploration of sector selection techniques. It finds, as noted above, 
evidence that the investment managers do use such techniques, but there 
was no evidence that their use conferred any advantage to the managers 1n 
terms of performance. This finding constitutes additional evidence in 
favour of the efficient market hypothesis. Selecting shares by their 
industry characteristics might be expected to be a successful investment 
technique only in an inefficient market. Inability to detect such success 
might therefore be interpreted as evidence in favour of the efficiency of 
the capital market, with consequent implications for resource allocation. 
If this conclusion, that little advantage is conferred by the use of 
sector selection techniques,is accepted certain implications relating to 
the present organisation of many investment managers may also follow. The 
most important 1S that research and share selection on the basis of 
industries may be inappropriate. 
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Chapter 2 
The Role of the Institution 
A prerequisite for understanding the particular investment behaviour and 
asset selection of an institution is a definition of the role and purpose 
of the institution within the financial community. With this requirement 
In mihd this chapter sets out to describe the activities and serVlces 
provided by investment managers. Attention is paid both to the relation-
ship of the institution to the financial markets and to the investment 
services - notably diversification and management - that may be provided. 
In line with recent evidence the argument is advanced that successful 
'management' requires superior information and that implicitly the 
organisation of many investment managers reflects this factor. 
Investment Managers and Financial Markets 
Investment Managers serve primarily to place funds raised from the publicI 
into various investment alternatives. In general the preferrea media of 
investment are ordinary shares and bonds, so that interest and activity is 
2 
mainly centred on the secondary markets. Since the institutions' success 
in these markets, in terms of capital gains and dividends, affects their 
ability to raise funds from the public, the selection of shares and bonds 
1. Funds are raised by the offer of shares (investment trusts) and units 
(unit trusts). To a lesser extent funds are also raised from private 
and corporate clients (charities and pension fUnds). 
o 
./ 
2. Issues sold in the secondary markets are of course close sUbstitutes for 
the new issues in primary markets so that the prices of the two do not 
move far out of line. High prices and low yields in the secondary market 
make newly issued securities more attractive and hence market conditions 
are transmitted to the primary markets. The extent to which an exogenous 
increase in demand for securities results in an increased flow of funds 
into real investment expenditures or causes higher prices on existing 
securities, depends on the response of the new issues market to changes 
in the demand for securities (Smith {91}). In general increased demand 
for stock causes an increase in price. Increased prices over most of 
the market in turn induce new primary issues whilst also providing a 
psychological climate favourable for investment. (Secondary is used to 
describe the trading market for "seasoned" securities). 
and their amalgamation into portfolios with appropriate objectives is of 
paramount importance. The different portfolios are intended to provide 
investors with a choice between a wide range of risk/return possibilities 
in addition to both diversification and management of assets in an easily 
obtainable form. 
To some extent the differences between portfolios are largely illusory. 
The development of the investment management industry with two maln 
investment vehicles - unit trusts and investment trusts l - has tended to 
obscure the essential affinity between the investment aims and objecti yes 
of most portfolios. This similarity allows uniform methods to be employed 
for both unit and investment trust portfolio selection and permits the 
investment :managers to adopt an integrated portfolio management structure. 
The legal and institutional distinctions between the investment vehicles 
naturally involve some differences in organisation and behaviour - for 
example, investment trust portfolios have longer time horizons than unit 
trust portfolios - but there remains a substantial area of common ground. 
In general the same type of information and means of processing it are 
required, giving rise to obvious economies. The diversity of portfolio 
types-may even be an added advantage, Slnce opportunities for one fund may 
arlse out of research for another and consequently investment sometimes takes 
place In areas that would not normally have been considered. It becomes 
clear then that it is unnecessary and probably undesirable to separate 
physically the different portfolio investment teams. 
With this general picture in mind it is useful to consider investment 
management from a more formal viewpoint. Financial markets in an economy 
exist to allocate savings efficiently to ultimate users of funds. 
1. Appendices 1 and 2 outline some of the legal and institutional details 
of the two investment vehicles. 
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Decision ma.king units ln the economy may be cla.ssified. into potential 
surplus and potential deficit units. l 
In the absence of financial institutions it would be difficult for economlC 
units to achieve their intended surplus or deficit positions. Potential 
borrowers wishing to spend more than their income would find it difficult 
to borrow and potential savers wishing to spend less than they receive 
might not find any acceptable way to lend. Capital would be misallocated 
and growth depressed. 
In this situation opportunities exist for an intermediary to put together 
savlngs and loans in a more efficient manner than would otherwise be 
possible. Intermediation is important because potential deficit units 
are frequently those which wish to engage in productive investment, whilst 
prospective savers may not have the desire or expertise to engage in 
" 
productive investment themselves. By offering their own liabilities as 
an attractive alternative to immediate consumption or unproductive invest-
ment, financial institutions are able to channel the savings of surplus 
units to borrowers who can put them to good use. 
Financial intermediaries transform funds and make them more attractive. 
The ultimate borrower is able to sell his primary securities to a financial 
intermediary on more attractive terms than if the securities had to be 
sold directly to ultimate lenders. The ultimate lender gains because the 
indirect security is more attractive than a primary security. 
. . {4,9l,l02 } The intermediaries provide the followlng servlces: 
(a) Economies of scale, since they are continUally purchasing prlmary 
securi ties 
(b) 
1. 
Divisibility and flexibility - borrowers often want to borrow large 
sums, while savers frequently want to lend small sums. Intermediaries 
are able to pool the small savings and transform them into a large 
loan, so providing a more attractive package to the borrower. 
Potential surplus (deficit) units are those for whom intended income 
I • , 
(c) Diversification and risk - the purchase of different prlmary 
securities spreads the risk for the ultimate lender 
(d) Maturity - the transformation of primary securities of a certain 
maturity into indirect securities of different maturities 
(e) Expertise and convenience. 
A consequence of financial intermediation is that the financial markets 
are made more efficient. The intermediaries lower the cost to the 
borrower and provide a security better suited to the lender. When 
opportunities for profit arise, financial intermediaries enter the market 
and narrow the differential. Their sUCCess in tapping the savings of the 
public should lower the cost of raising capital. MOre money flows into 
the market and there lS less need for corporations to pay a high premium 
to obtain capital. Total investment is increased due to the lower cost 
of capital. 
In so far as the investment managers investigated carry out several of the 
functions listed above, in particular receiving funds from one group and 
making them available to another, they perform as financial intermediaries. 
Indeed to some extent the managers represent a further development of the 
financial intermediary concept since they specialise by investing in the 
secondary market for other institutions that directly attract funds from 
1 
savers. At the same time however as the investment managers are becoming 
more specialised in their contact with savers they are tending to become 
less specialised In their dealings in securities. Far from concentrating 
more and more on seasoned stock market securities as increased specialisation 
of function would imply, the emphasis is very much on increasing their 
12 
1. As an example of this divorce of the managers from the savers one may note 
that where possible the investment of funds is separated from the admini-
stration of individual accounts. Thus the unit trust side of the organisation 
examined had a separate company and organisation handling the administration 
and marketing of units (the contact with savers). This division of 
operations enables the investment managers to concentrate on portfolio 
decision making. It also provides certain administrative savings. The 
distinction between administration and portfolio manag(;,--:-.cnt was less 
marked (due probably to the larger average holdings, fewer transactions 
-, - .... \ 
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involvement in the prlmary security markets by bringing companles to 
market, putting up venture capital and generally embarking on what have 
in the past been regarded as traditional merchant banking activities. In 
part this reflects a general trend. The movement of qualified outsiders, 
such as merchant banks, into the portfolio management field and vice versa. 
In part it simply reflects the search of an aggressive profit orientated 
management for new opportunities. In the search for new investment 
avenues the form of the different types of institutions tend to merge _ 
witness the blurring of the distinction between the merchant banks and 
investment managers in some of their activities. 
This blurring of distinctions is also to be found in portfolio management 
proper. Virtually all of the transactions (purchase and sale of 
securities) carried out by investment managers are put through a broker 
(and a jobber) who acts as agent for the manager and buys and sells on 
their ~behalf . In general, brokers and jobbers are financial intermediaries 
. only in a very particular sense, their basic investment objective being 
simply to provide for the temporary financing of securities in transit 
from one group to another. Their profits do not arise from interest and 
dividends on the assets they hold but depend on commission (brokers) and 
the difference between the price they pay and the price they receive 
(jobbers) • The capacity of these institutions to handle large transactions 
in securities is an important feature in both the primary and secondary 
markets. Traditionally brokers have also been involved In the management 
of small private portfolios. In recent years this side of their activities -
the management of portfolios - has been greatly expanded and brokers have 
become much more important in the portfolio management field. 
Services provided by Investment Managers 
The discussion so far has considered the role and position of investment 
managers within the financial community but has said little about the 
main services provided by them. Two of those generally provided by 
intermediaries would seem worth particular consideration - the provision 
of diversification and management. Diversification allows the investor 
to reduce his total riSk by spreading his capital Over different assets. 
The term encompasses a division between shares and other assets such as 
property as well as a division within each category. In the cases dealt 
with here almost all the diversification is between different types of 
shares. Management involves decisions such as whether to buy or sell, 
when to buy or sell, what to buy and how much to buy or sell. Both 
management and diversification are provided for a fee. 
Various types of management are possible. In the office under study the 
management of funds was almost entirely at "full discretion". When 
changes to a portfolio are necessary the managers are under no obligation 
to contact their clients or trustees. The power to alter a portfolio 
rests entirely with the managers although constraints such as trust deeds 
do affect their choice. 
By no means all investment management serVlces are of this nature. One 
possibility entails simply the provision of custodial and bookkeeping 
services, with investment decisions left entirely to the client. Another 
is the provision of advisory services only: the client lS advised of the 
need for changes to the portfolio together with details of suggested sales 
and purchases. Such systems tend to be unsatisfactory. They cause a 
l4 
time lag between the recognitlon of opportunities and their exploitation, 
so that advantages and profits are often lost through inaction. They also 
presume that the client knows as much about investment as the investment 
managers. This is unlikely to be the case. Unless the client has 
consistent access to inside information or some particular talent In 
investment matters then full discretion lS the logical service to offer. 
15 
From the client's point of Vlew it is highly desirable that the investment 
managers should justify their remuneration by making better decisions 
than the investor would himself. However, scarcity of information and 
lack of knowledge make the client's task of assessment difficult. In 
fact the belief that the managers have superior analysts or talents and 
can do better than a random selection of investments must be viewed with 
some scepticism - studies so far have found it difficult to identify such 
managers. Indeed it might well be asked what is meant by good investment 
management. 
In the context of financial intermediation a measure of success of 
investment management is the efficiency with which money is channelled 
into stocks with a high rate of return for an equivalent risk, and the 
consequent transfer of capital into the more profitable investments in 
productive goods. The evidence is not encouraging. For example, Friend, 
B d C {44 } .. " lume an rockett In the Unlted States found that Mutual funds as 
a whOle . . . . are neither especially good nor especially bad at 
directing capital into profitable areas of investment". This result lS 
in line with expectations. Given the extensive evidence in support of the 
efficient markets model that prlces "fully reflect" all publicly available 
information, it would be surprising if institutions other than specialists 
and corporate insiders with monopolistic access to information were 
particularly good at securing a high rate of return for an equivalent risk. 
(see Fama {37} for a general survey of the literature). How then should 
one judge the success of investment management? One criterion might be the 
provlslon of diversification at low cost, since on average, unless they 
have access to private or inside information, the managers are unlikely to 
be able to provide more than the expected return commensurate with any glven 
risk. The implications of this conclusion are worth considering. If 
access to private or inside information is denied then the sensible strategy 
16 
for the investment manager is to minimize costs when selecting portfolios 
and provide diversified portfolios at a lower cost than their competitors. l 
Failure to implement such a strategy would seem to revolve around three 
possibilities: lack of information on the research that has taken place 
into efficient securities markets and on its implications, disagreement with 
the results of the published research, and the belief that investment 
managers do have access to private or inside information. This last 
possibility is worth further consideration. Any share is assumed to have 
2 
an intrinsic value depending on earnings and other fundamental factors. 
Since individuals' perception of these factors differ, the market price 
does not necessarily correspond to this value, (but in general the investors 
feel that the two tend to converge). New information3 changes this intrinsic 
value. On the average however, because there are many astute traders ln 
the market, the full effect of new information on intrinsic values is 
1. Or in a rate regulated structure or' otherwise imperfect market to 
secure higher profits, growth or some other similar desirable 
objective. 
2. 
3. 
{46 } . . See Granger & Morgenstern for adverse comment on thlS Vlew. 
The question as to what constitutes information is an interesting one. 
"To an investor who contemplates a commitment in IBM the commonplace 
statement, 'IBM produces computing machines' is not information." 
(Smith {92}). The argument implies that what constitutes information 
varies between people. Information is defined here as data that is new 
and relevant to the firm and analysts. (i.e. any actual or anticipated 
change in a factor likely to affect a company's prospects). It is the 
stream of data that represents to an investor the environment and the 
features of the firms he may invest in. The environment is constantly 
changing and conveying facts and opinions to the investor. Hence the 
search for information is a continuing one, and since it involves costs, 
the level of search is determined on the basis of the relationship 
between the cost of searching and its expected value. 
reflected instantaneously 1n actual prices. l 
Since uncertainty surrounds any new information the adjustment of prIces 
to their new intrinsic values implies that actual prices will initially 
overadjust to the new intrinsic values as often as they will underadjust: 
17 
rr~reover, the lag 1n the complete adjustment of actual prices to successive 
new intrinsic values is not constant and may even precede the new 
information which 1S the basis of the change, for example when information 
is anticipated by the market. 
If pr1ce changes are independent technical analysis2 1S no longer profitable. 
Since new information is always becoming available and intrinsic values are 
continually changing this is not true of fundamental analysis. People who 
consistently predict the appearance of new information and successfully 
evaluate its effects on intrinsic values make larger profits than people 
who do not have this talent. The existence of people with these talents 
and sufficient resources is enough to ensure that on the basis of all 
available information actual market prices are best estimates of intrinsic 
values, since their activities will restore the price of a share to its 
intrinsic value if there is any significant discrepancy. The superior 
1. To explain this, three situations may usefully be described. The first 
explanation is that successive bits of new information arise independently 
across time, whilst uncertainty concerning intrinsic values does not 
follow any consistent pattern. Hence successive price changes in a share 
are independent. The second situation occurs when the uncertainties in 
estimating intrinsic values are dependent. In effect, one person comes 
into the market who thinks the current price of a security is below its 
intrinsic value. His actions induce further people into the market and 
the security price rises out of line with its intrinsic value. Sophisti-
cated traders (that is good at estimating intrinsic values) recognising 
this sell their shares so forcing the price back towards the stock's 
intrinsic value. Once more price changes are made independent. The 
third situation is when new information is dependent, that is when a 
piece of good news is always followed by another piece of good news or 
some other regular pattern. Sophisticated traders learn that it is 
profitable to attempt to interpret both the price effects of current new 
information, and of future information implied by the dependence of 
information. Hence in this case too price changes will tend to be made 
independent by the action of traders. Fama {36 } 
I'M __ , __ .:_~, ........ ."l ... Tc..;c ;c r>r.nr>.o,..,.....orl ~.T;+'h +'h.o ~r>+;r.n r.f' +'ho. m~1"'lrD+. ,n T'I~r+.i('111Rr 
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analysts make intrinsic value analysis a useless tool for the average 
analyst. (Fama' {36} ). 
In providing the serVlce of management as opposed simply to diversification, 
the importance of private information to the investment managers becomes 
clear. To secure above average performance of portfolios it is necessary 
to select stocks that are temporarily out of line with their intrinsic 
value. But what is meant by private information? There would seem to 
be two main kinds. Private information could be inside information 
about an event which if all other factors were held constant, would 
substantially affect the price of a company's share, and the news of which 
must be capable of physical exploitation in the market by some individuals 
I before the matter becomes public knowledge. The second source involves 
converting public information into private information by means such as 
the use of computer analysis of prices and balance sheets. 
Since superlor portfolio selection decisions generally depend upon securlng 
private or inside information, managers tend to be organised for the 
maxlmum assimilation of public information and endeavour to maintain 
extensive contacts in order to garner private information whenever possible. 
One might therefore see the purchase of management by fund investors as 
the purchase of an information collecting network. 
1. For an interesting view, see H.G. Manne, "Insider Trading and the Stock 
Market" {67}. Note also his opinion that "Information is not a free 
good and we should not assume without more information than we now 
possess that its distribution is generally capricious, arbitrary, random 
or uncontrolled. Rational individuals will not blithely and willingly 
allow information of tremendous value to pass freely to individuals 
who have no valid claim upon it. The safer assumption is that 
individuals with the power to control the flow of valuable information 
do so rationally and allocate it in a market like system of exchange". 
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Chapter 3 
Organisation and Structure of the Institution 
Discussion of the role of investment managers revealed the need to secure 
private or inside information if superior investment decisions are to be 
made. New information must be acted upon quickly if full advantage is to 
be taken of it. Of necessity this implies a management structure capable 
of making rapid decisions and sufficiently flexible to take advantage of 
new opportunities. It is to this that the analysis now turns. Investment 
decision making is considered to have two main elements. The first 
involves where investment decisions are made and what affects them. It 
considers the role both of the various individuals such as fund managers 
who are connected with the management process and of service departments 
such as research. The second considers the execution of investment 
decisions, in particular the role of the dealing function. Up to this 
point the analysis has said nothing about the managers' motives or 
objectives even though it is likely that these objectives have played an 
1 important part in deciding the form of the organisational structure. 
With this in mind the final part of the chapter considers the managers most 
likely objective and indicates some implications for their organisation. 
Decision Making 
It is worthwhile distinguishing at the outset between the investment 
managers and their clients - unit and investment trusts. The managers 
carry out for a fee the task of portfolio selection for their clients. 
They are responsible for their performance and actions to those clients, 
. 2 
or more particularly to the Boards of Dlrectors who represent them. 
1. 
2. 
For example, there is little point in constructing a flexible and 
qynamic portfolio management organisation if one's purpose is simply to 
buy a representative sample of shares and hold them. 
The regulatory and advisory role in the investment management process 
of these Boards of Directors is considered in the next chapter. 
The managers perform the same task for all their clients - the management 
of portfolios. / As such there is no particular requirement for the 
separation of portfolios other than perhaps by risk and return. In 
practice however administrative convenlence tends to separate portfolios 
into groups dependent upon both objectives and clients. In essence the 
managers are structured so that particular fund managers and dealers are 
responsible for the portfolios of one client. Figure 3.1 may make the 
structure somewhat clearer. The managers consist of a partnership to 
Unit Trusts] 
- -------...... --.- -J 
Fund Managers 
___ .'4' __ 
li~~;';~a~,,~~l J M,a~erl 
! 
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Figure 3.1 
whom the fund managers, dealers and research dep~rtment are all responsible. 
Within the partnership, fund managers and dealers tend to be allocated to 
particular investment or unit trust portfolios. The discussion that follows 
is organised in much the same way. Consideration is given first of all to 
the role and position of the partnership and then to the role of the fund 
managers and research in the decision making process. The dealers are 
considered in the section dealing with the implementation of decisions 
There appear to be three legal forms that a firm of investment managers may 
take - a partnership, an unlimited company, or a company limited by shares. 
The comments here are restricted to partnerships since the investment 
managers investigated are of this form. l A partnership is defined as 
"the relation which sUbsists between persons carrylng on a business ln 
cornmon with a view to profit". 2{19} To some extent in this particular 
case the partnership structure is a historical relic reflecting the age 
and previous small size of the institution. One would expect its form to 
change over time becoming a limited company with possibly a quoted capital. 
However a large equity stake would probably continue to be held by the 
partners themselves. 
The partnership form emphasizes the involvement of the partners ln the 
investment process. It is their money and profits that are at risk. 
The partners are responsible for the policy making decisions taken within 
the firm. They determine the direction and orientation of the office as 
a whole, and of the particular funds within it. The growth of the partner-
ship, the desire to increase profits and the search for new avenues for 
expansion, all seem to be important factors behind partnership decisions. 
The status of each of the partners lS by no means equal. Each individual's 
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1. Most of the remarks are fairly general however. The partners could 
equally well be executive directors of a limited company. Given the 
managers' emphasis on incentives and executive share participation to 
companies in which they invest, it is likely that, whatever the legal 
form, ownership and control would still largely rest with the same people 
and that the objectives of the firm would be substantially the same. 
The emphasis on equity participation by the executives in the firm 
would seem to be a characteristic of almost all investment management 
organisations. 
2. A number of advantages arise from this structure - private accounts, 
fewer formalities and therefore reduced costs, unconstrained business 
activities (a company is normally limited by its memorandum of association) 
and no restrictions on capital changes. Certain disadvantages are also 
apparent. A partnership's debts are borne jointly and severally by 
each partner with unlimited liability for the debts resting on each 
partner. One partner is able to bind all the rest to an agreement and 
furthermore, a share in the partnership cannot be transferred without 
the consent of all the other partners. A further restriction often 
occurs in that partners have to find the partnership's working capital 
out of their own pockets. This places a considerable strain on many 
partnerships. 
share of the profits may differ and their power and position within the 
organisation vary in consequence. Traditionally the senior partner has 
a special position and importance although quantification of these powers 
is difficult. He may be largely responsible for policymaking within the 
partnership, but clearcut answers on this are not easy. 
A useful way to consider investment decisions is to differentiate between 
strategic and tactical decisions. The overall policy and orientation of 
the portfolios is considered to be a matter for strategic decisions. These 
are made at the partner level and involve such factors as gearing, investing 
more in Wall Street, or changing emphasis between sectors. The day to day 
management of the portfolio is said to involve tactical decisions. The 
timing of a relatively small sale or purchase is left to the discretion of 
the fund manager. The distinction between tactical and strategic decisions 
is not always clear. For example, the sale of a large line of stock that 
has been held for some time may, or may not, involve a sUbstantial change 
in emphasis in a portfolio. Accordingly classification as a strategic or 
tactical decision varies. Similarly the partners, whilst concerned with 
policymaking and hence strategic decisions, are also involved in the 
general management of the funds, acting for example as fund managers and 
generally supervising and co-ordinating the investment process. 
Most of the day to day runnlng of the funds is the responsibility of the 
fund managers. The precise nature of a fund manager's activities and 
operations vary according to the funds they are managingl but in general 
1. Investment trusts for example tend to have lower turnover and in 
consequence longer term portfolios than the unit trusts. In addition 
a strong N. American influence results in a geographical split with one 
fund maqager managing all the N. American portfolios and another 
managing all the U.K. portfolios of the investment trusts. On the 
unit trust side each fund manager is likely to find himself managing 
three or four portfolios simultaneously each with its own particular 
objectives. In consequence a piece of information must be reassessed 
several times in the light of each fund's objectives. 
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the fund managers are not concerned with the initial construction of a 
portfolio, a relatively rare event, but with the day to d~ running of a 
fund they inherit. It is their job to assess the long term objectives 
of the fund, and to reVlse portfolios so that they retain the appropriate 
characteristics. The fund manager has to choose stocks that fit in with 
the strategic decisions laid down by the partners. The fund mangers do 
not however act in isolation. Partners acting as fund managers are 
responsible for the implementation of their own decisions as well as 
supervlslng those of other fund managers. In the light of this experience 
a feedback and modification process operates with decisions and policy 
continually being modified and adapted as appropriate for changing 
circumstances. The speed of reaction is therefore rapid. Theories 
and decisions that have outlived their usefulness can be quickly discarded 
and replaced with others. 
Is this particular type of organisation with fund managers straddling 
a large part of the market and little specialisation desirable? The 
advantages would appear to be the speed of response and the ability to 
follow a coherent, well thought out portfolio strategy. The disadvantages 
arise from hurried, ill considered decisions due to lack of knowledge and 
time to consider a matter in depth so that rational decisions may be taken. 
An alternative more specialised form of organisation is for the managers 
to be organised on a sector basis. By this is meant that a partner and 
several analysts consider one particular area such as Consumer Durables. 
Any decisions for a portfolio on Consumer Durables stocks are taken by 
them. The problem with this kind of organisation comes in deciding how 
much of a particular sector should be included in a portfolio. Few 
people will argue that their particular speciality should not be included 
at the moment, since to do so is to remove their decision making power. 
Time lags in changing the balance and structure of the portfolio are also 
It is also important to consider the orientation of fund managers Slnce 
considerable differences in orientation may exist. Some uniformity 
within the investment managers is achieved by constant communication 
among the fund managers and by the office philosophyl but evidence of 
different approaches is still apparent. At one extreme is the Market 
orientated fund manager; t' the strong belieYe in technical factors, 
rising price trends and market psychology. 
"Opportunity orientated, 
chart conscious; dealing in concepts as opposed to price earn1ngs 
ratios." Close to the market, investment is shifted 1n and out of the 
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ma:rket leaders and 'hot' stocks. A 'good' story is likely to be a 
signal for buying action and since such fund managers act quickly, heavy 
reliance is placed on their expertise and their contacts. Rising earn1ngs 
are discussed as an important factor but equally great weight is attached 
to what the market is doing. Has it over or under adjusted to good or 
bad news? The quality of management 1S paid lip service but is not 
generally of much significance except 1n so far as it influences others. 
Company activities and sector characteristics are accorded little 
importance. Concentration of holdings is also of little significance. 
At the other extreme is the complete fundamentalist. He is only interested 
1n the fundamental factors such as earnings growth, quality of management 
and an appropriate capitalisation rate for the share and the sector. The 
'good' story is of interest only in so far as it conveys information about 
changes in these fundamental factors. Market rumours are generally 
discounted and stories verified as objectively as possible with the facts. 
Portfolio turnover is likely to be considerably lower, and portfolios 
1. 
2. 
The office philosophy is discussed in some detail in a later chapter. 
Briefly it is the body of investment knowledge that governs in large 
part the investment decisions made in the firm. 
Generally denotes lower quality issues that react strongly in bull or 
bear markets. Their volatility arises generally from their highly 
speculative, often cyclical nature. 
concentrated so that proper attention can be paid to each stock. l 
The basis of decisions is information. In consequence consideration must 
be given to the parts of the organisation that are largely responsible for 
its dissemination. There seems to be two main mechanisms for conveying 
information. The first, the shuffling of brokers' reports and newspapers 
from one fund manager to another, with each fund manager in turn reading 
those to which his attention has been drawn as well as those of particular 
interest to himself, requires little comment. 2 The second, more formal 
mechanism involving the systematic assimilation of news and reports of 
stockbrokers by the research department must be considered in rather 
more detail. 
The Research Department is' a service organisation intended to provide the 
fund managers with up to date information and opinions. 3 Within the 
25 
1. The question as to how successful each of these types of fund manager is 
might reasonably be posed. The presumption in the firm lmder study is 
very much in favour of the fundamental approach. A problem in assessing 
success is the change in market conditions that occur. The investment 
managers argue that the market orientated do well in a bull market 
whilst the fundamentalists do better in the bear stages of the market. 
2. This is not to say that the less formal methods of information dissemination 
are not very important. They are. In particular telephoned information 
and verbal contact may well introduce a sense of urgency and perspective 
difficult to acquire from the printed word. "Professional money managers 
often seem to make up their minds in a split second, but what pushes 
them over the line of decision is an incremental bit of information 
which, added to all the slumbering bits of information filed in their 
minds, suddenly makes the picture Whole." (Adam Smith {45} ). 
3. The Research Department's objectives have been described by the firm as 
being to supply the fund managers with the economic and analytical 
resea rch that they want, to develop research and fund management control 
systems for improving fillld performance, and to find and train future 
fund managers. "one of its (Research) most important functions is to 
try and put a value on inflowing information and opinions. This may 
involve quite a lot of verification in some cases, whereas in others 
our accumulated experience may enable us to decide immediately." A well 
developed research organisation is also likely to add to the prestige 
of the organisation and is useful to demonstrate to clients the breadth 
and depth of the firm's expertise. 
Research Department the analysts cover the maln industrial sectors such 
as Capital Goods or Consumer Durables, reporting on the companies and 
sectors as new information becomes available. There is also some 
international coverage with analysts investigating American stocks, and 
a more general coverage of the main European, Commonwealth and Japanese 
companies by individual analysts whose main responsibility lies In some 
other area. In addition, a good deal of continuous monitoring of 
performance is carried out, both of brokers and companies, as well as 
routine information processing intended to present the fund managers 
with a brief summary of details such as company earnlngs and brokers' 
I forecasts. Assistance to research and fund management is also provided 
by the economist and his assistants. The intention is that they should 
co-ordinate their activities with the analysts where possible and provide 
economic reports on particular events, companies and industries. 
No mention has been made of the role of the analyst in research. 
Investment managers seem to adopt either of two positions. The first 
claims that the need is not for the ordinary analyst who works from 
original sources and monitors a small sector, but for a broad based 
researcher who is able to integrate ideas from elsewhere, primarily the 
brokers, and present them in an orderly and unified manner. The alm lS 
to adopt all the good (or right) ideas of other analysts and show why 
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these particular ideas are most appropriate. The analyst is not intended 
1. An essential part of the department is an extensive library covering 
most of the U.K. and many U.S. and foreign companies with files on each 
firm containing brokers' comments, annual reports and other items of 
interest. The function of the library is to present an immediately 
available comprehensive collection of information on any company 
analysts or fund managers are likely to be interested in. In addition 
a variety of publications, Extel cards and various news services are 
kept for supplementary information. The library facilities are 
intended not only as an aid to the research department, but also to be 
of assistance to the fund managers and partners in making relevant 
declslons. An effici~nt information system is important in enabling 
analysts to detect changes among critical factors affecting an industry, 
group or individual company, as soon as possible. 
to have a detailed knowledge of one particular area but a broad know~eGZe 
so that he can apply the particular methods and ideas of the firm to ar.y 
situation. Broad knowledge is also required because of the requirement to 
train analysts as fund managers. In house research is thus not only 
intended to present unbiased opinions but also to prepare analysts for 
fund management. The second position disputes the need for broad based 
researchers and claims that it is better to maximise one's total knowledge 
about a very restricted subset of companies. Exceptional rewards are 
thought to come from private information which includes information not 
generally known even if available. Since research is necessarily 
c.{ 
limited in scope and further knowledge costs timel and money, specialisation 
2 is the most appropriate strategy. 
It is difficult to come down categorically on one side or the other. 
If for example the managers were always the first investors glven access 
to the research of particular brokers,3 and if the managers were able to 
1. The need for speed ih decision making and research is obviously important. 
The life of an idea may be very short. Conditions change and it is 
essential for reactions to be swift. The process is one of anticipating 
the reactions of other market participants, establishing and liquidating 
positions before favourable conditions change. The more time consumed 
in researching a project or new development, the more assured one is of 
the conclusions reached. The more positive the course of action re-
quired, the less profit potential inherent in the move. It is necessary 
to trade off the adVantages of speedy decisions against the risk of 
being wrong. (Smith {92}). 
2. An interesting unanswered question relevant to the institution studied 
is "how often does information gathered later in an investigation alter 
the fund managers' or analysts' views?" Subjectively I would estimate 
little, but qualifications must be made as to who is doing the research. 
Some analysts seem prepared to spend time investigating companies and to 
drop them after considerable effort, as being unrewarding. Others 
come to a conclusion early and look for evidence to support it. 
Personality is obviously important. 
3. Large commission payments by the investment managers to the brokers do 
provide a considerable incentive for brokers to give the managers priority 
in seeing new research and give the managers leverage to dictate the type 
and nature of much of the research undertaken. Personal contacts would 
seem to be very important in determining the order in which information 
is relayed to clients. A few brokers for example are very close to 
certain fund managers and analysts in the investment managers with the 
result that information is given to them before other clients. The 
managers would ~tress that it is important to encour~~e reliable brokers 
to bring research and ideas to the firm as quickly &8 possible. 
judge between good and bad research, then the first strategy might be 
most appropriate particularly in view of the unfavourable brokerage fee 
structure
l 
which makes it difficult for the investment managers to employ 
the same range and quality of analysts as the brokers. In fact this 
latter factor in itself may well make the second possibility impractical. 2 
2~ 
1. A considerable controversy has raged as to whether brokers should be 
paid commissions as large as at present. Opponents argue that much 
of brokers' research is duplicated (by other brokers) and of poor 
quality and that if the fees were halved the larger investment managers 
could provide much superior research for their own institutions with 
the money saved. Leaving aside the problem that the commission 
reduction would not accrue to the managers, but to the unit and invest-
ment trust holders, the question would seem to revolve around broader 
issues than is generally realised. The larger institutions would have 
an advantage over the smaller ones who could not undertake the same 
amount of research. Problems of monopoly power might well become 
apparent. One would expect a significant contraction in the quantity 
and probably the quality of broker research with effects on the relative 
perfections of the market since research findings would no longer be 
available to so widespread a public, and the speed of adjustment 
consequently slowed. Counterbalancing the reduction in broker research 
one might expect an increase in institutional research. This research 
would not be generally available. Problems of research coverage, in 
particular their ability to consider the whole investment spectrum, 
would be likely to arise for the smaller institutions and one might 
expect them to be adversely affected by the change. Competition 
amongst the large institutions might of course still be sufficient to 
secure a perfect market and hence optimal allocation of capital and 
to present the investor with an adequate choice of investing 
institutions. From the institutional investor's point of view it is 
also likely that advantages would accrue from the increased impartiality 
of research effort. It is often difficult to separate out sound 
advice and knowledge from the broker's desire to generate turnover and 
commission. 
2. One might reasonably ask how good the research provided by the brokerage 
firms is. The answer briefly is that it varies in both quality and 
quantity. A few large brokers cover more or less the entire spectrum 
of research - into stocks, industries, bonds, the economy and fund 
management - and maintain enviable standards. Most brokers however are 
forced to concentrate on particular areas and stocks with the standard 
of research varying enormously. The problem of quality is crucial. 
How can one differentiate superior from inferior research? Long ex-
perience of particular analysts and firms is one main factor, whilst 
comprehensiveness and breadth of knowledge is another. Reports which 
contain new information and insights might generally be described as 
superior although inevitably, the assessment is subjective. Hence 
brokers research that superficially covers an industry or stock is 
of little value or interest (at least to the institution investigated). 
In addition it is argued that most brokers' analysts prefer to report 
new developments rather than interpreting events, since the effort and 
knowledge required are usually less. Generality and brevity may be 
of more interest to smaller institutions without much time for research. 
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Implicitly it has been assumed that it is worth while for the illEc.ager3 to 
devote considerable attention to research - either securing brokers' 
services or carrying it out themselves. It might reasonably be asked 
whether this is a sensible strategy or not. Given the evidence in favour 
of the efficient market hypothesis l and the spamecontradictory evidence 
it seems likely that securing private information is very difficult. 
Diversification at low cost might well be a more desirable objective along 
with an explicit statement of the risk/return combination that is being 
aimed for. 
IffiplemeLtation of Decisions 
The discussion of decision making processes In the investment management 
organisation has inevitably also included some consideration of the 
implementation of decisions. The fund managers for example might be 
regarded as implementing the partners' decisions in terms of general 
policy as well as being decision makers in their own right with regard 
to the constituents of individual portfolios. For this reason this 
section is confined to the dealing function, the only remaining significant 
part of the portfolio slection process. The dealers act as the interface 
of the fund manager with the market, respons ible for the purchas e m-< d sale 
of stocks at the best possible prices. The dealer is orientated to the 
very short term. As one writer has suggested he has a tunnel vision 
enabling him to see situations from a perspective foreign to a portfolio 
manager or analysts. A dealer is generally said to rely on 'feel' made 
up of all relevant information, basically short term, which he applies to 
1. Fama {37} distinguishes 'strong form' tests - whether individual 
investors or groups have monopolistic access to any information relevant 
for price formation - 'semi-strong' form tests where the information sub-
set of interest includes all obviously publicly available information, 
and 'weak form' tests where the information subset is just historical 
price or return sequences. In general it is only in the strong form 
tests that significant deviations from the efficient markets hypothesis 
have been found. In particular Scholes {81} presents evidence that t:-le 
value of the information in a secondary offering de:)e~1ds to some extent 
the sale and purchase of stocks. A good dealer is able to sell large 
blocks of stock disturbing the market little, and by precise timing and 
choice of broker pick up stock at attractive prlces. The dealer is also L 
source of information on lssues in demand or blocks of stock overhanging 
1 the market. Knowledge such as this allows changes in trends to be 
anticipated. By knowing the contents of the portfolios an~~ent research 
in the organisation, the dealer is able to keep fund managers informed of 
the market situation, the stock that lS on offer or that for which a 
ready market exists. The dealer is very much part of the investment team 
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implementing the ideas of the fund managers. 
Objectives of the firm 
A question that has not so far been raised but which may have important 
implications for the organisation of the investment managers and for a 
1. Large sales impending, or waiting for a buyer at a suitable price. 
Such situations tend to depress the prices of the issues in question. 
2. Not all of the investment community subscribe to this viewpoint. To 
some the gains from good dealing are negligible and indeed it is 
considered in some respects to have an adverse effect since it 
encourages short term horizons and viewpoints. It is argued that if 
an investment is worth making and one's hori zons are long term, the 
odd one percent or so saved by good dealing is irrelevant. Far 
better, it is argued, to reward the broker who suggests the original 
idea with commission to encourage him to come to you in the future. 
This is not necessarily incompatible with the belief in good dealing. 
With a large volume of business it is still·possible to make sure that 
brokers are rewarded for good ideas and research by giving them business 
which is perhaps less price responsive. The other possibility is 
for the institution to ask the stockbroker to split the commission 
with another broker. Another criticism relates to the question as to 
whether dealers are essential or not. Some institutions argue that 
the fund manager can easily deal for himself. However this may not be 
desirable where several fund managers are expected to follow similar 
policies. If all transactions are put through a dealer he is able to 
see if one fund manager is selling and another buying, and to bring this 
to the fund managers' notice. There may well be opportunities for a 
trade between them and more important, it may turn out that it is un-
desirable from the office philosophy point of view that one fund be 
buying whilst another is selling. Cent~alisation of dealing also 
enables easier administration since records can be more easily updated. 
positive theory of investment is the objectives of the investment 
managers, both of the specific firm investigated and of other firms with 
similar activities. 
The theory of the firm abounds with possible objectives such as the 
maximisation of the money value of sales subject to a profit constraint, 
maximisation of growth, maximisation of a managerial utility function 
and so on. It is unlikely however that these are as accurate a 
description of the objectives of the firm in this particular market 
situation asthe traditional profit maximising b . 0 1 o Jectlve. As 
S Olb t {87} . . . 0 0 l er son pOlnts out the lnltlal step In these new ideas has been 
to differentiate between the conventional entrepreneur as the decision 
taker in the firm and the separation of ownership and control usual in 
the large corporation. In the investment management market however, 
a distinguishing characteristic of the firms is the large equity stake 
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of the management such as the partners in the profits of the business. 
Having established the applicability of the profit maximising objective, 
it is easy to assert that for maximum profit, marginal revenue must equal 
. t 3 marglnal cos . A number of questions remain. What for example lS 
profit in this context and how are revenues and costs affected by 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. In the absence of irregular components of profits and ignoring 
advertising this is equivalent to maximising the money value of sales 
in this particular context. 
2. Indeed very large bonuses and salaries tied very closely to individual 
performance for all members of the firms are common and reflect the 
overriding concern commented upon earlier to give incentives and a 
stake in the profits. 
3. "The most profitable output will be either (1) an output for whi ch 
MR = MC which is also such that the MR curve is above the MC curve 
for a slightly lower output and below it for a slightly higher output, 
or (2) a boundary SOlution" see Lancaster {55}. 
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advertising and research? By profit is meant the profit of the partner-
ship as a whole. This is composed of the annual management fees of .the 
funds managed, as well as of more irregular components arising from the 
launching fees of new trusts and the pricing of units. 1 Costs and revenues 
are not so easy to define. It is assumed that the managers have one 
product - investment services - that they provide continuously.2 The cost 
of providing these services depends mainly on the amount of research that 
is provided assuming for the moment that advertising expenditure cannot be 
3 influenced by the managers. The quantity of research provided depends on 
the philosophy of the investment managers. If the managers know that they 
can acquire private information it will pay to expand their research until 
the marginal costs of so doing equals the marginal revenue gained. 4 The 
access to private information will be reflected in the increased value of 
the funds managed and perhaps In increased sales. Research in this case 
affects both revenue and costs. If on the other hand the managers accept 
that it lS very difficult to acquire private information the rational 
policy would be to minimise the extent of their research since in doing so 
costs will be reduced and revenue not affected. 5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
See Appendix 1 - Unit Trusts. 
The irregular contribution to profits are ignored in what follows as 
being once and for all olportunities that are limited in number. 
However the aggressive manner in which the firm searches for such 
opportunities are indicative of its profit maximising behaviour. 
In the particular investment managers investigated, the sale of units 
was divorced from the portfolio management so that sales promotion 
decisions were separate from the investment managers. However the 
decisions were not taken in isolation. 
Note the commodity provided is investment services. Hence interest is 
The investment in the revenue and cost from an extra unit of service. 
managers' revenue is derived from portfolio asset values. 
change in asset values induces a change in revenue. 
Hence a 
Unless funds are transferred from one investment manager who does not 
appear to have private information to one who does. The evidence would 
seem to indicate that few if any investment managers do have access to 
private information (see Jensen {50}). 
Up to the present it has been assumed that advertising expenditure 
cannot be affected by the managers. Relaxation of this assumption 
involves the consideration of two possibilities. Firstly advertising 
might be expected to 1ncrease the overall market size and secondly it 
might be expected to 1ncrease or reduce individual investment managers' 
market shares. In so far as the latter occurs competitive pressures will 
induce other market competitors to adVertise. Overall one might expect 
an 1ncrease in costs and a possible reduction in the number of small 
firms in so far as there are substantial economies of scale In advertising. 1 
If advertising increases the market size and this ~ncrease accrues to 
those who adVertise, then it will pay the firm to advertise until the 
marginal cost is equal to the marginal reVenue derived from the increased 
funds managed. In general it seems likely that advertising both affects 
d . . 2 market shares an 1ncreases the Slze of the market. 
It 1S perhaps useful to restate the argument at this point. The evidence 
1n the particular firm investigated indicates that the assumption of 
profit maximisation is, at the least, a good approximation to the complex 
of objectives pursued by the investment managers. Observation indicates 
that this conclusion also seems to hold true for the overwhelming majority 
of investment organisations. An implication of this assumption and of 
evidence adduced by the efficient market hypothesis is that unless the 
managers feel that they can secure private information - an unlikely event -
1. A similar prediction is likely if research provides private information. 
Overall it seems likely that portfolio management involves a falling 
average cost curve over low outputs (small total assets managed) which 
becomes horizontal for a wide range of output. 
2. It has been suggested that much research in institutions is conceived 
with the idea of advertising in mind. It is window dressing designed 
to attract clients. If this is the case minimisation of research 
carried on may not be the most appropriate strategy. 
they should reduce the Slze of their research departments. Observation 
does not indicate this to be happening. One might conclude either th&t 
the profit maximising hypothesis is an unrealistic assumption or that the 
managers believe that they can secure private information. The latter 
seems more probable and is in line with well documented resistance to 
the acceptance of 'academic' investment research. 
Overall the assumption of profit maximisation, whilst providing interesting 
implications for the organisation of the investment managers, in particular 
the emphasis on flexibility and preparedness to change, says little about 
the main question of interest here - how portfolio decisions are made. 
For this it is necessary to turn either to normative portfolio theory or 
to a behavioural theory of investment. l 
1. It is of course the intention of this thesis to provide some 
information to help construct such a theory. 
j4 
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Chapter 4 
Institutional Limitations on Investment 
Institutional limitations on the management of investment portfolios are 
an important factor in determining the nature of policies that may be 
pursued and in reducing the possible unlverse of stocks from which portfolios 
may be selected. In this chapter a very narrow view of institutional 
limitations is adopted, namely the constraints on decision making imposed 
from outside the investment managers. The analysis looks at each 
investment vehicle - unit trusts, investment trusts and gross funds - In 
turn and considers the nature of the external constraints on investment 
decision making. How in the unit trust portfolios for example, are the 
investment managers affected by the trust deeds or the requirements of 
the separate management company? Is substantial control exercised by 
the management company through the drawing up of the trust deeds or by 
its Board of Directors? Such question for which this chapter provides 
some answers are of considerable importance in the formulation of investment 
strategy and policy. 
Each investment vehicle imposes its own particular lim~ationson investment 
behaviour. Consider first of all unit trusts. They are created by trust 
deeds between the management company and the trustees. The trustee lS 
authorised to hold a trust fund of securities, cash and other assets for 
the benefit of the unit holder. He acts as legal owner of the underlying 
securities in the fund and is their official custodian, safeguarding the 
rights of the unit holder by supervising the investments of the fund and 
preventing management manipulation. The managers simply run the operation 
for a fee. Control over the managers depends on both the skill and 
integrity of the trustees and the precise framing of the' trust deeds which 
in turn reflects in large part the aims and objectives of the trust. 
The deeds usually specifY a particular objective to be aimed for &TId may 
eVen restrict investment to particular areas such as the financial sector. l 
The extent of these restrictions is likely to depend on the investment 
market aimed at but it is important that sufficient scope is left available 
to the managers for achieving reasonable diversification. Construction 
of the trust deeds is by the managers and draws upon experience accumulated 
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over many years. As a general policy the deeds are likely to be drawn 
up as flexibly as possible so that later changes are unnecessary. Super-
. 
VlSOry powers are exercised by the D.T.I. over the form and content of 
the trust deeds including technical matters such as sales methods and 
pricing (See Appendix 1 - Unit trusts). 
The discussion so far has ignored the distinction between the investment 
3 managers and the unit trust management company. This is an over-
simplification. The deeds are likely to be shaped according to both 
investment and administrative needs. Within the latter category a 
particularly important influence in fact is likely to be the marketing 
,requirements. Since the level of remuneration is geared to the total 
value of the funds managed there are obvious benefits to the managers from 
increasing the size of the funds. There may well in consequence be 
1. Similarly the proportion of the fund invested in each sector held nilly be 
restricted so that the sector choice of the managers is very confined. 
The aim must then be to choose the best performing shares. Restrictions 
may also be placed on the bond and equity proportions in the portfolio, 
on the possibilities for international investment, on the amount of 
property that may be held and possibly on the quantity of cash to be 
maintained in the fund. 
2. The trustees may of course insist on certain safeguards being included 
in the deeds. It is interesting to consider how important the trust 
deeds are, given the possibilities for the management to construct them 
as they desire. The role of the trustee is obviously likely to be 
restricted and fairly nominal. Their powers are likely to be of little 
significance given that the managers work within a framework which they 
impose themselves. In general the deeds are likely to correspond to 
the managers' own investment philosophy although as time passes this 
may change while the deeds remain static. 
3. As noted in Chapter 3 this carries out the adminis:,rati ve and marketing 
functions of unit trust management. 
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pressures to orientate funds towards the fashionable areas that will 
attract the investor's money. This may be undesirable since restrictivt 
trust deeds are likely to hamper the investment management in the future 
even if not in the present. In effect there may be a conflict betweeu 
marketing requirements and investment flexibility. 
The control exercised by the management company is not limited to 
restrictions on the trust deeds. Further influence is exerted by its 
board of directors who meet regularly. The members of the board are 
drawn both from the management and the investment sides of the organisaticn 
and from outside. l The general aim of the board is to ensure that the 
management company is doing its job effectively. Hence they are likel~r to 
consider riot only the orientation of the management company - whether 
2 it is in the right sectors of the market - but also the performance of 
the individual unit trusts run by the company. Consistently poor 
perforniance relative to its competitors is likely to lead to investibd,tions 
intended to reveal whether the investments of the trust are being :nm 
efficiently or not. The board may also exert an influence on day to day 
decisions. Buying and selling investments at a loss over a short period 
of time may well require an explanation. The control exercised by the 
board influences fund managers to take less risky decisions (or perhaps 
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more careful ones). 
1. The question naturally arises as to whether it is desirable for the board 
to be mainly composed of people from within the organisations concerned. 
Further attention is paid to this point when the investment trusts are 
considered. 
2. For example in selling units to investors, should it be selling to the 
upper income investor or the low income regular saver? Are the compan/' s 
activities broad enough? (e.g. should they include property bonds, life 
assurance etc.) 
3. One might reasonably question the importance of the management company 
board of directors. A personal view is that their influence is 
relatively slight. Events are influenced by them to some extent since 
explanations of particular decisions may be required. They may also 
exert an influence on strategic decision relevant to the funds, but it 
is difficult to sort out how important the board is for such decisions 
or indeed to separate the opinions of the board from that of the 
investment managers' partners. 
Unlike a unit trust an investment trust is a separate legal entity and a3 
such each investment trust has a board of directors to whom the investment 
managers are directly responsible. l The function of the board is much 
the same but its influence on the managers is more direct than is the case 
with the unit trusts. 2 The board is essentially a supervisory body laying 
down policy for the future. 
The composition and appointment of the board, and its powers, are 
particularly relevant in assessing its effectiveness. Considerable 
differences exist between institutions in the boards constituents. Some 
investment managers in forming an investment trust prescribe that the 
board be composed of the investment managers plus a certain number of 
outside directors (generally two). In consequence the board, the managers 
and the trust are in large part synonymous. The board is likely to be 
little more than a rubber stamp with no control over the managers' policies. 
The shareholders might in certain circumstances remove the board but such 
events are rare and unlikely. At the other extreme are institutions where 
the boards are more or less completely independent. One or two members 
of the investment managers are perhaps invited to sit on the board, the 
other members being all outside directors. The power of removing the 
investment managers is then much less theoretical and more of a practical 
possibility (although rare). 
Not all the linkages between the managers and the trusts are necessarily so 
straight forward as in these"two cases. One may for example find a trust 
owning more or less all the physical assets of the managers including their 
1. An investment trust is a conventional limited liability company and has 
memorandum and articles of association laying down its interests, much 
as the trust deeds of a unit trust. However, such memorandum are 
generally vague and flexible and likely to be much less restrictive than 
is the case for the unit trusts. 
2. The difference in influence arises because whilst each investment trust 
has its own board, the unit trusts are all responsible to the same board -
that of the management company. 
name so that control rests firmly with the board. At the same time, 
however, the initial and subsequent appointments to the board are 
influenced by the managers when setting up the trust, by their represen-
tatives on the board, or simply by their advice to it, so that the 
distinction between the managers and the board may well be more nominal 
than real. 
This matters because it affects the overall importance of the board as 
a constraint on performance. The board may in some circumstances be 
little more than a rubber stamp. How accountable are the managers for 
errors? What would the board do if the managers consistently turn in a 
1 poor performance? Consider first of all the accountability of the 
management fOT errors. It would appear that directors may be regarded 
in either of two ways. The first sees them as a check on management 
with the purpose of the directors being one of control. Each individual 
decision is scrutinised and questioned and appropriate steps taken if the 
outcome is not satisfactory. The second viewpoint regards the directors 
as an aid to investment - a sounding board for ideas. Policies are put 
to the directors for scrutiny so that they may be amended in the light of 
their experience. Thus the first approach regards the role of the 
directors as basically checking up on past decisions. If a purchase or 
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sale has been made in error or if performance is poor a reason lS required. 
The second approach sees this function of keeping people on their toes as 
relatively minor and credits the board with being responsible much more 
for long-term policy than interfering with day to day decisions. This 
latter approach is intuitively more appealing as One can see the interests 
1. This raises the question as 
it relative to other trusts 
trust? The matter is dealt 
to how the managers judge 
or according to goals and 
wi th in a-' later chapter. 
. performance - lS 
objectives of the 
of the outside directors being brought into the investment decision 
making process and possibly providing some inside information. It is 
not unknown for outside directors to address the fund managers on some 
particular sector or company about which they are knowledgeable. 
To assess the effectiveness of the board it is also necessary to consider 
the powers of the board. The board like the investment managers is 
interested in considering whether there are any lessons to be learnt from 
past decisions. Both the board and the investment managers are similar 
in outlook and purpose. Their objectives for the trusts are likely to 
coincide: generally both seek to maximise the growth in asset values of 
the trusts. Hence it is likely that the board and the managers will 
interact, each influencing the trust's investment policy - both long-term, 
such as the choice of sectors to hold, and shorter-term, such as policy 
concerning particular day to day investment practices. Control 1S 
exercised informally if at all. The question of the penalties for 
ignoring the board does not arise. It is instructive to compare the 
roles of the board of an investment trust and of a unit trust's trustees. 
Does the board fulfil a similar role to the trustees, playing little 
direct part in the investment process so long as certain broad principles 
are not contravened? This is unlikely to be the case. The board does 
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not have a readily available constructed set of principles for its guidance, 
but relies more on intuition and judgment as to the appropriateness of 
certain decisions. 
The external constraints on the gross funds and private client portfolios 
follow a similar pattern to those on the unit and investment trusts. The 
gross funds - pensions and charities have particular requirements for 1ncome 
and reasonable capital appreciation. Trustees are by law only allowed to 
invest in certain securities unless the trust deed explicitly gives them 
wider powers. If they are not so empowered and a loss ensues on a 
non-trustee security then the beneficiaries under the trust may sue the 
trustees for any loss incurred by their so doing. Losses and profits 
between different securities are not offsettable - the beneficiaries of 
the trust are entitled to take a profit on the one and sue for the loss 
on the other. 
A trustee is empowered under the Trustee Investment Act of 1961 to divide 
a trust fillld into two parts of which one part must be invested in "N arrower 
Range" securities (both not requiring advice, e.g. Defence Bonds, and 
National Savings Certificates, and requiring advice, e.g. British Government 
securities, Debentures and loans meeting certain requirements, mortgages 
etc.) and "Wider Range" investments, requiring advice and basically 
composed of the equity shares of companies fulfilling certain criteria of 
size and dividend record etc. 
The law requlres trustees to take advice from properly qualified advisers 
(in financial matters) although the trustee is not compelled to act on this 
advice. Machinery generally exists for considering the investment 
performance of the managers. Trustees and deeds may restrict investment to 
particular stocks or areas although in most cases the formal restrictions 
are few. Substantial flexibility lS conferred on the managers to invest 
as they see fit. However control lS much more immediate. There is no 
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longer a mass of unitholders and shareholders to be protecte~. The charities 
are In a position to dictate changes in policies for their filllds if they do 
not get satisfactory performance. Similarly most private clients are in a 
position to influence the disposition of their filllds if they so desire. In 
practice, however, most cl.ients pay little attention to the managers and 
leave the management of their portfolios entirely alon~. 
The maln external limitations on the investment manager~, arlslng from the 
owners of the funds or their representatives such as the trustees and 
the board of directors, have been detailed. No mention has been made 
of their effectiveness in this role and the recurrent problem of the 
division between ownership and control. Attention has been directed at 
the more immediate influences affecting the fund managers' investment 
decisions, arising from the position of the directors and the trustees. 
The general conclusion has been that they do exert an influence on the 
investment process both over day to day decisions and over future policy. 
Observation indicates that this influence is not extensive, although this 
view may be misleading, firstly because policies are tailored to avoid the 
opprobrium of the directors and secondly because the board's influence may 
be exerted mainly on comparatively infrequent strategic decisions. 
Apart from the constraints imposed by the owners of the funds certain 
constraints are also imposed by legal and official (mainly taxation) 
requirements. Trust deeds are inspected by the D.T.I. and changes may 
be demanded if considered necessary. Equally, to be classified as an 
investment trust, certain conditions must be fulfilled relating to the 
distribution of income, the proportion of assets that may be held in a 
particular company, and the types of investments that may be held. Similar 
rules exist for charities and other exempt funds and in some cases investment 
may be possible only in trustee stocks. These rules have grown up both from 
legislative requirements and from convention. They are by no means 
constant but are varied by the regulatory bodies as circumstances demand. 
Overall then it can be seen that each portfolio is subject to some constraints. 
These constraints vary from the formal - legal and official - to those imposed 
by such bodies as the board of directors on the basis of past exper1ence. 
The overall effect 1S to reduce the types of securities that may be 
selected and it is for this reason that the constraints are important to 
the construction of a positive theory of investment. 
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Chapter 5 
Portfolio Selection 
Portfolio Selection lS concerned with choosing the specific securities to 
be purchased for an investor's portfolio. It involves the allocation of 
total capital into major categories of investment and then further allocation 
into specific investments. In other words given a set of assets to be 
considered for investment the questions to be asked are, what particular 
assets from this set should be selected for investment and, given this 
selection, what proportion of the money available should be allocated to 
each item. The anSWers depend upon the methods employed. The selection 
of shares implies the use of one or a number of rules (or techniques) to 
devise a portfolio with the requisite characteristics. 
which rule to use l is crucial. 
The choice of 
Concern here is with a particular institution and its methods of operation, 
and in consequence interest is centred on a subset of the possible rules. 
Other evidence suggests that the use of these or similar techniques lS 
widespread throughout the investment community, but it is important to note 
" that emphasis on particular rules differs both between individuals within 
the investment managers concerned and between different firms of investment 
managers. It is perhaps worth adding the perennial disclaimer. The 
discussion of these rules lS In no sense a normative prescription for the 
institution. The remit was simply to try to describe actual behaviour. 
Very broadly this chapter describes what is known as the office philosophy -
a bo~ of knowledge that governs In large part the institution's approach 
1. One may also-ask on what basis this choice is made. In general this 
question is glossed over. One can at best resort to the level of 
"experience reveals it to be a more successful technique than any 
other" which begs more questions than it answers. 
. 1 to lnvestment.- Specific parts of the philosophy are examined in turrl, In 
particular those aspects relating to diversification, liquidity, market-
ability, sector selection, time horizons, anchor stocks and capital gains. 
Attention is also paid to the fund managers' objectives. 
Despite the marked differences in turnover that are discernible between 
the unit and investment trust portfolios it is assumed throughout that 
the office philosophy is of general applicability and governs investment 
in all the managers' portfolios. The variation in turnover levels is 
ascribed to institutional factors rather than to differences in investment 
'1 2 phl osophy. 
Fund managers' Objectives 
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the office philosophy relates to 
the objectives of the fund manager. The fund manager must adopt 
investment goals similar to those of the investment managers as a whole 
if a uniform investment philoS)P4Y is to be applied. What are these 
goals likely to be? The usual assumption is that the investor takes 
into account the different features of the securities in which he may 
invest and then selects the best combination suitable for his purpose 
that will maximise his wealth~ - the rationale for so doing being that 
otherwise his capacity for achieving all nonspecific economic goals is 
1. The office philosophy is not a hard and fast body of rules to be applied 
regardless, but an acquired body of information that dictates within 
broad limits the scope of share transactions. The philosophy is 
intuitive to the fund managers acquired through experience and for this 
reason difficult to define. It is a body of knowledge compiled at 
the partner-fund manager level and used for both strategic and tactical 
decisions. The philosophy leaves much to the discretion of the fund 
manager and in consequence is a continually evolving philosophy with 
methods, procedures and emphasis between its different parts, constantly 
altering wlth changed circumstances. The aim of the chapter is to 
outline the main continuing strands of the philosophy important in 
portfolio selection. 
2. Differences in turnover are discussed subsequently under the section 
on time horizons. 
3. The investor will of course maximise his wealth subject to constraints 
such as risk over his lifetime or whatever other period he considers 
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needlessly sacrificed. However whilst true of the investor this is not 
true of the fund manager since it is not his wealth that is being sacrificed 
by failing to maximise its value (subject to constraints). He may well 
have less demanding objectives such as satisficing rather than maximising. l 
There seem to be two main possibilities. Firstly the fund manager might 
feel satisfied if he aChieved the prior or stated objectives for the 
fund, and secondly he might feel satisfied if he achieved certain relative 
objectives. These relative objectives might take a variety of forms such 
as above average appreciation relative to the market or out performing the 
index over some period, long or short. These two types of objectives do 
not necessarily conflict but do help to indicate the problem that faces 
the fund manager. Beating the market (particularly if it is falling) 
may not be particularly valuable if the fund's prior objectives are not 
being achieved, whilst meeting the prior objectives (because the market 
has gone up) but performing poorly relative to the market may be equally 
unattractive. His goal is likely to be a compromise with prior objectives 
being achieved and the fund performing reasonably well relative to the 
market and other similar portfolios. 2 How does this aim differ from the 
goals laid down by the office philosophy? The differences are small. 
Realistic goals for the fund manager are in general similar to realistic 
goals for the office as a whole. 
DiVersification 
Discussion of diversification within institutional portfolios involves 
consideration of both the virtues and the extent of diversification. With 
this in mind, this section considers the advantages of diversifYing before 
going on to review the rationale for holding between 50 and 100 securities 
1. For example picking the first security that meets certain requirements 
rather than choosing the best security. 
2. Over longer time horizons the two objectives are rarely incompatible. 
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In a portfolio. It seems possible that rather fewer securities are 
needed to secure the benefits of diversification than is indicated by 
the office PhilosoPhy.l 
Diversification involves the allocation of wealth among several securities. 
It lS necessar,y because the investment process occurs within an environment 
of uncertainty. The risk associated with an individual share may be 
considered as being of two types; the market risk that exists because of 
uncertainty about future economic and psychological factors that may 
affect expectations (e.g. uncertainty as to whether the market will go up 
or down tomorrow, or next year) and the financial risk that can be 
eliminated by diversification. 2 
Financial risk is the portion of each stock's Variability that lS unlque 
to itself (e.g. a serious strike unlque to the firm will adversely affect 
its share price). By holding a cominbation of assets this financial risk 
can be removed. Over time and between companies one might expect the 
good unexpected events to balance out with the bad. Market risk, In 
contrast, reflects events that affect almost all shares in some measure, 
and cannot be eliminated by diversification. 
It is use~ul to make the galns from diversification more explicit. It is 
easily shown that the expected return on a port~olio consisting of two 
securities is the weighted average of their expected returns, with the 
proportions invested in each used as weights. When the correlation 
between the returns on the two securities is less than one the portfolio 
1. It is of note that the institution considered itself to have fewer 
holdings in a port~olio on average than the majority o~ investment 
management firms. The o~~ice philosophy is in favour of large 
concentrated holdings rather than hundreds of small holdings. 
2. Market risk is sometimes termed the systematic risk and financial risk 
the unsystematic or residual risk. 
standard deviation (risk)l is less than the weighted average of ~~e 
standard deviations (risk) of both securities. 2 In other words so long 
as securities are not perfectly correlated risk may be reduced when 
securities are combined together into portfolios. This may be demonstrated 
more generally as follows {39 } 
Let an equal amount be. invested in each of K assets the returns of which 
are independent 
(i :f j ) . 
where X. 
1 = 
The 
2 
0 
P 
1 
K 
so that the covar1ances between as sets i and J = 0 
variance of return on the portfolio is then 
K 2 L X.2 1 2 = o. = L o. 1 1 K2 1 1 
1S the amount invested in each share and 0. 2 1S the 
1 
.th 
var1ance of the 1 share. If now, of all the assets in the market, the 
distribution of return on asset g 1 . 2 has the argest var1ance 0 g = M (where 
M is finite) then the variance on the portfolio return must satisfY 
1. Standard Deviation or Variance is used throughout this discussion as the 
measure of risk. Other measures than the dispersion of outcomes around 
their expected value could be used. A discussion of some of them (and 
their implied utility functions) is to be found in Markowitz {68}. In 
general in order to reconcile mean variance analysis with the expected 
utility model it is assumed either that the probability distribution of 
expected returns is normal or that an investors utility of wealth 
function is quadratiQ. (See for example H.A.J. Green {47}.) 
2. For example, denoting EpE~2,to represent the expected return on the 
portfolio, security one, and security two respectively, and Xl to 
represent the proportion of the portfolio invested in security one. 
Ep = XlEl + (1 - Xl )E2 
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Denoting 0 , 0 , 0 to represent the standard deviation on the portfolio, 
security oRe a~d s~curity two respectively, and P12 as t~e correlation 
coefficient between securities one and two, then portfol1o standard 
deviation 0 = (~ 0 2 + 2X (1 - X ) 0 0 P + (1 - X )2 0 2)~ 
If now P12 
0p = Xl 0 1 
P 1 1 1 1 1 2 12 1 2 
= 1 then 
+ (1 - Xl )02 whilst if P12 = -1 then 0 p = 
thus illustrating how portfolio variance may be lower than the weighted 
average of the standard deviations of both securities. 
a 
p 
2 
= 
M 
K 
This expression 1S smaller the larger the value of K. Increased 
diversification has the effect of making portfolio return more certain. 
Clearly assuming independent returns is unrealistic. Dropping this 
assumption portfolio variance with equal weighting is 
2 ~ ~ 1 a = X. X. a .. = ~ ~ a .. p 1 J 1J K2 . lJ 1 J 1 J 
1 ~ 2 1 = a. + ~ ~ a .. K2 . 1 K2 . lJ 1 1 J 
1 :1 J 
So long as the varlances of returns on individual assets have a finite 
upper bound, then as the number of assets in the portfolio is increased, 
the first sum approaches zero, 
so that a p 
2 
when K is large. 
= 
~ ~ a .. lJ 
1 J 
1 :f J 
Denoting a.. as the average covarlance this may be rewritten as lJ 
a p 
2 
tV K - 1 
= K 
a .. lJ 
K - 1 As K increases approaches 1 so that the var1ance of the distribution K 
of return on the portfolio approaches the average covarlance between the 
returns on the individual assets in the portfolio. Thus in a diversified 
portfolio the riskiness of an individual asset depends more on the co-
variability of the return on this asset with the returns on other assets 
than on the variance of the distribution on the return of the asset itself. l 
1. This demonstrates that a cominbation of individual risky stocks does 
not necessarily result in a high risk portfolio. 
Enough has been done to demonstrate the reason for diversification. There 
remains the question of how many securities are needed. A number of 
alternative approaches to this question are possible. One woula be to 
consider the above demonstration when returns were assumed independent and 
plot an approximation to this expression. l Another approach is empirical. 
F 1 E . {34} . d . .. or examp evans conSl ered the varlablllty of rate of return, over 
the period 1958 to 1967, of 2,400 portfolios chosen from 470 stocks. Each 
of the first 60 portfolios included only one security, the next 60 portfolios 
contained two securities and so on. For each group of 60 portfolios the 
average value of the standard deviation of the rate of return was calculated 
to provide an estimate of the variability of rate of return for a typical 
portfolio of comparable diversification. A typical portfolio with equal 
amounts in each~$ shares was found to have only 14% more risk (standard 
deviation) than the most highly diVersified portfolio imaginable. A 
typical portfolio with equal amounts in 10 securities had only 7% more risk 
than the minimum possible~ while a portfolio with equal amounts in 20 
securities had only 3% more than the minimum. To illustrate this IDlnlmUID 
possible and indicate in another way the possibilities for diversification 
one may assume that the return on a security is related to the level of an 
important index (such as the F.T. Actuaries),2 
that is R. = a. + b. I + c. l l l l 
where R. 
l 
= return on security i and I is the level of the index 
a., b. are constants, cl' is the error term. l l 
(c.c.) 0 . :f . (c.l) = o. E( c. ) = 0 cOV. = l J cOV. l l J l 
( c. ) 2 Var = 0 
l C. 
l 
50 
1. The approximation is 1. The function moves toward 0 more and more slowly 
as K is increased. ~y the time about 20 secur~ti~s are held little 
more diversification is achieved as the number lS lncreased. 
2. The index or diagonal model was first suggested by Sharpe ln {83} . 
Portfolio risk is then 1 
2 b 2 2 2 2 0 = or + L: X. 0 where b P P 1 c. P 1 1 
If now an e~ual amount is invested 1n K securities X. 
1 
due to the un1que characteristics of the securities is 
(i) 2 ~ 2 ° c. 
1 
= L: x. b. 1 1 
= 
1 
K ' the risk 
where the last term represents the average value of the unsystematic risk 
for the K securities included in a portfolio. Then for the portfolio as 
a whole the total unsystematic risk is simply l/Kth of this quantity. 
The unsystematic risk is likely to be so small a proportion of the total 
portfolio risk that it may reasonably be ignored. Hence for well 
diversified portfolios 
° p 
2 
'V b 
P = 
2 
The importance of this argument 1S that as noted above, while diversification 
can reduce the residual or financial risk, the risk due to movements of 
the market as a whole remains and cannot be diversified away. Both the 
advantages and the extent of diversification have now been considered. 
It has been shown that diversification serves a useful function by enabling 
the fund manager to eliminate most of the unsystematic or financial risk 
of securities from a portfolio. Furthermore about tWenty securities is 
probably sufficient for this purpose (provided they are not perfectly 
correlated) . Why then did the institution investigated have 50 or more 
1. Return on a portfolio R = L: X. R. 
P 1 1 1 
= L: x. a. + (L:X. b. ) I 1 1 1 1 
Let L: X. b. = b then R = L: X. a. + b I + L: 
1 1 P P 1 1 P 
The varlance of a portfolio = L: L: X. X. 0 .. 
1 J 1J 2 
In this case the covariances are zero hence 0p 
Now ~2 = E(a. + b.I + c. - E(a. + b.I + c. ))2 Vi 1 1 1 1 1 1 
= 222 
b. °1 + ° 1 c. 
1 
+ L:X. c. 
X. 1 
= 
1 1 
c. 1 
L:X.20. 2 
1 1 
2 '\' V 2 (h _ 2 Ii 2 + ~ 2, = h 2 ~ 2 + J'Y 20 2 
. 
stocks 1n each of its portfolios? The cause is at least partly in3titut-
ional. Government restrictions tend to limit individual holdings when 
purchased to less than 5% of a total portfolio. l Marketability (discussed 
later) and restrictive trust deeds are advanced as other causes whilst a 
further possibility is a general failure to appreciate how few shares are 
needed to secure diversification. 2 
In conclusion it is perhaps appropriate to ask whether fund managers 
select investments at all with reference to their effect on portfolio 
risk, or whether selection decisions are made simply on a share by share 
basis. Is diVersification achieved simply by investing in large numbers 
of securities without explicit consideration of the inter-relationships 
between them? The answer is not obvious. It seems that some sort of 
balance is often desired between sectors and to this extent the portfolio 
as a whole 1S considered. Risk is considered at least implicitly in the 
analysis of sector balance, but little attention is likely to be paid to 
the relationships between individual securities. It is difficult to 
distinguish the accidental diVersification that occurs from investing in 
large numbers of securities from the reasoned diversification due to 
sector selection. 
Liguidity 
Some evidence on fund liquidity is provided in the accompany1ng graphs 
where A is a very large, well established fund (figure 5.1) and B is a 
fast growing fund (figure 5.2).3 The graphs illustrate the percentage 
1. This is not true of all portfolios. 
higher proportion of the portfolio. 
In some cases it 1S a considerably 
2. Discussion of the difference in number of portfolio holdings between 
portfolio theory and institutional portfolios is to be found 1n a 
recent paper by Mason {69}. 
3. B is discussed in appendix 3, New Portfolio Construction. 
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of the total value of the funds comprised by cash. l In general l:.tle 
managers' philosophy is to be as fully invested as possible even though 
this may involve the purchase of securities that are not quite optimal. 
In this section it is intended to discuss some of the reasons advanced by 
the managers for this emphasis on full investment and then to consider . , 
"Ltle 
implications of liquidity and gearing in terms of normative portfolio theory. 
The liquidation of a portfolio is one of the classic defences to a bear 
2 
rrarket. Consider for example a unit trust going 100% liquid. In a 
falling equity market the fund stands to outperform its competitors 
although in terms of growth prospects it offers little. Few unit holders 
are likely to be drawn into investment with such a prospect so that there 
are few marketing advantages in going liquid. The gains even if the 
managers judgment of a bear market is right are few. However if his 
expectations are ill-founded and the market continues to rise, the fund 
that has gone liquid will fail to register sUbstantial gains in market 
value and is unlikely to attract substantial new funds into it. ThlJ.~; if 
there is an equal chance of a rise or a fall in the market it is likely 
that the damage done by going liquid may far exceed the possible galns. 
For such reasons fund managers tend to be reluctant to carry substanti~l 
amounts of liquid assets in their portfolios. Low liquidity migh"c be 
seen as a means of adjusting for uncertainty. 
1. The substantial variability of the percentage of cash held by fund B 
mainly indicates the considerable inflows of funds that arise from block 
offers and to a lesser extent the continuous offering of units. As 
regards Fund A three influences would seem to have been at work affecting 
liquidity the inflows of new money, deliberate policy on the part of 
the fund ~anagers to keep liquidity at or around a certain level (which 
changes with circumstances) and the fluctuations in sales and purchases 
which are unlikely to exactly correspond in both amount and timing. The 
inflows of new money were particularly important until early 1970, whilst 
in the bear market of 1970 more attention than previously was devoted 
to maintaining a certain degree of liquidity. 
2. The other classic defence is to shift the portfolio into stocks with 
defensive qualities or to buy gilts. 
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In general then the fund manager actively tries to avoid high liquidity 
in most conditions. High liquidity does occur at times for the smaller 
funds when advertising is heavy and appropriations large but the policy 
is usually to reduce this as rapidly as possible. On this basis one might 
distinguish between temporary liquidity in a fund, owing to transactions 
and the inflow of funds, and liquidity aq a means of avoiding an expected 
fall in share values. Both tend to be minimal. The question arises as 
to whether the cash position of the fund is managed at all? Observation 
would tend to indicate that it is a residual and that little management 
takes place. In most market conditions little attempt is made to keep 
a substantial liquidity balance to meet net redemptions. Redemptions 
have generally been light and little attention has been paid to the 
;"1"" 
problem ln the office under study. 
It is interesting to contrast this emphasis on low liquidity with the 
predictions of portfolio theory. The discussion of diversification has 
shown the possibilities of combining securities to form portfolios with 
varying combinations of risk and return. For obvious reasons interest 
is generally centred on the members of the set of portfolios that are 
efficient where an efficient portfolio has either more return than any 
other investment of the same risk, or less risk than any other security 
with the same return. The problem becomes one of delineating the efficient 
frontier of portfolios in risk-return space. A number of solution methods 
are possible. One of the simplest is to use lagrangean multipliers l to 
1. This is termed the Basic problem by Sharpe' {86}. It is differentiated 
from the Standard problem by its absence of inequality constraints. In 
general portfolio analysis problems involve inequality constraints that 
prevent more than a certain amount being invested in anyone share (but 
not usually in cash or Government bonds) and rule out negative holdings. 
The Separation Theorem described below will not always hold for the 
Standard problem. Constraints must not prevent the mlnlmum variance 
portfolio from being composed simplY of the riskless asset. 
. . . 
mlnlIDlze -AE + ° 2 
P P 
for all possible values of A > ° subject to EX. = 1 
l 
where E is the expected return on the portfolio and 02 lS its varlance. p p 
Having generated the efficient frontier for all values of A (A describes 
the investor's attitude regarding expected return vis ~ vis variance of 
return) it is possible to introduce borrowing or lending into the model. 
The investor is assumed to borrow or lend at the pure interest rate by 
investment in a riskless security (such as cash or Government bonds). 
Combining a riskless security with risky portfolio gives expected return/ 
standard deviation of return values lying along a straight line. l The 
straight line with the greatest slope now forms the efficient frontier. 
1. Let E be the riskless security's expected return with 1 2 
°1 = 0, 
Theh 
E p 
° p 
. 
l.e. ° p 
E2 
= 
2 
= 
= 
be the risky security with variance 02 2 
XIEI + (1 - Xl) E2 
2 
Xl °1 
2 
+ (1 2 
- Xl) °2 2 + 2Xl (1 - Xl)P120102 
(1 
dE 
The slope of this frontier lS -12. dXl 
dXl 
do = 
dE 
---12-
do 
P P 
E2 - E 
= 1 
°2 
varlance 
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= EM' i.e. it is the expected value of the market portfolio, 
. E - R 
and if El is replaced by R, to glve M one has the slope of 
OM 
the Capital Market line which summarizes in equilibrium the relationship 
between expected return and risk for efficient portfolios. 
A diagram (fig. 5.3) may make the analysis clearer . 
Figure 5.3 
, /' 
v" 
I 
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RM represents the efficient frontier when borrowing or lending at the 
riskless rate R is allowed. l M is the optimal combination of securities 
or under certain assumptions 2 the market portfolio. 
...... ~. 
---......., -- . ---
Faced with this 
situation the investor need only decide how much to borrow or lend. 
There is but one appropriate combination of risky securities in which to 
invest the remainder of his funds. The consideration of alternative 
1. Note that if borrowing or lending at the riskless rate R was combined 
, with the portfolio P then the line RP would be dominated by RM. 
Hence it would not be the efficient frontier. 
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2. Capital market theory assumes that all investors are Markowitz efficient 
diversifiers who delineate and seek to attain the efficient frontier. 
The market for investment assets is assumed to be perfect in the sense 
that all go'ods and assets are infinitely divisible; any information is 
costless and available to everyboqy; there are no transactions costs or 
taxes; and so on - i.e. investors are assumed to be price takers in 
frictionless markets. In addition any amount of money can be borrowed 
or lent at the risk-free rate of interest. Finally it is assumed that 
all investors visualize identical probabil'ity distributions for future 
rates of return - i.e. homogeneous expectations. Note that if the 
assumption of homogeneous expectations is dropped M is simply an 
optimal combination of securities. Each individual will face his own 
capi tal market line rather than the s arne capital market line. The 
separation theor~ will still hold. 
combinations of risky securities can thus be separated from the investor I s 
1 attitude toward uncertainty relative to expected return. 
Interesting implications for fund management follow from this theory. 
Two interp~etations are possible. The first sees fund managers as 
providing the investor with the market portfolio (assuming homogeneous 
expectations) or more realistically perhaps (not assuming homogeneous 
expectations) as providing the investor, given his own particular prefer-
ences summarized as broad general preferences such as growth, with his 
optimal combination of securities which may be combined by the individual 
investor with borrowing or lending. 
The second interpretation sees fund management as providing investors 
with a particular amount of risk. This degree of risk is attained by 
combining the market portfolio with borrowing or lending. It might be 
argued that this second interpretation is much more realistic since it 18 
difficult for the fund managers to know a particular investor's optimal 
combination of securities, whilst also borrowing and lending is often 
very difficult for the individual and much easier for the institution. 2 
1. This result is termed the separation,theorem and is due to Tobin {96}. 
It may be demonstrated as follows {86}. The solution to the Basic 
problem is of the form X. = K. + k.A where K. and k. are constants, A 
1 1 1 1 1 
is as defined above andX. is the proportion invested in asset i. Now 
if X is a riskless asset land there ar~ no constraints preventing inve~tment solely in the riskless asset the solution may be simplified 
i.e.,.X. =.k.A i:f I (Xl = 1 + kIA). Now the portion of the portfolio 
at rlsi wlli be n . n 
LX. = AL k. 
j=2 J j=2 J 
The proportion of such funds invested . security . will be In 1. 
X. k.A k. 
1 1 1 
= = 
n n n 
L: X. AL: k. L:k . 
j=2 J j=2 J j=2J 
59 
which is unrelated to A, the investors attitude to risk relative to return. 
2. Whether or not unit trusts can borrow is a subject of some controversy. 
Certainly investment trusts can. In practice at least unit trusts do 
not borrow. 
" 
Two points are worth noting a propos the assumptions of the theory. 
The first concerns borrowing and lending at the pure rate of interest. 
It might reasonably be asked whether borrowing in particular is possible 
at the pure rate of interest. Tf it is impossible, then instead of a 
linear capital market line, one would expect a capital market curve which 
was linear over some ranges perhaps but became flatter as risk increased. 
I In this case the separation theorem no longer holds. The second point 
concerns transactions costs. In the presence of transactions costs a 
portfolio of relatively few securities (which the demonstration of 
diVersification shows is all that is needed) may perform better than the 
market portfolio (assuming homogeneous expectations) so that the buying 
of relatively small numbers of securities by fund managers is perhaps 
rather more sensible than would appear at first sight. 
A large number of other criticisms2 of the theory are possible. Interest 
however lies in its implications. The theory suggests that investors 
need only combine the market portfolio with borrowing or lending to secure 
their desired amoUnt of risk. This is in marked contrast to the ideas 
of most fund managers who combine particular stocks into portfolios in an 
endeavour to secure more or less risky portfolios. Given that it is the 
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1. Black {6} investigated the market equilibrium under the assumption that 
there is no riskless asset. His results together with those of Vasicek 
{IOj would seem to indicate that the capital asset pricing model 
described above may be considerably generalised. The implications of the 
generalised model are likely to be similar to those of the more specific 
model for most institutional investors, i.e. the holding of the 
riskless asset and a portfolio of equity stocks although this portfolio 
should be of low to medium risk. (see vasicek & McQuown {104 }). 
2. The majority of criticisms have been of the Markowitz model. Briefly 
the criticisms have been firstly the use of the standard deviation as 
a measure of risk and the treatment of subjective probability estimates 
as though they were obj ecti ve (the Bayes ian approach). Secondly the 
input problem may be cited. Apart from the huge number of covariances 
necessary, random walk investigations show that it is extremely difficult 
to predict future price changes. (In fact this would seem to be an 
argument in favour of buying the market portfolio and using borrowing 
or lending to secure one's optimal risk position.) Thirdly one may 
note the computational costs involved and fourthly the single period 
nature of most of the solutions. Dynamic and multi period solutions 
have not yet been applied much. 
covar1ances between securities that are in general important in determining 
portfolio risk and given the huge number of covariances involvedl it is 
possible that traditional methods of portfolio selection are less than 
optimal. 
Before leaving the question of liquidity it is worthwhile considering 
the question of gearing and its effect on investment trusts. The impact 
of gearing is· to increase the variability of portfolio returns. Depending 
on the cost of fixed interest debt and the rise or fall in the market it 
can substantially increase (or decrease) portfolio returns. Increases 
1n gearing rely on issues of capital. These are infrequent and likely to 
be dependent on their cost (in interest terms) and market prospects. An 
increase in gearing is generally a decision taken at the highest level 
after much consideration. Decreases in gearing are likely to come much more 
within the everyday investment decision and can be achieved simply by 
buying fixed interest stock. In this sense gearing is also available to 
the unit trust. Fund managers do not tend to look upon buying fixed 
interest stock as a gear1ng decision. The argument for buying fixed 
interest stock 1S much more likely to be that it offers a higher return 
(both dividends and capital gain) than equities, rather than as a method 
of reducing variability in the portfolio. In general. the office invested 
little in bonds and fixed interest stocks. It 1S an option open to the 
managers but an option that is little exercised. 
1. However, as an earlier discussion has illustrated, it is possible and 
indeed desirable to simplify the portfolio selection problem by use of 
the diagonal or index model which relates return on a security to the 
market return. Similarly it is typical of analysts to relate security 
returns not to other securities but to the market return, i.e. analysts 
simplifY the problem in much the same way as has been suggested for 
mathematical portfolio selection procedures. 
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Marketabili ty 
.., 
It is common to distinguish two hypotheses 1n discussion about marketability.~ 
The first, the pr1ce pressure hYPothesis 2 , argues that whilst one can buy 
and sell small <luanti ties of stock at approximately- the market pri ce, when 
the Slze of the transaction is large relative to these small purchases or 
sales, then the price of the stock must fall to induce investors to purchase 
d · . 3 these ad 1t1onal shares. This inducement results from an increase in the 
quantity of shares that must be held by other market participants. If 
the excess demand curve for shares is downward sloping, the additional 
shares will only be held at lower prices. In conse<luence purchasers 
buying shares at these lower prices are rewarded with extra profit. The 
second hypothesis! that of substitution! argues that the market for a 
security must be defined in a broader content than the security itself 
or its particular industry group1ng. Most securities are close SUbstitutes 
for each other with pr1ces such that the expected rates of return on assets 
of similar risk are e<lual. If any security should be selling to yield 
a higher expected return due simply to large purchases or sales then 
1. 
2. 
3. 
/ 
Marketability is taken to mean the ability to realise a security's 
value in money or alternatively to convert money into one particular 
security. The marketability problem involves both the length of 
time necessary to dispose of a holding and the cost of so doing where 
the cost is defined to include the difference between the ruling price 
for a share and the price actually received for a large holding. 
Marketability is used here interchangeably with liquidity. Moneta~J 
theorists frequently see liquidity as two dimensional (1) a time 
dimension for the expected ability to exchange out of the particular 
asset and into cash (2) a value dimension showing the extent to which 
the asset is expected to maintain its value when exchanged for cash. 
(1) is frequently termed marketability by the theorists but in the 
terminology adopted here both (1) and (2) constitute marketability. 
See Scholes {81}. 
As an expositional convenience it is probably best to view the market 
for any company's 'c;hares as being in two parts. The large block share 
transactions, generally between institutions with very few buyers and 
sellers and the normal small transaction market with a considerably 
number of buyers and sellers at least for reasonably large companies. 
Interdependence between the two parts of the market exist in the form 
of jobbers. They provide the machinery for connecting the different 
parts of the market - matching small sales and purchases and adjusting 
prices according to how much stock is on offer. Whilst unable to absorb 
a large block of stock immediately they may well buy and dispose of 
such a block 1n smaller parcels. 
- -- -->- --it . ''''" 
investors would soon arbitrage the extra profit away. The sUbstituticn 
hypothesis implies that the inducement necessary to sell large quantities 
of stock should be close to zero. 
In general the institutions seem to favour the former hypothesis. 
They argue that two alternatives face the large fundI - either restriction 
to an unmanageably large list of small holdings In both good and in'-
efficient companies, but which can be sold easily, or restriction to a 
short list of relatively unmarketable holdings. 2 An empirical study by 
{81} 
Scholes however supports the sUbstitution hypothesis. Scholes 
derives testable hypotheses by relating the price pressure and substitution 
arguments to the efficient market model. He argues that the sale of 
shares takes place for a number of reasons. One such reason is that 
the investor feels he possesses adverse information about the company's 
prospects. There are SUbstantial costs to acquiring information of 
value so that one would suspect that the sellers of a large block of 
stock possess more information of value than sellers of small quantities 
of stock. Hence one might expect small transactions to be effected at 
very little information discount from the previollli transaction, whilst 
large transactions may only be sold at a lower price to reflect the 
expected value of information in these transactions. The information 
hypothesis states then that when a large block of stock lS sold in the 
1. The problem for the small fund is not so crucial. In general the 
managers are able to switch between stocks easily and quickly. 
2. It is worthwhile asking whether it is important that shares should be 
marketable. Studies of turnover indicate that in general there is 
little reason to expect high turnover to be linked to high performance 
and that whilst there is a mechanical strategy that produces better 
returns than a buy and hold strategy the amount of turnover required 
for this is likely to be small. In fact, since the strategy in 
question is a reallocation strategy, it involves selling marginal 
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amounts of stock rather than the large blocksof stock which are generally 
meant when discussing marketability. Again discussion of the separation 
theorem (although of course this was developed in a single period 
framework) emphasized the strategy of buying the market, which again 
would seem to imply low turnover. 
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market one would expect to see a downward price adjustment in the pr1ce 
of the stock. This fall is the expected value of information contained 
in large block transactions and is a permanent fall not simply an inducement 
as the price pressure hypothesis suggests. Casual observation of trading 
in markets has led the price pressure adherents to conclude that the pr1ce 
adjustments are due to downward sloping demand curves for shares and not 
to a change in the equilibrium value of the firm. The efficient market 
model implies that the value of information in transactions is much 
smaller than the price effects suggested by the price pressure hypothesis. 
To test the hypotheses Scholes investigated the U.S. Secondary Market for 
common stock in order to isolate the effects due to size of offering from 
other factors influencing price. After adjusting for a stock's reaction 
to market movements he found that secondary distributionsl were typically 
associated with a modest fall in price (2.2%, mainly concentrated on the 
day of sale and the five succeeding days). A variety of methods we~e 
then employed to isolate the effect on pr1ce of the size of the distribution 
but in general the results were negative. The pr1ce decline was no greater 
when 35% of the firm was sold than when the proportion was less than 1%. 
It would seem from Scholes' evidence that the price reaction associated 
with a secondary offering is not simply a consequence of the additional 
supply of stock. The impact of large block sales does not seem to depend 
on how large the block 1S but on how much information it conveys. The 
evidence would seem to be inconsistent with the pr1ce pressure hypothesis. 
Analysis of effective commission paid supported this conclusion. 
Scholes also tested the information SUbstitution hypothesis more directly. 
He examined the performance of the secondaries by vendor arguing that the 
likelihood of a sale containing adverse information is very different among 
1. Secondary distributions are large block sales of stock initiated not by 
the company (as in a primary distribution) but by one or more shareholders 
to whom the proceeds accrue. 
the five ma1n vendor groups. At one extreme are the corporation's 
officers (due to the possibilities of insider knowledge) and at the other 
estates and trusts, individuals, insurance companies and other such 
institutuions. The results supported the information substitution 
hypothesis. On average the stocks sold by individuals and trusts did 
not perform particularly badly subsequent to their sale. In contrast 
corporate insider's sales were generally followed by prolonged price declines. l 
Accepting Scholes' conclusions as being representative of all reasonably 
large companies and of the U.K. as well as the U.S. market implies that 
the problem of marketability is seriously over-rated. On Scholes' 
evidence it 1S unlikely that the demand for marketable holdings conflicts 
with other demands for portfolios containing a small number of holdings. 
The price effect resulting from a sale of a large block appears to be 
substantially less than is generally believed or accepted and certainly 
unlikely to be enough to deter sales by an institution. One question 
however does rema1n relating to the sample from which the conclusions 
were drawn. It 1S possible that the only large blocks of stock that are 
offered for sale (in one block) are those which the fund manager feels he 
can sell without much difficulty and without too much loss in price. It 
might be that Scholes' sample only included marketable stocks. 
If one rejects Scholes' evidence and continues to accept the pr1ce pressure 
hypothesis then the institution has a twofold problem. It must decide 
what constitutes a reasonable degree of marketability (time traded off 
against cost) and then must choose assets with these properties. The 
question arises as to what are the properties that confer marketability? 
One possibility 1S to list all the properties assumed for a perfectly 
1. In general the vendor is not officially known on the day of the 
distribution. However Scholes argues that some information as to the 
vendor and the cause of the sale leaks to the market. 
66 
competitive market - a large number of buyers and sellers no one of whom 
buys or sells more than a very small fraction of the total, identical 
products in exchange, complete information about all transactions available 
to both buyers and sellers and the only criterion for a transaction being 
that no better bargain is available elsewhere (no buyer loyalty to sellt.r":) -
and to use these as criterion for marketability. {91} No measure appears 
to exist as to what constitutes a reasonable degree of marketability. 
Subjective judgment has to be applied to determine those stocks that are 
or are not marketable and in what quantities. Some attempt has been made 
ln the U.S. to measure a stock's marketability by calculating the dollar 
transactions for the week (volume times price, summed), and dividing 
{6l } this total by the percentage change in prlce ove~ the week. A large 
amount of transactions (by value) in a stock for each percentage point 
of change is then taken as an indication of a stock's marketability. 
No evidence was given as to the stability of the ratio from week to week 
or OVer longer periods. One would suspect that it would not be a very 
reliable indicator. The number of large blocks traded in a given period 
might be a more useful indicator of the institutional marketability 
being considered here. Some research has also been carried out into the 
II "1" II {l, 66 } u.S. Government Bils market on its depth, breadth and reSl lency 
but studies on measures of marketability remaln rare. 
{ 2 3} "" t " t d th t Recently Copeman's study of London lnstltu lons sugges e a a 
considerable number of institutions and stockbrokers do try to measure 
marketability. Most of them considered market capitalisation a meaningful 
proxy for marketability although they also took into account any percentage 
of the total equity which was deemed to be 'tightly' held. 
The conclusions that may be drawn from this discussion of marketability are 
mixed. On the one hand there are the practitioners who feel that market-
ability is an important quality in a share although measurement and 
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quantification is difficult. On the other hand a comprehensive study of 
large block transactions indicates that the price effects of such transactions 
are relatively small. It is possible that marketability lS less of a 
problem than is currently thought. 
Sector Selectionl 
The selection of shares by their sector or industry characteristics is 
considered by the investment managers to be a technique crucial to their 
methods of investing. It involves the buying of some sectors in preference 
to others. For example the faster growlng sectors may be considered 
preferable to the slower growing sectors so that investment is orientated 
to the former rather than the latter. The weighting of the portfolio 
this selection procedure produces is compared at frequent intervals with 
the weights for the F.T. Actuaries Index so that an overall view of the 
divergence between the portfolio and index distributions may be gained and 
appropriate adjustments carried out. Much of the sector selection is 
carried out at a very aggregate level with for example consumer durables 
being compared to capital goods. Some comparison also takes place within 
these aggregates; for example within consumer durables, household and 
electronics may be preferred to less obvious growth sectors. 
Two questions arlse from this discussion - how are sector decisions reached, 
and how much attention is paid to these decisions in the portfolio selection 
process? In part explanation of how sector decisions are reached may be 
answered by consideration of the objectives and needs of the fund. Thus 
for example a high yield fund may have little choice of sector. In the 
main however the choice of sectors is the result of judgments about economlC 
factors and other information that comes to the knowledge of the fund 
1. Further discussion of sector selection lS to be found In part II. 
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managers. The second question is more difficult to answer. Observation 
does not yield a clear-cut answer. Examination of a new portfolio reveals 
divergence between the planned portfolio and the actual portfolio (see 
appendix 3: New Portfolio Construction) but with the broad outlines being 
maintained. Conclusions for established portfolios are much less easy. 
Time Horizons 
Earlier in the chapter mention has been made of the sUbstantial difference 
in turnover and hence time horizons, between the unit and investment trust 
portfolios. Some obserVers within the industry see this difference as 
being due to the different orientation of the portfolios - the market 
orientation of the unit trusts with holdings and purchases on a short term 
basis (one to two years) contrasting with the more fundamental viewpoint 
of the investment trusts concerned not so much with correct timing and the 
latest pelce of news, but more with the long term (five years) trend of 
earnings and prospects within a particular area for growth. 
Overall one might summarlse the essential differences between the two 
types of portfolios as being due to risk and turnover. The unit trusts 
might be seen as high risk, high turnover portfolios and the investment 
trusts as the reverse - low risk, low turnover portfolios. The question 
then arises as to how these differences have come about. The justification 
for the higher risk of the unit trusts seems to involve a variety of 
factors. The recent growth of the trusts has resulted in an influx of 
young aggressive fund managers in comparison to the older managers of the 
investment trusts who have perhaps less flexibility or desire to innovate. 
Size may also be a contributory factor. The relatively small size of many 
1. A justification for sector selection may be made in terms of portfolio 
theory. King's {53} analysis indicated that the industry clusters in 
his study were negatively correlated. Investment in such clusters 
was therefore likely to confer substantial diversification with little 
computing or detailed analysis of covariances. 
unit trusts in comparlson to the much larger established portfolios of the 
investment trusts may make it easier for unit trust managers to construct 
higher risk portfolios. They are less constrained to invest in the large 
stable companies and may take positions in small very risky stocks. l 
Consider now the differences in turnover. A number of explanations may 
be advanced. One possible cause is the effect of tax regulations on 
investment trusts. These undoubtedly limited turnover in the past. 
Another cause is perhaps the capital structure of the investment trusts. 
Once their capital has been subscribed for the managers do not need to 
consider their shareholders overmuch. Certain safeguards are provided 
for, but In general, if a shareholder is dissatisfied he cannot compel 
liquidation of the company but can only sell his shares to whoever will 
buy them. In contrast a unit trust must always maintain some sort of 
liquidity margin to meet the possibilities of redemption. The unitholder 
if he is dissatisfied can always cash in his units. The unit trust may 
feel therefore that they are in no position to invest totally for the 
future. Private companies are unsuitable since the shares cannot be 
easily liquidated. Redemptions however are not in general heavy. It lS 
probably easy to over-emphasize this fear of illiquidity. 
1. Whilst there is some truth in the arguments advanced above, on a number 
of counts they are less than satisfactory. The discussion of diversifi-
cation for example has indicated that a combination of individual risky 
stocks does not necessarily result in a high risk portfolio. The 
important factor is not in general the riskiness of stocks in a portfolio 
but their covariance or correlation together. A second point involves 
the separation theorem. Under very specific assumptions it has been 
shown that the consideration of alternative combinations of risky 
securities can be separated from the investor's attitude toward uncertainty 
relative to expected return. The portfolio problem changes from being 
one of choosing an efficient portfolio to one of deciding how much cash 
to borrow or lend in combination with the best securities portfolio. 
Hence one might not so much expect a difference in the portfolios of 
equity securities held by the different trusts as in the extent of 
liquidity and gearing. It is here that a paradox occurs since the unit 
trusts are seldom geared and yet are said to be more risky than the 
investment trusts which are often substantially geared. 
Perhaps the most likely cause of the difference in turnover is the linking 
of the idea of performance with turnover in the minds of many unit trust 
managers. It is worth exploring this idea in more detail. One approach 
is to look at empirical evidence and see whether any studies to date have 
indicated that performance has been helped by high turnover. The 
- . 
evidence is less than convincing. Studies by Sharpe {85} and Jensen {50 } 
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for example found that on average mutual funds did no better before expenses 
and considerably worse after expenses than market based portfolios of 
comparable volatility, whilst few funds consistently performed better than 
market based portfolios of comparable volatility. Most funds appeared to 
have spent too much money searching for mispriced securities. Expenses in 
fact did not include brokerage fees, so that the funds might have performed 
considerably better before all expenses than market based portfOlios. l 
However it is the net returns that are of interest since for turnover to 
2 be beneficial it must produce higher net returns than buying the market 
and holding. 3 
Apart from considering the problem empirically one may also ask whether on 
theoretical grounds one might expect a link between performance and turnover. 
1. The recent Institutional Investor study reported in Masonffi9 } indicates 
that at best turnover is unrelated to performance and at worse is inversely 
related to performance. 
2. Investing in a portfolio with similar characteristics to the market as 
a whole. 
3. Interestingly in fact Evans· {35} has shown that a buy and hold strategy 
is an adequate standard of comparison only when applied to securities. 
He shows that a mechanical trading rule - the fixed investment proportion 
maintenance strategy - when applied to portfolios of securities consistently 
lea&to significantly greater expected returns than those produced by the 
naive buy and hold strategy even after allowing for transactions costs. 
The essence of the strategy is that at the end of each sub period the 
investor reallocates the investment bundle such that the same proportion 
of the investment bundle is maintained in each security as was originally 
allocated to it. 
Hence a priori one might expect some turnover (that necessary for re-
allocation) to produce greater returns than a buy and hold stragegy. 
Note however that investment in a market index is equivalent to a re-
allocation strategy under some circumstances (see later chapter.) whilst 
the amount of turnover necessary for following this strategy is likely 
to be fairly small. 
Earlier chapters have drawn attention to the efficient market hTPothesis 
which indicates that an investor can expect neither more nor less than 
a fair reward for the risks involved. On this basis one would not expect 
unit trusts on average to be able to secure performance substantially 
better than the market irrespective of their level of turnover. 
Overall there is little reason to expect high turnover to be linked to 
1 high performance. It seems that one must look elsewhere for an 
explanation as to why unit trusts have higher turnover than investment 
trusts. Tax, capital structure and the relative size ·difference between 
the unit and investment trust portfolios would seem likely to be the main 
explanations. Differences in portfolio composition, notably the large 
N. American holdings (with a penalty on sales due to the dollar premium 
surrender - see appendix 4: Capital Gains Tax),- may be another contrib-
utory factor. 
A further facet of the turnover question that is worth pursUlng is the 
emphasis of the office philosophy on long term time horizons. Despite 
the relatively short holding periods of most of the securities held in 
unit trust portfolios, the managers claimed that the stocks were selected 
on the basis of their long term prospects - perhaps five years or more. 
One way of considering this claim is to consider what is meant by long 
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term prospects. It is unlikely that the managers mean by this the selection 
1. If the investor feels he has some ability to analyse individual stocks 
he may prefer not to diversify his portfolio perfectly. He may be able 
to profit from a lack of diversification. Treynor and Black {98} show 
under certain assumptions that such an investor's holdings should 
consist of some risk free investment, some investment in a 'market' 
portfolio (i.e. a portfolio that is perfectly diversified and moves with 
the market) and some investment in an 'active' non diversified portfolio. 
In this situation high turnover may provide above average returns. The 
lack of empirical evidence that some investors can predict successfully 
or o~ consistency in portfolio performance however makes this 
justification of turnover rather less than likely .. The Treynor and 
Black article is discussed in more detail in a later chapter. 
of a share or industry that should perform very well sometime 1n the 
future. High performance five years from now 1S unlikely to appeal to 
either the directors or the unitholders. More probably, the requirement 
of the office philosophy for share selection on the basis of longer term 
prospects is intended to emphasise the desirability of selecting consistent 
good performers over the longer term rather than outstanding performers 
over very short periods. The philosophy does not require that investments 
should be held for five years but simply that .they should be bought with 
long term horizons in mind. This aspect of the office philosophy accords 
with the majority of empirical evidence to date. The efficient market 
hypothesis leads one to conclude that it is unlikely that the investor can 
outperform the market and that in consequence the optimal strategy is to 
keep turnover low with only marginal adjustments to investment holdings, 
and hence long holding periods. 
Anchor Stocks 
An aspect of the office philosophy not considered as yet is the division 
of the portfolio into long term investment and trading sections. Whilst 
somewhat at variance with the demand for long term investment one might 
characterise some of the portfolios as containing stocks bought for 
trading purposes as well as stocks bought with a longer horizon in view. 
The latter stocks are termed anchor stocks - securities which fulfil the 
main conditions for a portfolio and have a proven record of success. The 
requirement for these stocks is based on the argument that it is difficult 
to turn round a portfolio quickly. The anchor stocks act as a support 
for the portfolio providing 1ncome if income is required or growth if 
that is the objective. 
How reasonable is this concept of anchor stocks? Two main arguments have 
arisen from the portfolio theory discussed so far. The first is that 
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there is no need for any portfolio to be invested in stocks other than 
those compr1slng the market portfolio along with investment in the riskless 
1 
asset. The second is that there is no particular benefit from extensive 
turnover. Applying these two principles one might define an anchor stock 
as one which when combined with others performs 1n a manner similar to the 
market, and in the main is bought and held with only marginal sales and 
purchases over time. Clearly there is conflict with the 'institutional' 
definition given above but it is interesting that when considered in the 
light of portfolio theory the concept need not disappear altogether. It 
is also interesting to note that examination of portfolios does not reveal 
obvious anchor stocks. The problem is that ex post any stock that has 
been held for a number of years is declared to be an anchor stock although 
the reasons for buying it may have been completely different from those 
needed for it to qualify as an anchor stock. Overall the concept of 
anchor stock is not a particularly useful one. 2 
Capital Gains Tax 
Until now little mention has been made of the effect of capital ga1ns tax 
on decision making. In general the investment managers pay little or 
no attention to calculations of the amount of appreciation or depreciation 
in share price required for profitable switching between shares. Profit 
taking 1S however induced by the managers' knowledge of the existence of 
allowable losses for tax purposes. 
1. vide the separation theorem (assuming homogeneous expectations).; 
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2. If one assumes that the managers were able to predict successfully then 
following Treynor & Black one might identify the anchor stocks as the 
passive portfolio and the trading stocks as the active portfolio. 
This might be thought to redeem the concept of an anchor stock although 
again it implies that the anchor stocks should be a surrogate for the 
market portfolio. In the event it is unlikely that the managers are 
able to predict successfully. 
The question naturally arlses as to what factors the fund managers should 
consider VlS a vis capital gains taxation. The following attempts to detail 
the main considerations that must be borne in mind. Dealing expenses are 
ignored. It is also assumed that the institution will have to sell its 
shares at some stage. It does not have the option of holding them for 
ever and consequently paying no tax. The intention is to outline the 
basic rules for evaluating shares in the present of capital gains tax. 
The first and most important rule (ignoring dividends for the present) lS 
that to be indifferent between them, the net of tax proceeds of a switch 
must be the same as the net of tax proceeds of the holding of the old 
shares. Thus if existing shares are to be sold sooner or later, a switch 
is justified if the shares to be acquired are expected to appreciate as 
much in absolute terms as those held at present, over whatever seems 
the most advantageous holding period of the old shares, if they are not 
sold now. If L is the existing capital gains tax liability expressed 
as a fraction of today's price, then to justify a switch the rate of 
appreciation expected on the new shares has to be at least I . l-L tlmes that 
expected on the old, over what would otherwise have been the holding period 
of the old shares. Restrictions on switching therefore depend on the size 
of the existing tax liability and on the expected appreciation on the old 
shares. If no appreciation on the old shares is expected at all then any 
appreciation on the new shares will justify a switch so long as the tax 
liability on the old shares lS to be paid sooner or later. If the old 
shares are expected to fall to a permanently lower level, selling for cash 
now will result in a larger net of tax value than would result from future 
lower prices. Selling shares in the expectation of being able to repurchase 
at a lower price is analogous to a switch between shares but with the re-
p~chased shares being treated as new shares. The same rules apply. Thus 
if the old shares will be sold sooner or later the expectation of any fall 
1n pr1ce will justifY a sale in advance whenever the recovery 1n pr1ce 
1S expected to take the share price back to its old level but not beyond. 
Where the pr1ce of the old shares is expected to recover to above the 
level at which they are sold the question becomes one of calculating the 
maximum repurchase price above which the switch is no longer profitable 
since the proceeds of selling the investment (reduced because they have 
paid tax) can no longer be reinvested to yield the same net of tax proceeds 
as simply as holding the investment with no switching. 
The formula I + A 1 + A 
l-L 
times the existing share pr1ce 
may be shown to gl ve the breakeven repurchase price where L is as before, 
and A is the appreciation expected on the old shares expressed as a 
proportion of the existing possible sale price. 
The existence of allowable losses must strengthen the incentive to switch 
shares. Consider the case where shares are at a discount on their 
purchase price and a new share is in prospect. Sale of the old shares, 
presuming a tax liability exists, will effectively yield more capital 
I for the purchase of the new share. 
Sale of the old shares in a future period will cause the USe of that extra 
capital, between now and the future period, to be foregone. A given tax 
saving must be worth more today than at some future date. To defer a sale 
will not prove advantageous unless the old shares recover in price by an 
amount sufficiently more than that on the new shares, to compensate for 
1. Complications arise because gains and liabilities are settled up in 
arrears. Hence the investor's actual capital will not-change until 
the date when the gain would have had to be paid. 
7c:. 
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the appreciat ion whi ch would have been obtainable over the period, on the 
tax saving obtained today. If there are no chargeable gains against 
which to set realised losses the effect is to lower the appreciation 
required from the old shares to an amount simply equal to that expected 
on the new. 
Until now dividends have been ignored Slnce they seldom affect the 
conclusion. Postponing the payment of capital gains tax provides extra 
capital on which income may be earned. In effect the investor obtains an 
interest free loan from the Government, equivalent to the amount of tax 
payable. What is being asked is "How much is this loan worth?" Its 
value depends on its size multiplied by the after tax yield of the security 
at present held. The investor's choice is between the return on the present 
investment and the return on a smaller investment in an alternative switch 
security offering a higher yield, the comparison being after tax. The 
returns on shares purchased with the proceeds of the sale of an existing 
holding must, among other things, compensate the investor for the element 
of income foregone by not postponing the payment of tax. The rules remain 
as before but it is necessary to calculate the net discounted cash flow 
returns on the two assets allowing for tax, over the shorter of the two 
expected holding periods. The problem becomes one of deciding whether the 
compounded value of what is expected to be the shorter term holding will 
reach that of the al ternati ve investment, at the date at which the shorter 
term assets are likely to be disposed of. Income and capital gains must 
both be taken into account. 
If the existing holding would have grown to P(l + r)n 
and new assets accumulate to P(l - L)(l + r )n 
s 
then the condition for breaking even on the change of assets must be 
from which may be derived 
r = 
s (1 + r)n - 1 
1 - L 
where r is the required minimum D.C.F. rate of return on the new asset 
s 
over the period considered net of the relevant taxes; r is the expecteQ 
rate of return per annum on the existing asset over the same period, net 
of the relevant taxes; n is the number of years over which the existing 
or alternative asset would probably be held, whichever is the shorter 
period; L is the existing capital gains liability as a proportion of P, 
the existing price of the asset considered for disposal. 
This approach assumes that the investor has some idea of probable holding 
periods. Where assets are held or are being considered explicitly for 
short or medium term reasons then some figures can be placed on the likely 
holding period in these cases. In situations in which the investor lS 
quite uncertain as to holding periods one approach is simply to assume 
that both the existing and alternative assets would be held for a time 
which experience has shown to be an average holding period for the investor 
concerned. 
. . R { 79 } An . 1 t h The above analysls leans heaVlly on ose . equlva en approac 
is given in Smith{89} (see also Holt-Shelton{48} ) who provides a simple 
decis ion rule. If the following condition holds 
then the investor is better off to switch from security A to security B 
where EA and EB represent the expected percentage returns over the total 
horizon, from the respective securities, gA represents the percentage 
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appreciation on A, and W = the applicable tax rate on capital galns. 
Smith also shows how the same framework of switching from one security 
to another can be expanded to include explicit brokerage fees. However 
I 
as he notes the analysis does not consider the effect on market price of 
a given buy or sell transaction. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis· of investment 
behaviour? Note first of all that the analysis takes no account of risk. 
It implicitly assumes that the difference in expected yield between 
securities is the only important factor. No allowance is made for the 
inter-relationship between risk and yield. To this extent these rules 
may need modification. On balance the tax means that switching must 
overcome an additional obstacle in the form of some minimum margin of 
return. However the margin of return needed to compensate the investor 
for paying tax sooner rather than later is often small. Using the tax 
as the main reason for not selling will rarely be justified unless the 
existing gain proportion is very large or the expected return on the old 
shares very high - in which case the shares would not be candidates for 
switching. An effect that does occur because of capital gains tax, arises 
when old trusts have large contingent gains liabilities compared to new 
trusts. On realising securities there is a smaller amount after tax to 
purchase new securities with, than is the case for a new trust, on the 
sale of equivalent securities. The portfolio of the taxed company is 
penalised by (a) the loss of the securities- which could have been bought 
by the tax p~ment and (b) the loss of capital appreciation enjoyed by these 
foregone securities. Assuming all things equal other than contingent 
gains liability, the new trust and the expanding trust should 'perform' 
better than the old and static one. l 
Similar problems to capital galns tax are met with regard to the dollar 
. prerm. UIn. The rules for surrender of part of the premium on switching, 
deter switching unless the potential gain makes up for the tax payable 
and the element of the premium lost. 
CencI us ions 
This chapter has been concerned with an investment philosophy. The maln 
elements of this philosophy have been stated and examined, one by one. 
To this end various parts of normative portfolio theory as well as empirical 
studies, have been introduced in order to provide some standard against 
which institutional behaviour might be compared. The result it is 
hoped has been to illustrate some of the conflicts apparent in the managers' 
investment philosophy as well as to stress some of its basic precepts. 
1. The improved' performance' arises because the base from which 
performance is measured does not take account of contingent 
lia.bilities. 
7r i) 
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Chapter 6 
Investment Analysis 
Investment analysis provides the inputs for the portfolio selection 
decision. It consists of a series of procedures designed to indicate 
the desirable and undesirable qualities in a share so as to allow the 
estimation of prospects and prices in the future. l It is based on the 
belief that the analysts concerned , whether from simply being superior 
. 
analysts or from access to private or inside information, are able to 
make predictions that stocks will perform better than the market. 
Investment analysis might be described as a collection of tools and 
techniques which is applied to the consideration of most stocks. It 
employs both quantitative and qualitative methods in an endeavour to 
achieve superior forecasting. It is these techniques, rather than 
the particular desirable share characteristics that analysts are looking 
for, that are of interest here. 
On the quantitative side most investment analysis employs a combination 
of economic and accounting data. The investment process might be seen 
1. The previous chapter was concerned with how portfolios are constructed. 
As such it outlined the office philosophy and examined it against 
theory. This chapter takes a different approach. It accepts that 
empirical evidence suggests that it is very difficult to estimate 
share prices and that most analysts are likely to be unsuccessful, 
but all the same puts forward the techniques and factors that are 
commonly considered. It does not compare these techniques with those 
that should be used for portfolio analysis (such as for estimating 
variances and covariances). The efficient market hypothesis suggests 
that this would be unlikely to be particularly fruitful. From the 
po~nt of view of normative theory the main suggestion must be that 
the analysts secure private information if their aim is successful 
share prediction. This chapter concentrates very much on the main 
interest of the thesis - How do investment managers select shares? 
It attempts to outline some of the main factors that are considered. 
as comprlslng, first consideration of the economy as a whole (Economic 
Analysis), and then.with this in mind, consideration of the individual 
characteristics of each company. In the main the analysis in the 
. . .. .. 1 lnst1tut1on 1nvestlgated 1S fundamental rather than technical 1n 
character, with the managers looking for a sound financial structure 
and long term underlying growth. On the qualitative side appraisal 
of the company management is generally considered to be the most 
important factor. 
. A . 2 Econoffilc nalys1s 
Investment recommendations are made against a background of econom1C and 
1. Fundamental analysis may be defined as the assessment of a stock's 
value on the basis of the present value of the future stream of 
payments to be received either by the company or from the company's 
earnlngs stream by the shareholder (as dividends). More generally 
8l 
the term can be applied to all attempts at assessing fundamental factors 
behind stock valuation. The alternative, 'Technical Analysis' does 
not consider the relationship between price and economic value but 
concentrates on price and, in the U.S., volume data. The technical 
analyst maintains that using prices, yields better results because of 
the complexities of analysing and predicting causal factors. The 
analysis involves the investigation of price histories of stocks, 
charted visually, from which it is said to be possible to identifY 
both accelerating trends upwards and downwards and turning points. 
The chart follower buys shares with strong uptrends and believes that 
trends when established tend to persist. Warnings as to when a reversal 
is likely to take place are based on standard historical patterns. 
Inaccuracies in these patterns is normal and it is here that subjective 
judgment is important. It is always possible ex post to identifY a 
particular pattern as heralding a reversal, but ex ante interpretation 
is not nearly so clear. 
Recently a renaissance in technical analysis has been brought about by 
the use of relative strength concepts made available by computer analysis. 
Essentially the idea is to identify by price analysis, firms and 
industries that have outperformed the market or sector and then invest 
in a subset of these on the grounds that these stocks and industries 
are likely to continue to do well. Rigorous testing of such methods 
does.not seem to indicate that they perform particularly well. 
It is important to note that intuition and judgment are considered 
important elements in the application of technical analysis. In the 
managers investigated the teChnique is used more for inspiring ideas 
as to the companies that should be investigated or to give additional 
backing to an analysis already carried out than for decision making 
about which stocks to purchase or sell. 
2. For a· discussion of the use of Economics in Investment Analysis 
see R.E. Moor {70} . 
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industry analysis. It 1S necessary to weight the var10US factors 
detel'll1ining the path of the economy and to come to certain conclus ions 
therefrom. How the assessment is arrived at is not easily answered. 
Few people consider explicit economic models. Much of the reasoning 1S 
economically naive. The judgments on the economy are likely to be 
strongly influenced by the trends in company profits and GNP (Gross National 
Product) as well as by the Balance of Payments and the rate of interest. 
It is impossible to detail all the factors that are considered but it 1S 
worth stressing that the investment community 1S generally interested in 
trends and predictions as to the future - the growth of GNP, of employment, 
government spending, profits and so on. Movements of the interest rate 
are of consequence Slnce they act both as an indicator of Government 
policy and expectations, as well as having direct implications for the 
discount rate and for switching between bonds and equities. Opinion is 
formed both by professional economists, working for stockbrokers as well 
as within the institutions and by other commentators through the papers 
and other news media. In the final analysis, however, the analyst and 
the portfolio manager must make up their own minds as to how they think 
the economyl will behave and its implications for the market as a whole. 
The evaluation of which way the market will move is likely to be central 
to the analyst's investment thinking. Few analysts are likely to recommend 
sUbstantial investment if they believe the market is going to fall 
. 2 
substant1ally. 
At the industry level the attention paid to macro-econom1C factors 1S much 
more explicit. For example, favourable predictions might be made for 
large overall sectors, such as consumer durables if it is anticipated that 
1. 
2. 
Attention must also be paid to the way other economies behave; the most 
notable example is the United States. It is of interest both because 
of investments held in America, which will be affected directly by the 
performance of the U.S. economy, and because of the effects of the U.S. on 
the world economy and in particular on British companies with substantial 
exports. There may also be a factor termed 'market sentiment' that can 
be carried over from Wall Street to the London Market. 
Analysts may of course try and change the orientation of portfolios by 
~:;;eq. j k1iW¥,le~~" v~atile stocks. 
consumer spending will be gl ven a boost by the government. Then wi tr. ill 
this broad grouping more precise analysis is carried out on the individual 
industries, involving a consideration of a vast array of factors ranging 
from government economic policy to such matters as the average level of 
dividends and earnings yield within a sector. l Evaluation of a sector 
must involve an evaluation of the relative prospects in all respects 
. " . Vls--a-VIS other sectors. 
Share Selection 
As a means of indicating the maln factors involved in share selection the 
analysis begins by considering the intrinsic value approach to equity 
valuation - a formal model for valuing a company's shares. Then, having 
established the maln variables an analyst is interested in, consideration 
IS gIven to the maln source of information about companies, namely 
accounting data and in particular the balance sheet variables that are 
considered by the analyst to be of prime importance. However whilst 
financial ratios are of great assistance in determining the appropriate 
valuation for a share it is the quality of management on which particular 
1. One of the most useful indicators of industry prospects is sales. For 
the industry as a whole, fast expanding sales are an obvious bullpoint, 
although considerations such as increased competition, government 
regulations, and increasing costs are all relevant. Also important 
as an industry indicator are earnings. Analysts frequently endeavour 
to predict the.impact on earnings of increased sales or costs. If 
wages are rising rapidly one might expect industries with low wage 
bills to be relatively better off, on the assumption that prices will 
not be able to rise sufficiently to absorb these increased costs 
without a considerable delay; the profits of the labour intensive 
firms are likely to be more affected than the profits of the capital 
intensi ve firms. 
Aside from the forecast of earnings, the likely pie (price/earnings) 
ratio of the sector (the reciprocal of the capitalisation rate) and 
the time period over which changes are likely to occur must also be 
considered. In terms of the pie ratio, the analyst will be looking for 
signs that indicate that the share will be re-rated. A decision that 
the capitalisation rate for the sector, relative to the market, is 
incorrect has obvious implications. However these implications must be 
tempered by an estimate of how long it will take the market to re-rate 
a particular share or sector. If the realisation is going to be 
protracted there may well be more profitable avenues for investment. 
;:r\ 
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emphasis 1S placed and it is this that the analysis finally considers. l 
In its most extreme form fundamental analysis sees the intrinsic value 
of a security as the present value of all future cash payments to be paid 
on the security. The assumption is that cash payments (dividends) 
determine a security's value. Retained earnings are not included in the 
d o • 2 1scount1ng. Th . h (d t J B W ° 1 . {IO 5 }) ° • 1S approac ue 0 . . 1 llams 1S str1ctly a 
long term approach. If V is the value of a share at time t; and 
Dt ...• Dt +n- l the dividends received in each year from 1 . . n 
then 
V = + + + . . . + D t+n-l 
(l+r)n 
The problem becomes one of estimating Dt , Dt +l and so on, in the future. 
Modifications have been suggested such as substituting etp for Dt' 
et+lP for Dt +l and so on where p is the payout ratio and et is the 
. 3. .. 
normal1sed earn1ngs per share 1n per10d t. Further sophistications 
allow the growth rate for a number of years to be estimated and then at 
the end of this period, for earnings to grow at the historical rate for 
00 
1. Earlier discussion has indicated that the interest of the analyst should 
be (and is to a certain extent) to secure private information. The 
extensive empirical evidence in favour of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
suggests that the market price of a stock discounts all available public 
information; to be successful the analyst must therefore look for 
sources of information not generally considered and in valuing stocks 
should be interested only in the effect of new information on the market 
price. Actual behaviour does not reveal such single minded behaviour. 
In some cases only new information is evaluated but in others analysts 
tend to examine and re-appraise recent events affecting the company even 
though the Efficient Market Hypothesis indicates that these events are 
discounted in the stock price. Analysts frequently feel that the 'market 
has got it wrong' and act on this belief. 
2. It is argued that they produce dividends later and if they do not, then 
this is of no consequence since a share is worth only what you can get 
out of it. 
3. Normalised Slnce all estimates are based on this figure and illlusual 
influences could be a severe distortion. 
1 for the economy. It is also necessary to estimate the discount rate, r. 
It would seem reasonable to base the estimate of r on the long term 
historical yield of shares, with adjustment according to an evaluation of 
the risk assumed. 
The information involved in the analysis consists of a forecast of present 
normal earnlngs, a forecast of the growth rate of earnings per share, the 
length of time this growth is likely to be continued, the growth rate 
forecast thereafter, an estimated payout ratio and finally the discount 
rate. The intrinsic value of a share can then be calculated on the 
assumption that one expects to earn the adjusted discount rate. Such an 
approach allows considerable experimentation with appropriate values for 
Variables. 
The assumption that a stock is being bought to hold indefinitely may easily 
be relaxed. If the stock is to be sold In the foreseeable future then 
the receipt of dividends will come to an end and there will be a receipt of 
the proceeds of the sale. 
Dt D Dt+2 + Pt+3 Intrinsic Value = + t+l + 
l+r (1+r)2 (1+r)3 (1+r)3 
for a three year horizon. How is Pt+3 to be estimated? One approach 
. lS 
to use the share's intrinsic value at that date - the disco~ted value of 
dividends thereafter. Is this realistic since it assumes that price and 
intrinsic value are the same In three years' time? All one can say is that 
it is likely to be the best estimate available of prlce in three years' time. 
This approach to equity valuation has been stressed, not because analysts 
follow it explicitly in all their calculations, but because it illustrates 
1. If a stock was allowed to grow at an above average rate indefinitely, it 
would eventually become the only stock of consequence. In that case one 
would expect it simply to grow at the historical rate for the economy. 
86 
many of the variabies they are trying to estimate. l Quite obviod:;ly Ll'ie 
crux of the security analysis problem lS the estimation of future growth 
rates whether of earnlngs or dividends. No future dividend earnings 
stream can be foreseen with complete confidence and it is necessary to turn 
to the consideration of the information that helps in the evaluation of 
these streams. Estimates of the discount rate (r) are also difficult 
Slnce the discount rate is likely to be some function of the returns 
available on alternative investments and the risk involved in each stock 
examined. The quantification of risk involves numerous factors including 
the analyst's confidence in growth rate projections and price in some future 
period as well as his confidence in how long the growth will persist. 
Having established the maln variables the analyst is interested in, it is 
possible to consider one of the main sources of information - the company 
accounts. A number of financial services summarise the accounts data of 
the majority of British Companies. The more sophisticated services are 
increasingly suppl anting the internal analysis (of the investment managers) 
that has been common up to the present. However in order to draw attention 
to the factors considered particularly relevant in the office under 
investigation, their own internal standardised format is reproduced as 
Appendix 5. Two years' historical data are generally considered sufficient 
1. The cross sectional regresslon analyses carried out by several of the 
larger stockbrokers to predict the theoretical price earnings ratios are 
similar to this intrinsic value approach. The theoretical price 
earnings ratio is simply the intrinsic value divided by current earnings. 
In both cases it is assumed that what makes a stock valuable is what an 
investor thinks he will get for it in terms of dividends. In turn the 
level of dividends is determined by a forecast of earnings and the 
dividend payout ratio. One difference arises in that the regression 
approach is essentially a relative value approach. It ranks stocks as 
over or under valued. The intrinsic value approach has no such automatic 
mechai-lism. 
Ho".,r much interest is paid to the stockbrokers' regression models? The 
answer is not simple. Few institutions use them automatically buying 
all the shares that are undervalued but they are probably important 
for drawing attention to stocks that appear to be out of line with the 
market. In any event the instability of the coefficients and their 
extreme sample sensitivity make them tricky tools to use. 
and space provided for estimates for the next accounting year-end. 
This particular format considers sales and wages costs first before moving 
on to consider earnings. The latter are generally broken down into a 
ntiIDber of categories so that figures for cash flow, depreciation and equity 
earnlngs are readily available. The analyst is then in a position to 
consider the operating ratios of the firm. The data are not considered In 
isolation. The standard format provides a basis against which most 
companies are analysed. Over time a picture is built up of likely values 
for the various ratios within a firm, relative to all firms~ and relative 
to similar firms' ratios. Ratios such as operating profit to net sales 
and per employe~ provide information on the operating efficiency of the 
firm whilst consideration of net sales per employee, net sales to stocks 
and similar ratios, provide evidence of the competitive position of the 
f " I lrm. A similar approach is used to consider the financial position of 
the firm.2 
The accounting data give valuable insight both into the financial structure 
of the firm and into its prospects. The aim is to forecast earnings growth 
on a per share basis. Economic reports on the industry and neWS comment 
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1. Some evidence as to the importance of ratios may be adduced from the fact 
that the investment managers commissioned a stockbroker to calculate 
sales/wages and wages/profit before tax figures for more or less all the 
major companies. These figures were then used to pick out shares and 
sectors that were considered least likely to be affected by wage cost 
inflation. 
2. The particular ratios here are by no means sacrosanct. Several stock-
brokers provide a rather more detailed and sophisticated analysis includ-
ing charts showing the values of the variables for a firm relative to 
their main competitors. However the principles remain the same, as do 
the necessary cautions. Accounting standards between companies vary -
many methods of adjusting earnings and profits are arbitrary. Inventories, 
Depreciation and Research and Development are well known problem areas. 
Standardised methods of analysing accounts help to point out some of the 
difficulties and to pinpoint areas for further investigation. The analyst 
must reduce to a manageable few the vast number of differences between 
companies in terms of financial details. The general approach is to 
prepare an analysis in the standard way and then in the comment to piCk 
out particular quirks of the accounts and hence reasons for being 
cautious or optimistic. 
may also provide valuable information on this variable. However, much 
is said to depend on the quality of the management and whilst financial 
ratios can be of assistance in determining its quality the preferred 
method of assessment is company visiting. This belief in the quality of 
management assumes firstly that a company's management can systematically 
affect the company's performance and secondly that 'good' management is 
identifiable. A variety of qualities have been claimed as indicating 
1 good management. In assessing these factors the historical record 1S of 
some relevance. So also is trade and press comment, but ultimately the 
analyst has to rely on a discussion with the managing director and chairman. 
From the answers given to questions on the company's achievements and 
plans for the future it is necessary to judge the quality of the management. 
Undoubtedly some analysts have a flair for this analysis. Questioning 
on matters of earnings may well reveal ignorance and inconsistencies which 
lead one to suspect the quality of the managers. They may also reveal 
information of considerable relevance to the analyst, not disclosed in 
2 the accounts. Company visiting might then be seen as a method of secur1ng 
private information. However, whilst the assessment of company management 
should be the prime factor in company visiting there is a tendency to gloss 
over the qualities of the management and seize upon particular statistics 
relating, say, to sales and earnings. Company visiting may be seen as a 
game of bluff. The manager wants to convince the analyst that the company 
is growing and increasingly profitable. He attempts to understate the 
problems and overstate the benefits. The analyst ~nerally wants specific 
1. See for example P.H. Dutter {31} . 
2. In at least one case, such questioning revealed the preC1se areas ln 
which the company was losing money and why. It also revealed not 
only that the company was aware of the problems and had set in motion 
a mechanism to solve them, but also the time it was expected to take. 
Some of the information was public to the stock market. Certainly most 
of it was known to the trade, but personal interview brought home its 
significance for company earnings and allowed an accu:rate assessment 
of next year's earnings to be made. 
details on company operations on which he can base his projections. It 
1S not difficult for the questions about the quality of the management 
to become hidden by less relevant considerations. A side-benefit of 
company visiting is that it allows the analyst to ask about competitors 
and suppliers and so obtain additional information on the industry as 
a whole. 
It 1S worth summar1s1ng the discussion so far. The analyst is interested 
1n estimating earnings per share of a company and other important variables 
such as the capitalisation rate. He is also interested in the financial 
structure and the management team. Information on these components is 
obtained by analysing company accounts and other published information as 
well as by visiting the management. The analyst uses this information to 
try to predict company earings at least for the next financial year, which 
may well have only a few months to run, and possibly for several years in 
the future. He will probably estimate a range for the share price and 
say whether a share is under- or over-valued. It then remains to consider 
how soon the market price will adjust to this predicted price. The speed 
of adjustment has implications for yields from investments. It is this 
element that is the most difficult to judge. However correct the model 
may be , unexpected favourable and unfavourable short term events may cause 
the actual market index to move substantially above or below the level 
justified by more fundamental considerations. In general the best the 
analyst can do is to provide subjective appraisals as to the likelihood that 
pricffiwill adjust within a specified time period. The stock assessment 
process 1S thus by no means purely mechanical; the analyst is considering 
all the time influences on the market, industry and similar firms which will 
interact with the more specific company information and affect the prospects 
1 for the stock. 
1. Although there is little explicit consideration of risk and variability 
several fund managers and analysts claimed that within their minds they 
have fairly clear-cut reward-risk ratios associated with particular share~. 
There were certainly clear indications that upside potential and the 
Implicitly the discussion so far has been In terms of British equities. 
Nothing has been said, for example, about the eValuation of bonds E1.LQ 
convertible loan stocks. The former have not been discussed because 
relatively few bonds were bought by the organisation under study (at least 
in the period considered.) Their experience with government bonds on a 
short term basis had generally been unhappy. Certain funds bought bonds 
to secure tax advantages, but the selection was left to the fund manager; 
the proportion of office holdings was small. Industrial bonds and debentures 
have also been of little importance, although serlOUS undervaluation might 
result in some buying. However, convertibles present an interesting mixtu~e 
of equity and bond. They confer the privilege of exchanging the bond for 
a specified number of shares should the bondholder find it to his advantage 
to do so. Pricing of convertibles must therefore attach a value to this 
privilege (which will be closely allied to the likelihood of the stock's 
price rising substantially) and a value to the income characteristics of 
the bond. If an analyst considers a share likely to rise substantially in 
say the next two years, purchase of the convertible may well yield consid-
erable extra income in the meantime as well as substantial capital appreciation. 
Convertible evaluation may therefore be regarded as an extension of the 
ordinary share evaluation. It is usually regarded In the office investigated 
as a cheap way into the shares rather than as a means of" lncome. protect ion. 
More details of particular types of investment evaluation could be glven. 
No mention has been made of private company investment, options, warrants, 
letter stock or underwriting; several of these are undertaken. However, 
investment in them is limited in extent so that there lS little to be gained 
from investigating the methods of evaluation employed on them. In any case 
the analyst's role in essence remains unchanged. 
Chapter 7 
Portfolio Evaluation 
An important goal of investment management is superior portfolio management. l 
Such a goal implies the ability to assess the success of different portfolios 
and points to the significance of portfolio evaluation. Portfolio evaluaticn 
entails the comparison of the ex post performance of investment portfolios 
with the object of improving the methods and technique used in selecting 
particular portfolios as well as throwing some light on the abilities of 
analysts and fund managers. It provides a description of historical results 
and hopefully insight as to future results. The measurement of portfolio 
performance has in fact no unique meaning. {14 } Campanella for example 
distinguishes between the portfolio manager's ability to maintain a portfolio 
consistent with a stated investment objective such as risk level, lncome 
characteristics or liquidity and the portfolio manager's ability to perform 
successfully. This he suggests might consist of standards designed to 
measure his ability to minimize risk through diversification, to predict and 
take advantage of market turns, to buy undervalued and sell overvalued 
securities or to correctly weight and time purchase and sale decisions. Until 
now measurement procedures used by institutions have been cruder than this 
division suggests. The object has been simply to indicate portfolios that 
have performed better or worse than some standard with little or no allowance 
made for the cause of the difference in performance. At best, risk has only 
, 
been allowed for by restricting comparisons to portfolios with similar 
objectives. 
This chapter considernsome of the methods that have been used or suggested 
for performance measurement. It does not consider the results of applying 
1. Where superior implies performance at least as good as that of an 
unmanaged portfolio, such as the market. 
1 
these methods. For convenlence the exposition is divided into two 
sections. The first considers simple return measures which take no 
account of risk, in particular the internal rate of return and the unit 
methods of calculating returns. It also cons iders some of the advantages 
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and drawbacks of the usual index comparison standards. The second section 
considers composite measures based on capital market theory, in particular 
the Sharpe and Treynor methods which consider both the risk and return 
of a portfolio. 
The importance of this chapter for a positive theory of investment lies in 
its ability to throw light on superior portfolio management. The desire 
for superior performance implies that portfolio evaluation must be an 
essential part of the portfolio management process. The methods by 
which superior performance is measured are obviously important. It is 
apparent that consideration must be given not only to the conventional 
cautions, such as the time periods comparisons cover, but also to the 
effect of risk on returns. In this respect most portfolio measurement 
up to the present has been deficient. 
Portfolio Returns 
There is no one unique method of calculating portfolio returns. Unit trusts 
subject to a continuous flow of capital into their portfolio require different 
procedures from investment trusts. Both are assumed to be measuring their 
rates of return, which include both dividends and capital appreciation 
although for short-run comparisons dividends may well be omitted. 
A common method of comparlng portfolio performance is the internal rate of 
2 
return method. This measure implicitly assumes that the inflows into a 
1. 
2. 
For an illustration of 
Sharpe {85} and Jensen 
See for example Archer 
th~ important conclusions that 
{50 }. 
& D'Ambrosio{3} K.V. Smith{89} 
may be derived see 
and R L {60 } . evy . 
portfolio are reinvested at the calculated rate of return. l The internal 
rate of return (IRI) is the solution of the polynomial 
T F
t E = 0 
t=O (l+y)t 
where Ft is a series of periodic flows. FO being the initial market value 
of a portfolio~ and FT the ending value. Ft < 0 indicates a capital addition 
whilst Ft > 0 indicates a withdrawal at period t. Y is the internal rate of 
return for which a solution is sought. If the time periods t are quarterly 
then Y lS the rate of return per quarter. The IRI method provides information 
as to how fast a portfolio is building up. Thus if the IRI was higher than 
some expected or assumed return~ the capital contributions needed to provide 
the same final income could be reduced. It is more likely to be useful to 
charities and pensions than to unit trusts. 
The unit trusts are more interested in measurlng the performance of the 
investment manager. If a unit accounting method is used and if the portfolio's 
value on each date a capital inflow occurred is known then the manager's 
performance quarter by quarter (presuming inflows are quarterly) can be 
calculated (in terms of rate of return). The portfolio at time 0 lS 
considered to consist of n units. When an inflow (outflow) occurs the total 
number of units increases (falls). Over a quarter however the number of 
'. 2 unltS lS constant. At the end of each quarter the value of each unit is 
calculated and hence for each quarter a unit's change in value is known. 
An overall rate of return lS provided by the geometric mean of these 
1. Note this measure glves conflicting answers in certain circumstances where 
the cash flows alternate in sign. Such problems are ignored here; they 
are of little practical importance in the cases dealt with. 
2. The inflows (outflows) only occur at the end of each quarter. 
quarterly changes. 
I I 
T T V2 V r yield = = :_1 VI . . . . . 
1 
= (::Y 
where Vo lS the value of a unit at the base period 
and VT lS the value of a unit at time T 
This method removes the advantages of heavy contributions to the fund at 
low points of the stock market and the disadvantages of heavy contributions 
at high points in the cycle. 
This geometric mean calculation can obviously be applied to any portfolio 
where the inflows into a fund are small. Investment trusts may well find 
it convenient to use such measures although the IRI method is equally 
applicable. It is assumed in investment trust calculations that one lS only 
trying to value the underlying assets of the trust. The share prlce may be 
at a premium or discount to these assets. 
A number of other difficulties occur in the measurement of performance. 
There is for example the problem of foreign stocks in a portfolio. Is it 
appropriate to calculate the value of American stocks with or without the 
1 dollar premium particularly since part of it must be surrendered on sale? 
Similarly, valuation of private companies lS rather arbitrary and can be 
very important. How, for example, do you value a share-dealing subsidiary? 
Nor has the problem of time been considered anywhere. Starting dates for 
comparisons are often unfair and rather arbitrary. Since they make a 
1. Such problems come into the same category as galns taxation generally. 
They are exactly analogous. 
substantial difference the preferred method is to calculate performance 
over a number of periods. Outstanding performance is likely to be of 
real value only if it is consistent. 
On their own, calculations of performance are of little relevance. A 
popular method of comparison is with an index. l The most usual type of 
index is an arithmetic mean of prices weighted according to the market value 
of the company at the base date. It may be interpreted as a weighted (by 
size) portfolio of stocks bought at the base date and held. It corresponds 
to a buy and hold type of strategy (that is, no change In a portfolio). 
Similar in conception are the F.T. Actuaries Indices. These might be termed 
periodic reallocation indices, reallocation of security values taking place 
when a capital change in one of its constituents takes place or a constituent 
is replaced. It is intended not to represent a fixed and static portfolio 
but to measure the changing value of a portfolio similar to the market. 
The F.T. Industrials index on the other hand is a geometric mean index. 
Under certain assumptions it represents a portfolio in which the value 
2 
representation of each stock is kept constant. This type of index contin-
uously reallocates the portfolio so that for an unweighted index equal pound 
amounts are maintained in each stock. When a stock rises in price part of 
it is sold and the money reallocated between the stocks so that equal amounts 
are maintained in each. 3 Apart from the difference in assumptions of these 
indices there is also a significant difference in their samples. The F.T. 
500 index, for example, excludes the financial sectors. Choice of index for 
1. Although only indices are described in what follOWS, other performance 
standards are available, such as portfolios of investments selected at 
random and the use of the long term rate of return on investments. 
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2. In particular it assumes that the price series is continuously differentiable 
see Rich {77} , and Latane, Tuttle & Young {58}. 
3. The geometric mean index is always lower than the arithmetic mean due to 
the variability of prices ef the component stocks. Cootner {22} has 
vigorously attacked its use and argues that any widely diversified 
portfolio is likely to surpass such an index. 
comparlson purposes should not be automatic. It should depend on the 
purpose for which it is required. In certain circumstances a buy and 
hold strategy is likely to be most appropriate. In other cases a 
periodic reallocation strategy is more representative. 
The question arlses as to whether it is appropriate to use any of the3e 
indices for a portfolio, such as an investment trust portfolio, that 
contains a substantial foreign element. In so far as one is simply 
jUdging the relative merits of one investment against another, what causes 
the difference in performance (e.g. N. American holdings) may be of little 
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relevance. However, if one is interested in future performance and improving 
performance it may be very important to know. One possible solution is to 
compare investment trusts with an investment trust index, but this lS 
unlikely to be satisfactory since investment trust share prices do not 
exactly reflect the asset values of the underlying portfolios. The 
difference (the premium or discount) reflects in a sense the stock market's 
optimism or pessimism about the trust's future performance and is indicative 
of the value the market puts on the trust's management record, gearlng, 
foreign holdings and other similar variables. Another possibility is to 
divide the portfolio into segments and compare each of these in turn. The 
portfolio's American holdings may be compared with a suitable American index 
to give an indication of how well the managers have done in this segment. 
Similarly, the portfolios may be broken down into equity and bond sections 
and appropriate comparisons made. However the problem of comparison remains 
for companies which are not publicly quoted. 
Considerable attention lS paid by the investment managers to some of the 
indices and to some of the performance comparlson problems that have been 
described. It is considered important to know how well a fund manager's 
performance compares with his objectives and with the performances of other 
fund managers. Performance measurement may also provide material for 
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improving future decisions, and of course it gives the investors a mea~s 
of comparing different funds so that resources may be switched accordingly. 
A particularly important use of indices in the organisation investigated 
1S for the comparison of portfolio performance against the performance of 
an equivalent index. This use was given further impetus by computer 
programmes similar to that compiled by Fox for Mobil Oil. {42 } For each 
fund being considered, a broad based Index equivalent investment is 
created. Whenever a security lS bought or sold, an alternate hypothetical 
investment or liquidation is made in this index. Similarly whenever 
contributions (withdrawals) are made to the fund, equivalent units are 
invested (sold) in this index. Commissions are charged on the index 
purchases to allow for brokerage fees whilst dividends based on the 
dividend yield of the index are assumed paid and reinvested monthly. To 
obtain a complete range of performance information the model is used over 
three different time periods. Examination of the most recent quarterly 
results gives information on short term trends such as cash holdings, new 
areas of concentration, turnover, adaptability to present market conditions 
and the discounted rate of return equivalent to an index investment. 
Evaluation of annual trends and longer (3 - 5 years) performance is also 
possible. 
It is perhaps worth considering the industry procedure in more detail. For 
each security information is known about purchases, sales, capital issues, 
dividends and interest. Each stock is assigned to an indUStry and in the 
original programme to broad categories such as growth, cyclical or defensive. 
When a stock purchase is made the same amoUnt is hypothetically invested 1n 
the corresponding industry index as well as in the market index, with 
suitable adjustments for brokerage. When the stock is subsequently sold the 
profit (loss) over the time held is calculated for the stock, for the 
equivalent industry and for the market. Comparison of these figures 
enables one to draw conclusions about the strategy and tactics of invest-
ments. If the industry index had outperformed the market then the right 
strategy had been adopted whilst if the stock had outperformed the industry 
the right tactic had been chosen. 
The analysis is carried out for all stocks and industries and for the market. 
It could also be carried out for the cyclical portion of the portfolio, or 
whatever else 1S considered appropriate. Further refinements of the methods 
are obviously possible, but are not c.onsidered here. What must be stressed 
is that consistency of performance is the target. Spectacular short term 
performance is of little merit in itself. It may merely be due to chance. 
Consistent long term performance may well denote a high level of risk. 
It is this that the analysis now considers. Before doing so, however, 
there remains one method of performance evaluation used extensively that 
has not explicitly been mentioned. This 1S the method of pr1ce relatives. 
Typically dividends are ignored and funds plotted graphically daily or 
weekly, relative to the market. Above 100 (or I or whatever the base figure 
is) and r1s1ng, indicates a desirable fund - outperforming the market. Since 
different funds have alternate objectives they tend to be grouped into 
similar categories (such as growth funds). The charts give a visual 
impression of short and longer term performance. To some extent they are 
inappropriate. Starting dates are often unfair, whilst there is also a 
tendency for events such as the payment of capital gains tax to reduce 
the price relatives rather erratically. However, considerable attention 
is paid to them and plunging price relatives often serve as the first 
indicators that portfolios need attention. 
Performance Comparisons and Risk 
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The measures discussed so far have not allowed for risk 1n their calculations, 
but it lS possible to utilise the capital market theory discussed 1n an 
earlier chapter to construct composite measures which consider both a 
portfolio's risk and return. 
O h . {85 } ne suc measure 1S Sharpe's reward to variability ratio 
A - R' 
P 
(J , 
P 
which may be interpreted as the excess portfolio yield per unit of ex post 
risk, where A is the average rate of return for a portfolio, R' is the p 
actual pure interest rate and (J , is the standard deviation of actual rate p 
of return of a portfolio. l The higher the value of this ratio the better 
the performance of the portfolio during the investment horizon. The result 
can be illustrated diagrammatically (Figure 7.1). Points i and j represent 
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the performance of portfolios i and J. In terms of average return portfolio 
i is better, in terms of variability j is better. By borrowing and lending 
at the pur~ rate of interest investors can reach any point along R'.Y or 
1 
R' .X. 
J 
Clearly the latter dominates. Hence a natural measure of 
performance is the slope of the line associated with the portfolio. The 
e 
slope of the line is the rward to variability ratio. 
" 
The risk term ln Sharpe's ratio may be decomposed into a systematic and a 
residual risk component. Most institutional portfolios are well diversified 
so it is likely that most of the unsystematic risk has been diversified away 
1. Note the relationship to the capital market line which was shown ln 
chapter 5 page 57 to have slope EM - R or in ex post values 
~ - R' 
aM' 
Now if A 
P 
= E 
P 
aM 
a , p = a p and R' = R then all portfolios 
that are ex ante efficient will also be ex post efficient. All such 
portfolios will lie along the capital market line in the ex ante case 
or its empirical counterpart in the ex post case. In fact it is 
unlikely that predictions will equal outcomes. However if one assumes 
predictions to be unbiased the reward to variability ratio of highly 
diversified portfolios will vary randomly around the value associated 
with the predicted capital market line. Persistent differences among 
reward to variability ratios will arise only in cases involving 
inadequately diversified portfolios. 
A.Vf~r~(,,f 
~ ( -r IJJ!N 
Figure 7.1 
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and only systematic risk remalns. Hence the slope of the characteristic 
line - TreynOr's{ 97} term for the line resUlting from the regression of 
portfolio rate of return against the market rate of return - may be taken 
as a measure of ex post risk. The characteristic line portrays the 
responsiveness of portfolio yield to changes in return obtainable from 
the market. The component of total variation explained by the line is 
the systematic risk. Substituting the slope of the characteristic line 
(or volatility) into Sharpe's measure l glves A - R' P where 
b' p 
A is the average return on a portfolio, R' is the actual pure interest p 
rate, b' is the actual volatility of the portfolio. p 
1. The Treynor measure may be derived from the security market line - the 
linear relationship between the return on a security (portfolio) and its 
risk in equilibrium - with slope E. - R where E. is the expected rate 
l l 
b. 
l 
of return on security (portfolio) i, and b. the volatility of security 
( . ) .. al Cov( iM) c ( . Ml) b· th . b t portfollo l lS equ to 2 ; ov l elng e covarlance e ween 
a 
the return on security (port~olio) i and the return on the market 
portfolio M, and a~. the variance on the market portfolio. 
lOa 
Treynor showed thst rankings consistent with this measure of fund 
performance could be obtained directly from the regression coefficients 
of the portfolio's characteristic line (portfolio returns (R ) are 
p 
regressed on returns from the market (RM) , that is ~ Rp = A + B R + e ) p M P 
so that V = R' - A B The smaller the value of V·the better the ex post 
P 
performance of the fund. 
Diagrammatically V is defined by the intersection of the characteristic 
line and a horizontal line through the risk free rate. (Figure 7.2.) 
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Figure 7.2. R,.., 
If two characteristic lines were exactly parallel then the one higher in 
the space would exhibit a lower ~ and thus preferred performance. The 
Treynor ranking measure may be seen as the distance RY or RX. A smaller 
distance is preferable to a larger distance. Even if fund volatilities 
differ, funds with a smaller distance are preferred since they may be 
combined with the risk free asset to glve the same volatility as a fund 
,wi th a larger distance, but a higher return. Comparison with the market 
o is facilitated by construction of a market characteristic line at 45 to 
1. It is assumed that the e 's are random errors and E(e) = 0, p p 
var(ep ) = a finite constant, cov(ep'~) = 0 and Cov(eptept+k) = O. 
It is the expected value of the equation that is termed the 
characteristic line. 
lOl 
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the orlgln. (Figure 7.3) Combining the market portfolio with the risk 
free asset allows a direct comparison between a fund and the market 
. Market Characteristic 
Line 
,// 
Fund 
/ 
/ 
Figure 7.3 
portfolio. AB represents a measure of the difference in return by which 
the fund outperformed the market. This measure is closely analogous to a 
composite measure proposed by Jensen{50! I The Sharpe and Treynor measures 
may be shown to be consistent if a fund is assumed to be perfectly diversi-
fied2 and in general empirical studies have shown all three measures to be 
very highly correlated (e.g. Smith and Tito {90}). 
These measures of performance are not of course without their problems. 
Two particularly important assumptions are that portfolio volatilities are 
stationary over time and that they are invariant with respect to the length 
of time interval over which the returns are measured. It is not intended 
1. Jensen assumes that portfolios are well diversified such that residual 
risk is zero. His measure lS akin to Treynor's and may easily be 
related to it (see {90} ). 
2. See for example {90}. 
to explore thc:se areas here. The discussion has been intended to point 
out SCIlI:,;:- of the newer methods of portfolio evaluation that are now being 
applied and to indicate the deficiencies in some of the more traditional 
methods of portfolio eValuation. Performance comparisons which make no 
allowance for risk are second best measures In most situations and do not 
allow performance comparlsons to be as objective as one might wish . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • •••••••••• • •••• ct •••• 
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This discussion of performance concludes part one. This chapter and those 
preceding it have each examined different aspects of portfolio decision 
making within an investment management organisation. They have attempted 
to outline the main factors governing investment decisions, whether arising 
from the structure of the institution, for example, the influence of the 
directors on investment decisions, or from a deliberate investment strategy 
such as the demand for large concentrated portfolio holdings. Part two 
goes on to consider one such strategy more exhaustively. It provides' 
evidence on the value of sector selection as an investment method as well 
as examining the extent to which the managers actually make use of it. 
The assessment of the different strands of the investment process is therefore 
left for the present; the threads are best drawn together at a later stage 
when material from part two can also be considered. 
P AHT II 
rrhc:: importance of ~3ector Selection in Port folio PerformancF: 
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Chapter 8 
Sector Selection 
Earlier chapters have already indicated that scepticism of the importance of 
00me of the influences affecting decision making in an investment management 
organisation led the author to make a detailed analysis of one particular 
aspect of the managers' investment philosophy. The aspect considered, the 
selection of shares by their sector characteristics - a technique thought by 
the managers to be particularly useful and valuable - is the subject of this 
and the succeeding three chapters. This chapter sets the scene for those 
following. It attempts to outline more precisely than previously, the 
definition, meaning and advantages of sector selection, and also explains 
the hypotheses and tests examined in subsequent chapters. This is followed by 
a survey of the. relevant published academic studies. 
The Logic of Sector Selection 
The rationale for the classification of a group of firms as an industry is 
1 generally their similar output or technology. This similarity in product or 
production technique suggests that some of the factors affecting the individual 
firms may be common to the industry as a whole, an idea reinforced by bargain-
ing at the industry level between the employers and the employed on wages, and 
between the Government and the manufacturers on taxes, aid and legislation. 
Common products and techniques are not of course the only similarities between 
firms. From a wider viewpoint, the common economic environment facing most 
companies leads one to expect economy-wide influences which affect the great 
majority of firms. Similarly individual differences between firms, even if 
only of a geographical nature, suggest the existence of influencesunlque to 
particular firms. One is thus led to distinguish between market, industry 
1. Classification by output or technology is by no means the only grouplng 
possible. Aggregating stocks by their growth rates, their share price 
volatility or some other criteria might in certai~ circumstances be 
equally useful. 
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and unique influences on individual companies, a categorisation that immedlo_~~~y 
suggests a variety of possible investment techniques in which the investor's 
preferences depend on an assessment of the importance of each set of influences -
market, industry and unique - as well as on his particular investment s~ills. 
rIne orlglD of sector selection may now be seen clearly. It arlses from the 
investor's belief In the importance of industry influences on the company, or 
more precisely on company profits or share price, and the possibilities of 
applying this knowledge to select superlor portfolios. It reduces the 
investor's task to the selection of those industries th~will perform well and 
the conscious weighting of portfolios toward some sectors and against others. 
Industries are related to overall economic and social influences in an attempt 
to determine those areas in which shares are likely to show the greatest profit. 
The sector selection teChnique implicitly assumes that the firms in a sector 
move together. This does not mean that the share prices in a sector are at 
the same level, or that they move together In terms of absolute amounts, but 
rather that the proportional prlce changes of the constituent firms are much the 
same. 
1 These price changes may be considered as proxles for the rate of return 
(yield) on the shares, the variable which in a taxless world would ideally be the 
one considered. 2 Well defined homogeneous sectors will exhibit a high degree of 
1. This is computed using both the dividends and capital gains on a share. 
Consequently the length of time over which a price change is being considered 
may well be an important influence. Over different time horizons the 
elements of price changes due to the sector characteristics are likely to 
vary so that the appropriate strategy may alter. For short time horizons 
one might expect the individual share component to be the most important 
(due to random fluctuations in prices). Similarly over very long time 
horizons as firms change their products and move between industries, the 
effect due to the firm itself is likely to be dominant. In the medium term 
however it might be that sector selection is the dominant influence since 
chance fluctuations in prices are much less significant whilst even good 
management is unlikely to be able to change processes and plants quickly. 
Hence performance may correspond to that of the industry as a whole. 
2. The existence of differential rates of tax between income and capital gains 
confer advantages to higher tax payers who receive capital gains rather than 
dividends. In consequence, price changes rather than gross rate of return 
figures in which dividends are a large component are more representative of 
returns to these tax payers. 
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correlation between the rates of return of their component firms. 
heterogeneous sectors in contrast will exhibit a low degree of correlation between 
'ates of return. 1 
An important implication follows from this correlation between companles. If 
11li thin the same sector the yields of individual shares are highly correlated, t~!Srl 
the selection for a portfolio of more than one share from the sector is likely to 
contribute little to the reduction of the financial risk of the portfolio. 
The existence of well defined,homogeneous sectors2 enables the investor to secure 
a diversified portfolio easily, quickly and cheaply by simply choosing one share 
from each of several sectors. 3 Clearly In this case sector selection lS an 
information saving approach. It allows a reduction In the evaluation of possible 
investment opportunities so that portfolio construction may be framed in terms of 
a few simple decision rules. 4 The analyst is faced with a choice between 
industries rather than between shares. 
Unfortunately two influences are at work to reduce the usefulness of the technique. 
The first is the existence of heterogeneous sectors with consequently relatively 
low correlation between the sector components. The second is the requirement 
imposed on fund managers by law, the office philosophy or marketability which 
prevents them from holding large amounts of anyone share. Faced with these two 
influences lone possible strategy is to include in a portfolio several shares 
from a sector in an attempt to secure the average performance of the sector. 
1. Sector Slze has so far remained unspecified. A relationship lS likely to 
exist between sector size and heterogeneity. Larger sectors in terms of 
number of companies generally imply less precise definition of the sector and 
hence greater variation in the constituents. 
2. Assuming that the sectors are orthogonal or negatively correlated. 
3. The analysis also has implications for share prices. If for example two 
assets are perfectly correlated apd have the same variance,profits are to be 
made by buying the share with the higher yield and selling short the share with 
a lower yield. Such behaviour is likely to adjust prices so that yields In a 
sector are equal if the shares are perfect SUbstitutes. 
4. In terms of capital market theory it allows the analyst t,o construct a 
portfolio that is a proxY for the market portfolio easily and cheaply. 
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Th~n, provided that the investment managers are able to predict the r elati ve 
performal~ce of sectors, their overall portfolio performance will exceed the 
erformance of the market as a whole. The success of the strategy depends on 
the fund managers' ability to forecast sector performance, a matter discussed in 
a later chapter. 
Sector Selection as a Rational Investment Strategy 
In defining the nature and purpose of sector selection, a variety of questions 
were inevitably left unanswered. Three questions may be singled out as of 
partifular relevance to this study in view of its interest in the cOi.lstruction of 
a positive theory of investment. Firstly, do sector effects exist or not? 
Clearly, if analysis reveals that the aggregation of shares on the basis of 
industrial product or some other easily established criteria is not associated 
with any effect peculia.r to that grouping, there lS no basis for selecting shares 
from one grouping or sector rather than: another. To put it another way, if the 
rates of return of shares within a sector are uncorrelated, then such ~hares are 
unlikely to be satisfactory sUbstitutes within a portfolio and the shares must 
be selected on some other basis than their sector characteristics (which are of 
1 little consequence). To provide some answers about the existence of sect or 
effects, regresslon techniques are used to partition changes in share prices into 
market, sector and residual components and to provide estimates of the relative 
contributions made by these factors. 
The second question of interest is whether the investment managers do select 
shares on a sector basis for their portfolios. Observation of their investment 
1. If little evidence of sector effects is found a number of possibilities exist. 
The simplest l:J that the statistical methods employed are not sufficiently 
s :nsitlve or discriminating (or even appropriate) to identify effects that do 
in fact exist. Another possible explanation is that the sector classification 
used is inappropriate and that different, more sUltable criteria may be 
employed by the investment managers. Finally one might argue that both the 
methods used and the classification scheme are appro~~i~te, and that the 
conclusion that no sector effects exist is right, but tha~ the investment 
managers erroneously believe that sector effects do exist and select shares on 
this basis. In this case the managers are probably rational in their procedures 
but W1B id d due to information. 
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decision making process does not reveal a clear answer. The procedure adopted 
to investigate this question, is to compare the constituents by sector of an 
actual portfolio with a distribution of securities that might have been expectEd 
to occur by chance, given the distribution of securities between sectors over 
the market as a whole. If the investment procedure used had been to select snares 
on the basis of their sector characteristics, then on average one might expect 
SUbstantial divergence between the market and the portfolio. 
Thirdly, it may be asked whether the sector selection technique is a valuable 
one and rewards the managers with above average investment performance. To 
answer this question an actual portfolio, its constituents selected as before on 
the basis of sectors, is broken down into components such as the shares held 
throughout the holding period, the shares bought during the period and the shares 
sold during the period, and the performance of these components compared with 
equivalent amounts invested in the appropriate sector indices. A portfolio 
performance close to that of the sector equivalents, and substant.ially better 
than the market equivalents over several periods, would provide some 
evidence of the success of sector selection as an investment technique. 
Taken as a whole the answers to these three questions help build up a picture of 
sector selection techniques. In particular they provide evidence of its value 
as an investment technique although additional evidence either directly from an 
analysis of other. portfolios or indirectly from studies of share price prediction, 
is of course desirable. 
A question that remalns to be answered lS the relationship of the sector concept 
. I 
to the efficient market hypothesls. The problem lies, not in the presence of 
market, sector and individual firm influences in an efficient market, but in the 
1. Many of the studies of share price prediction mentioned previously have 
provided support for the efficient market hypothesis. 
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existence of a decision rule (sector selection) that results ln above aV'erage 
rewards for given risks. In short the efficient market hypothesi.3 SUE:6,-StS 
that the likelihood of such a rule consistentlY providing above average rew~~is 
is very small. In the event of the tests employed here indicating sector 
selection to be a successful decision rule, two explanations are possible. 
The first and most likely is the failure of the analysis to take account of 
risk. It has been assumed throughout that differences in risk between 
sectors are relatively small. This assumption would need to be re-examined. 
The second possibility is that the investment managers have access to private 
information that allows them to predict industry performa~ce successfully. 
A result such as this would provide valuable evidence against the strong-form 
of the efficient market model (see Farna {37} ). 
Academic Studies of Sector Grouping 
Academic interest in sector selection has until now largely been confined to 
the statistical grouping of shares. Attention has been centred on the dual 
question of whether shares cluster into statistically meaningful groups and 
whether these groups correspond to industry classifications. Prime concern 
here however is not whether better more meaningful (in a statistical sense) 
groups can be formed but whether given the existing and widely accepted 
sectors there are identifiable sector effects. It is this existing sector 
classification of shares that is of interest ln deciding whether sector selection 
is a valid method of portfolio construction. The distinction between the 
two questions is of importance in that it determines in large part the 
statistical methodology employed - Factor Analysis or Analysis of Variance. 
The primary aim of factor analysis may be thought of as being exploratory. 
It seeks to discover principles of classification although it is likely 
that one ,·,ill start with certain notions or hypotheses that one wishes to 
test. The statistical analysis takes the form of a verification or 
refutation of one or more of the hypotheses proposed, and perhaps as well a 
~-. '~ .. -----
110 
modification of the hypotheses in the light of experience. l An analysis 
of varlance on the other hand is not concerned with discovering new schemes 
of classification. The primary objective is to determine whether the dlfierence 
between groups within an already established classification is statistically 
significant or not. Factor analysis in these circumstances may well be extremely 
o 0 t d f 0 1 t tOO 0 0 { ll} ClrCUl ous an al 0 answer he speclflc questlon belng asked. 
The most thorough and comprehensive study to date of industry group1ngs 1S that 
b Ko { 53 } who applied factor analysis to an observed covariance matrix y lng 
comprised of ser1es of prlce changes (monthly and logged). He argued that a 
plece of information can affect more than one security price change, -P0SSlt).LY 
even the whole market in a given time period, and in consequence the securities 
will exhibit correlated behaviour to some degree. To investigate this King 
1. B {7} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f th orch provldes a brlef, lntultlvely appeallng descrlpt1c·n 0 e 
technique. "Assume that we have n strongly interdependent stochas1~i c 
variables zl z2 ••• zn which may represent return in n industries. It IDi3..Y 
then be poss.ible to find a few, say three' stochastically independent 
variables ~, x2 and x 3 ' so that equations of the form 
= 
= 
. . . . . . . ~ . . . . . 
Z 
n 
= 
hold. with sufficiently good approximation. Here a; b; and C; are constrults 
to be determined so that we in some sense obtain the best possible fit aa •• 
It may be possible to give a concrete interpretation to the components or 
the factors Xl' x2 and x 3• If for instance these stand for return on 
investment in the three industries, 
1. Automobile production 
2. Shipbuilding 
3. Aluminium production 
it is quite reasonable to assume that return on investment in the ste21 
industry may be determined approximately by an expression such as 
Z = + " 
...L ... LL 
analysed the prlce changes of 63 stocks both for a period of 403 months and 
for four sub-periods thereof. He endeavoured to determine whether market, 
industry and individual firm effects could account for the complex inter-
relationships of security price changes, and whether the industry effects 
corresponded to the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) classification. 
The factor analysis model attempts to break down the covarlance matrix into 
1 
a common and a unlque part, although doing so involves the estimation of 
cormmmali ties. King used the squared multiple correlation (R~) of each share on tbe 
J 
others as his estimate of communality and adjusted the covariance matrix 
appropri ately. The adjusted covariance matrix was then analysed by both the 
. G . . . 2 
centrold and the uttman-Harrls factorlng technlques. The results were similar. 
The mean value for the varlance extracted by the first factor for the overall 
period by both methods was 52% - the typical stock had about half of its varlance 
explained by the element of prlce change that affects the whole market. However 
considerable variation was apparent both between industries and over time. 
Metals and rails were most closely associated with the market and tobaccos least 
dependent. The time behaviour of the market component of variance was reflected 
in a downward drift of the sub-period means. Approximately 58% of varlance was 
attributable to the market from June 1927 to September 1935 as against 31% for 
the period August 1952 to December 1960 indicating the diminished effect of the 
general stock market comovement. 3 Subtracting these figures from R~ indicates 
J 
the proportion of variance the industry effects might account for. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Principal components analysis does not assume a unique part in the model in 
contrast to the factor analytic model used by King. However whilst the 
latter is clearly more appropriate in this application, experience suggests 
that results do not differ markedly by failing to make this assumption. 
{ 46 }. Granger & Morgenstern lllustrate the corresponding regression equations 
to the factor methods used by King. 
However possible unique influences such as the extreme boom and slump in 
the first period and the war in the second, both possibly contributing to 
the larger market movement than in later periods, sho~ld be noted. 
Removal of the rr~rket factor left a matrix of residual covarla~ces that wer~ 
useful for the following stage in the analysis, a cluster analysis of tt~ 
transformed residual covariance matrix (that is transformed into a correlation 
matrix) . The new matrix was searched for the highest positive pairwise 
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correlation between two variables. When this was found the two variables were 
added together to form a new combined variable and the procedure then repeated 
until all the variables had grouped together. The result was spectacular with 
the variables clustering according to industry grouplng. The most recent 
sub-period however showed a weakening of industry affiliation. 
In addition a multiple factor solution was forced upon the residual covarlanCe 
matrix, the object of which was to fit a possible factor pattern to a given 
covariance matrix, and then to reconstruct the covariances so that the 
reconstructed covariance matrix could be compared with the original. The 
factor pattern would be accepted as a possible explanation of the observed 
inter-relationships of the variables if the differences between the two matrices 
were small enough. The result of this forcing of a pattern on a matrix was 
considered successful. The high loadings in the proper industry locations 
and low loadings elsewhere suggested that the market-industry model was 
adequate. There was for example,no variable in which the appropriate industry 
factor did not have the highest loading after the market factor was excluded. 
The computing of the residual covariances and the examination of the proportion 
of total communality explained would seem to bear out the goodness of the fit. 
The final step in the analysis was to use the Guttman-Harris technique to grind 
out a factor analysis from the data, and then to rotate the factors found 
orthogonally to obtain as uncomplicated a factor pattern as possible. The 
result, for the overall period at least, was to bring out strongly the industry 
groups even though the orthogonality constraint forced the factors to be 
uncorrelated and so broke up some of the industry clustering. 
- -==-----
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The several different forms of analysis used by King all tended to confirm that 
price changes may be broken down into market and industry components. However, 
a number of criticisms have arlsen. The most obvious relate to King's data. 
For each company monthly changes in prlce over 33 years were required so that the 
basic population of securities was confined to those stocks that had been listed 
continuously over the period - 316 stocks covering 46 industries. In turn, 
vrithin each industry it was necessary to have sufficient firms to allow industry and 
individual firm effects to be separable, but not so many firms that only one 
industry was represented. With a practical programme limitation of seventy 
stocks, King selected six distinct industries - tobaccos, petrol, metals, railroads, 
utilities and retail stores. All of these were fairly homogeneous groups and it 
is of interest to consider what the results would have been if groups such as 
. . . 1 
englneerlng had been consldered. Again as King pointed out the continuous 
listing for 33 years requirement, restricted the study to mature industries and 
excluded the unsuccessful firms. However, continuous listing does not 
guarantee that the behaviour of a particular series is highly correlated with 
other series in the same industry or even the same market. 
Besides the data a number of other criticisms of the study have been made. 
Granger & Morgenstern contend that the methods used introduce a bias in favour 
f th f .. . G - {32, 33} o e market actor and agalnst the lndustry factor whllst Elton & ruber 
note problems with King's use of correlation coefficients in his cluster analysis. 
Criticisms have also been made of the usual assumptions of normality and 
stationarity in the data. 
King's numerous and varlOUS applications of factor analysis to the problem all 
seem to indicate that shares can be grouped meaningfully and that these groups 
1. King f01IDd that metals split up into smaller sub groupings of ferrous and 
non ferrous metal stocks. The same might have occurred for engineering with 
the division of a large heterogeneous sector into sub groups by product. 
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correspond to industries. His study provides a justification for the use ,J:::-' 
analysi:::; of variance techniques to discover whether statistically significant 
effects exist for a large number of sectors. 
A number of other studies in the area have also been carried out. One of the 
{ 40 } 
earliest was by Farrar who was interested in explaining the investment 
behaviour of mutual funds in terms of the Markowitz model. In an attempt to 
make the analysis more tractable Farrar employed principal components analysis 
to reduce the 47 x 47 variance - covariance matrix of share price indices 
(industrial equity groupings) to a more reasonable Slze. He reduced it to 
11 x 11 but found little basis for identifying the components with familiar 
industry groupings. His first component explained 76% of the trace of the 
correlation matrix. A number of reasons have been advanced for the failure 
of the analysis to identify industry factors. King contended that the use of 
highly autocorrelated series of monthly levels of index number values, rather 
than first differences, and aggregate 
prices were important explanations. 
figures rather than individual security 
{ 41 } Feeney & Hester similarly disputed 
the appropriateness of his basic variable and criticised his extraction of roots 
from the correlation rather than the covariance matrix. They argued that 
Farrar ignored the existence of considerable differences in both the variance of 
different individual stock indices and the stocks used for constructing the 
indices. In addition they contended that Farrar inappropriately applied factor 
analytic techniques which assumed the existence of a particular model. 
~\\; 
'" Feeney & Hester's paper used principal components analysis to analyse the stocks 
included in the Dow Jones index. When investigating rates of return they found 
41% of variance to be explained by the first component, a figure similar to King's. 
Their analysis also provided some measure of support for industry effects. Stocks 
of the same industry appeared to have positively correlated rates of return over 
time although because industries move together they thought~ tnat this might be of 
-; 1 5 ~ ...... 
. 1 little use to lnvestors. 
Feeney & Hester provided interesting evidence on the use of raw prlces as well 
as on rates of return. They point out that because of the trend in price 
S8rles raw prices are correlated over time. Prior to removal of the trend 
approximately 70% of the variance is explained by the first factor. On 
removal of the trend the proportion of variance explained by the first factor 
comes down to about 40%. In consequence obvious doubts are cast on Farrar's 
analysis~ 
Overall from these American studies it seems reasonable to conclude that firms , 
do form statistically meanimgful groups and that these groups correspond, to 
some extent at least, to the industry groups. Reported Studies for the U.K. have 
{ 80 } 
so far been confined to a pilot study by Russell & Taylor on the same 
lines as Farrar's study and with similar disadvantages. The results were not 
particularly encouraging. 
A rather different approach to the testing of the validity of the industry 
{ 90 } 
approach to investment analysis was that used by Tysseland 
• He set out 
to discover firstly, what returns have been available to investors from 
investment in the common stocks of various industry groups in the past, and 
secondly whether an analysis of the behaviour of such returns over time indicates 
that the industry concept has been useful for investment decisions. He computed 
for each of 470. firms the dividend, capital gains and combined returns figures for 
the period 1949-1966 in addition to computing the industry returns and their 
variability. Non-parametric rank correlation tests were then used to test for 
the consistency of industry returns over time, and for the consistency of the 
1. However King's analysis indicated predominantly negative correlations between 
industry clusters and a reasonable fit when orthogonal rotation was employed, 
so that their criticisms - that industries move together - may not be too 
serlOUS. 
variability of industry returns over time. Little consistency was found 
between t~e longer time periods with respect to either industry returns or their 
variability. Tysseland then concluded that industry rates of return would be 
of little use to investors in making portfolio decisions. 
Fortunately however the outlook is perhaps not as bleak as it appears. As 
. {29 } . 
Dletz has pOlnted out, the results are biased particularly for short time 
periods by Tysseland's use of the mean of high and low stock prices In 
computing rates of return. Dietz goes on to criticise the lack of independence 
in the data and to argue that the rank correlation tests are not powerful 
enough to determine movement within successive rankings. Some exploitable 
consistency in rankings did appear to exist. 
Apart from the direct tests on the industry market hypothesis using prlce or 
rate of return data, a number of other studies have also thrown light on the 
area. 
. . . . { 107 } . One of partlcular lnterest lS that by Wlppern who was lnterested 
In the validity of the equivalent risk class assumption frequently made in studies 
of capital structure. He considered the variability of the stream of net 
operating earnings to be an appropriate proxy measure of basic business uncertainty, 
and using this tested the hypothesis "Do objectively determinable risk classes 
exist?" and, "Do these clas ses correspond to industry groups?" His sample 
consisted of 61 firms in 8 industries to which he applied a one way analysis of 
variance to test the within and between industry varlance. Significant 
differences were found between industries. The analysis of varlance glves no 
indication as to whether the null hypothesis is rejected because all industries 
differ significantly from each other, or just one or two industries differ. 
Scheffes method of multiple comparisons amongst means provided a method of 
determining this. It indicated that all of the attributable differences were 
due to one industry and that even this one industry did not differ significantly 
from all of the other industries. Given acceptance of the basic measure of 
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uncertainty it would appear that industry classifications do not discriminate 
among grmIJ!s of firms with equivalent degrees of basic business uncertainty. 
A possible explanation of this result is the low power of the test resulting In 
the acceptance of the null hypothesis when in fact it is not true. The small 
sample sizes of three of the industries left much to be desired in this respect. 
The study is of interest in illustrating the possibility of applying analysis of 
varlance to the question as to whether industry differences exist or not. 
A number of other studies have also directly considered market and industry 
factors. B al {8} f ' . ~e ey ,or examp e, suggests that the varlatlon In company 
earnlngs has reflected In part both common and industry influences. He argues 
that aggregate corporate profits exhibit wide sWlngs which could scarcely 
be possible unless the profits of individual companies were responding in part 
to a common influence. The existence of this comovement might arise because 
all goods and services are in some measure sUbstitutes for each other, so that 
variations in available wealth must exert a wide impact on sales. A similar 
argument, he suggests, is possible for costs, with the industry affected by a 
sympathetic movement in costs helped by Government action in such areas as 
corporate taxation and minimum wage rates. Insofar as each member's product 
is directed at the same market, each must feel the effect of any change in 
consumers' tastes and must respond to any change in the price of a rival's product. 
In the same way, to the extent that each company employs the same production 
process, it must feel the effect of any labour settlement, any change in material 
costs, or in production techniques. 
From this line of reasoning, Brealey argues that it lS reasonable to assume that 
the variance of a company's earnings changes can be expressed as the sum of a 
common influence, an incremental portion explained by the industry influence and 
residual unexplained varlance. 217 companies with accounts from 1948 to 1966 were 
then selected (non randomly) and as signed to 20 industry grou" s. Us ing. as hi s 
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basic variable the first difference in the logari thIns of earnings per share, 
Brealey goes on to estimate the proportions of variance due to the market and 
industry factors. The estimate for each factor was 21%. In the case of the 
industry factors the proportion of variance explained was generally larger for 
industries characterised by homogeneous product lines, and least for those 
characterised by a diverse range of products, or with strong brand preference0. 
& G b { 32,33} 1 . . . Elton . ru er have a so glven cons1derable attent10n to the group1ng of 
firms. They argue that most empirical work in the area of finance makes tacit 
or explicit assumptions about firm grouping and suggest three reasons why this 
1S so. The first reason - the one with which this study is most concerned -
1S the need to isolate units that should in some sense act alike. The grouping 
of firms by industry implicitly assumes that industrial classification is a 
suitable basis for homogeneity. The second reason they advance is to hold the 
effect of an omitted variable, or group of variables (such as risk) constant; 
failure to hold this effect constant can result in a complete misspecification of 
the relationship under study. The third reason for group1ng is to obtain a 
homogeneous relationship between the variables included 1n a regress1on. 
Suppose for example one was exaIDln1ng a sample of firms that financed their invest-
ments from internal funds. A positive relationship might be expected between 
stock price and payout for firms which earned a low return on their marglnal 
investment and a negative return relationship for firms which earned a high 
return. Pooling the data and carrying out a regression might find no 
relationship between payout and price even though two different relationships 
existed. In such circumstances the usual method of grouping firms by industry 
to overcome the problem is less than ideal. 
Clearly no one group1ng is appropriate for all purposes. The appropri at e 
grouping depends on the objectives of the study and the nature of the process 
under investigation. Elton & Gruber argue that one must first decide why one wants 
homogeneous groups and then with that objective in mind select a variable or 
group of variables with respect to which homogeneity is desired. 
They go on to provide a technique for the clustering of variables based on 
principal components analysis. Their method benefits from beiGg insensitive 
to the correlation and scale of the original variables and is applied by them, 
as an example, to the forecasting of earnings per share for industrial 
corporations. They argue that the determinants of earnings per share are not 
homogeneous across all companies and that improvements in forecasts result from 
the sUbstitution of statistical grouping techniques for groupings based on the 
final product. The results appear to bear their contention out and indicate 
that analysts might benefit from grouping companies according to the particular 
purpose in mind. 
In order to throw light on the related prlce movements of industrial prlce 
{46 } indices, Granger & Morgenstern analysed a number of indices by means of 
cross-spectral methods. Substantial correlations between pairs of indices were 
found, and it was suggested in explanation that traders in one group keep a 
close and constant watch on prlce changes in other sectors of the market and 
then use these price changes as a relevant information about how price should 
change in their sectors. 
. This results in a constant feedback between prlce 
changes in different parts of the market. Estimates of the market factor for 
each of the sectors considered were also computed and found to be substantial. 
However, as Granger & Morgenstern point out, the fact that averages for large 
sections of the market appear to move together, throws little light on the 
extent to which individual stocks move together. An exploratory study of 25 
stocks found little evidence of an important market factor in explaining the 
varlance of weekly price changes, although stocks of closely related companies 
appeared to move together. 
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The overall impression of this survey lS that on balance prlce changes appear 
to be affected by industry and market factors. However the evidence as to 
the strength of these effects is by no means conclusive and it is to this that 
the analysis now turns. 
I . 
Chapter 9 
Sector Influences on Share Price Variability 
The present chapter 1S concerned with establishing whether the classification 
of shares by sector 1S associated with clearly distinguishable sector effects. 
There is no basis for selecting shares from one sector rather than another 
unless the aggregation of shares into sectors is associated with effects 
peculiar to those sectors. In consequence the identification of sector 
effects, as the previous chapter indicated, constitutes the first stage in 
the investigation o'f the usefulness of sector selection techniques. 
To some extent the question of whether sector effects exist or not has 
already been answered. As the discussion of the last chapter made clear, 
several studies have examined the two questions of whether statistically 
meaningful groups exist and whether these groups correspond to industries. 
The circuitous methods employed have however, due to computational 
limitations, tended to narrow the number of industries considered. 
Evidence on non homogeneous industry groups has been particularly scarce. 
In addition almost all the studies have used American data. This study 1S 
aimed at filling some of the gaps by providing evidence for the U.K. and 
1 for a wide range of sectors. 
1. The available data bank consisted of quarterly price information on 520 
companies for the years 1965 to 1970 inclusive. The original intention' 
was to use the companies included in the F.T. Actuaries Index in January 1965. 
However a substantial proportion had been taken over and in order to maintain 
adequate industry representation additional companies were added. Use of 
the F.T. Actuaries companies is equivalent to selecting companies by market 
value. (Generally greater than £4m but varying slightly according to the 
number of companies in the industry with a larger market capitalisation. The 
smaller companies are generally excluded.) Prices were adjusted for rights 
and scrips using Extel cards. They were not adjusted for issues of loan 
stock and convertibles, or for dividends .In general with take-overs the 
taken over company was dropped. Schemes of Arrangement were dealt with by 
using the price information of the dominant company. 
The classification by which companies were assigned to sectors was 
generally that of the F.T. Where possible the analysis tried to use the 
data as it came so that sectors were of unequal sizes reflecting the 
divergence in sector size of the market itself. However at times computational 
and programming requirements demanded equal sector sizes. The shares in-
cluded for each group were then selected on a random basis. It was also 
occasionally necessary to merge small sectors. Efforts ' . .rere made to keep 
the components as comparable as possible. 
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The method of presenting this evidence deserves a few clarifying comments. 
The chapter is centred on testing the hypothesis that the classification of 
shares by sector is associated with clearly distinguishable sector effects. 
In the process a number of different statistical models and subsidiary 
hypotheses are.considered. To present each model, the hypothesis of 
interest and the empirical evidence simultaneously would complicate the 
assessment of the main interest of the chapter, the existence of sector 
effects. In an attempt to overcome this problem, the chapter segregates the 
hypotheses of interest from both the statistical methodology and the empirical 
evidence, each of which is considered separately. 
Hypotheses 
The original objective was to determine whether the variability of the 
prices of the shares wi thin any particular sector was mainly due to factors 
causing movements of the sector as a whole or due to the individual 
characteristics of the different shares. l To this end movement of the 
share price, or more correctly of the share prlce relative,2 was partitioned 
into sector and firm components and the variability of these components 
measured. The ratio of these components was termed the contribution ratio 
and was used as an estimator of the relative strength of the sector and 
firm effects. Values of the ratio larger than one implied that the error sum 
of squares was greater than the sum of squares explained by the sector. Values 
smaller than one indicated that the explained sum of squares predominated. 
Difficulty in specifYing the sampling distribution of the ratio ruled out 
1. No attempt has been made in this study to compare the variance of price 
changes between sectors. For example it might be the case that on average 
the price changes of bank shares have a smaller variance than the price 
changes of rubber shares. Whilst of interest time did not permit 
such an analysis. 
2. Use of the share price relative was an attempt to abstract from 
movements of the market as a whole. 
the application of tests of significance to the relative contributions. 
However Monte Carlo studies provided some data on the values of the 
statistic when no sector effects were present so that approximate standards 
existed against which the relative strength of the sector and firm effects 
could be compared. 
Attempts at probing the contribution ratio in an effort to specifY formal 
hypotheses revealed its close affinity to a one way analysis of variance. 
The null hypothesis of this analysis is that the means of the sectors are 
all equal, and the rejection of this hypothesis implies that there is a. 
significant difference between sectors. The null hypothesis was tested 
both for each time period and for the overall period. 
The null hypothesis that the means of the sectors are all equal is also 
connnon to the second model considered - a replicated measures, hierarchal 
analysis of variance. Whilst the general conception of the model is 
l23 
similar to the one way.analysis of variance de-scribed above, the sophistication 
of the model is somewhat greater. The model relates the rate of return on 
a security to market, sector and firm factors and in addition specifies 
interaction terms that allow one to test the adequacy of the basic structure 
of the model. In particular it allows the' testing of three hypotheses. 
Firstly the null hypothesis that the time (market) means are all equal. 
Failure to reject this hypothesis would indicate the abSence of a market 
effect. Secondly the null hypothesis, described above, that the sector 
means are all equal, and thirdly the null hypothesis that the interaction 
term means are equal. Rejection of this hypothesis would cast doubt on 
the reasonableness of assuming an,additive model. 
Apart from providing mean squares enabling tests of the significance of these 
factors to be made, the model also allows estimates of the variance of the 
I ' 
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components to be ma(~e. 1 
The analysis of varlance simply indicates the existence (or not) of an 
overall sector effect. It tells one nothing about individual sectors. 
In the event of a significant sector effect however it is desirable to 
know which sectors are responsible for this effect. To find this out an 
analysis of means must be employed. A Newman Keuls analysis of means is 
used to indicate the sectors that are not significantly different from 
other sectors. 
Despite the complexity of the analysis of varlance model outlined above, 
it fails to provid~ a mean square suitable for testing the effect due to 
the individual firm. One way of providing such information is to apply an 
analysis of variance to each individual sector and test the null hypothesis 
that all the individual firm means are equal. Apart from providing 
information about the existence of an effect due to the firm, the analysis 
also provides an indirect way of considering sector difference. For 
example if significant differences are found to exist between firms within 
a sector, this may indicate a marked heterogeneity of rates of return within 
the sector, and hence that it is unlikely that a pronounced sector effect 
may be found. 
The estimate of sector effects provided by the replicated measure analysis of 
variance provides data on the overall importance of sector influences for 
a large number of sectors. It is also of interest however to know for 
individual sectors the importance of sector and market effects. One means 
of providing such estimates is through the regression of share price on 
sector and market indices, an approach to the identification of sector 
1. The model employed involves a considerable number of assumptions. 
Tests were also made of the validity of some of these assumptions. 
effects which permits both tests of significance of the regression 
coefficients and estimation of the importance of sector and market effects. 
However, two statistical problems in particular must be noted: the existence 
of multicollinearity between the indices and the close relationship between 
the individual firms in a sector and the sector index. 
Statistical Methodology 
Early attempts to determine whether the variability of prlces within any 
particular sector was mainly due to factors causlng movements of the 
sector as a whole or due to the individual characteristics of the 
different shares, employed a three stage procedure. This consisted of 
partitioning the share's price movement into its components, measuring 
the variability of these components and then subsequently examining the 
statistical properties of the measure employed. 
In an attempt to abstract from movements of the market as a whole, and 
obviate the requirement for a market component in the model, the 
proportional changes in individual share price relatives (rather than simply 
prices) were considered to depend multiplicatively on a component due to 
the firm~ and an element due to the sector. To convert the relationship to 
. . 1 
an additive form a logarithmic transformation wa~ applled to arrlve at 
~.log F = ~.log F. t + ~.log F t J •• t J lS J .s 
where ~.log F t represents the change In the share price relative, ~jlOg Fist J .• 
1. See Appendix 6. 
represents the element due to the firm and ~.log F t the element due to 
J •. s 
1 the sector. 
It was then necessary to devise a measure of the contribution of these 
components to the performance of the share. Since interest is centred on 
the dispersion or variation of the distribution of changes of the logged 
relatives the second moment was used as a measure of these quantities. 2 
In order to compare the contributions of the sector and firm effects to 
the variation in the share price relative, a variety of ratios may be 
formed such as 
n 2 
L (~.log F. t) 
t=l J 1S 
n 2 
L (~.log F ) 
t J • st 
t = 1 ..... n time periods = 
Interest 1n general does not however relate to the relative contributions 
1. At first sight the notation in this chapter is rather confusing. It 
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1S worth noting the following points. Firstly that ~.log F t represents J •• 
the firm relative to the market (since the market index is arrived at 
by summing) of which ~.log F t represents the sector element (hence 
J .s 
summed over i) and ~.log F. t represents the element due to the individual 
J 1S 
firm. 
Secondly, the individual share index (or price) is denoted by I. t(P' t) lS 1S 
. . th . f th t' th. 
where 1 .represents the 1 f1rm or the s sec or 1n the t per1od. 
Sector and market indices are than I t and I t indicating summing over 
. s .. 
all firms in the sector and over all firms and sector respectively. 
Thirdly ~.log I. t' ~.log I t and ~.log I t may be conveniently 
J 1S J • s J .• 
abbreviated by Xist ' X. st and X .. t respectively. 
-
Whilst it would have been possible to use X .. t from the outset it was 
felt that this rather cumbersome notation was more informative. 
2. The analysis was carried out using both the variance and the second moment 
about the origin as measures. The justification for the latter rested on 
the possibility of a strong trend in the data. If for example a sector 
exercised a constant effect over time then it would have no variance as 
the model was originally constructed. Subsequent analysis shows that this 
argument loses much of its force but the second moment about the origin 
turns out in this context to be much more tractable alg~braically. In 
fact variance measures were also calculated and showcl little divergence 
in general from the second moment about the origin. 
of each individual share, as this ratio illustrates,l but to the re:ative 
contributions of sectors and other factors to all the shares in the sector 
taken together. Summing the contributions found for the individual shares 
in a sector leads to a sector contribution ratio 
n ks 2 
E E (A.log F. t) 
t i J lS 
= h 2 
Ek (A.log F t) 
t s J • s 
l = 1 .... k firms in the 
sector 
The ratio indicates the contribution of the sector (A.log F t) and other 
J .s 
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factors (A.log F. t) to the share price movement. 2 J lS Analysis of the firm and 
industry components reveals that the basic variable of the study has become 
I ( f· .)3 A.log . t or X. t or convenlence. J lS lS This may be identified as the change 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Further light on the influence of the individual company on the ratio may 
be gained by substituting back into the ratio, . and indices for prlces 
the expressions A.log F. t and A.log F t J lS J • s 
2 
n [lOg ti;~ + 1 I .st JJ E then C2 t I .st + lSt = +l~ F n fOg (oSi + 1 0 I •. t 2 E I t .. t .st 
Hence a share with a substantial price change from one period to the next, 
will have a larger contribution ratio than a share with a small price 
change over the same period. 
Looking ahead to later results one may similarly show 
firm component in the analysis of variance EEE(X. t -
represented as r (P I ~ ~s 
E. EE. log i~~ + I. lost 
implications. tSl lSt .st + 
See Appendix 8. 
that the individual 
X t)2 can be 
.s 
with similar 
From Appendix 7 it can in turn be seen that A.log I. t = A. log P. t so J lS J lS 
that the basic variable could equally be the change in log prlces. 
in the logarithm of the share price. This variable represents a close 
approximation to the investor's rate of return when dividends are ignored. l 
Composite variables such as ~.log F may be identified as the rate of 
J •• t 
return of a firm abstracting from the market rate of return, ~.log F. t as 
J lS 
the firm rate of return adjusted for the sector rate of return and 
~,log F t as the sector rate of return adjusted for the market rate of J .s 
2 
return. On this interpretation the comparison has become one of relative 
2 
rates of return and the C measures are simply ratios of squared (and summed) 
s 
adjusted rates of return. To probe the meaning of the C2 ratios it is 
s 
necessary to break them down to their basic components. Denoting the basic 
variable as before by ~.log I. t 
J lS = X. t and summing over time, firms, and 1S 
sectors, the partition of the price relatives may be denoted as 
n L ks n L ks X )2 n L X )2 E E E (X. t - X )2 = E E E (X. t + L E ks (X. st 
.• t 1S .st .. t . 1S t t s t S 1 S 1 
n(Ek - 1) n(Ek - L) n(L-l) s s 
the cross product term being zero. Summation over t provides replication 
and may be omitted. In this case the partition is seen to be a one way 
analysis of variance. 
L ks L ks 
- 2 L - )2 - )2 E E (X. - X ) + E ks (x. s - X E E ( x. X = 
. 1S .s . . 1S . . S S 1 S 1 
Providing all the usual assumptions are met, notably the independence of the 
1. Fama has shown that the change in log 
compounding from hol~ing the security 
taken over 
price is the yield with continuous 
for whatever period the change is 
Pis(t+l) = 
P. t 1S 
= 
exp (log 
e 
P. t exp (log Pis(t+l) ) 
1S e P. t 1S 
P ( ) - log P. t) P exp (log is t+l e 1S ist e 
2. Interpretation of these composite variables follow from the demonstration 
in Appendix 6 that ~ .lo.g F t = ~ .log I. t - ~ .log I t and so on. 
J •• J 1S J •. 
( 4) 
( 5) 
explained and error sum of squares, normal distribution of the errors, 
homogeneous population error variances and the additivity of effects, then 
F ratio tests may be carried out. The null hypothesis in this case is 
that the means of the sectors are all equal, implying that there is no 
significant difference between sectors. If the means were not significantly 
different there would be no point in investing by sector as there would be 
no difference between the sectors. When summed over t the null hypothesis 
remains the same although the analysis becomes one of a hierarchal classi-
fication with the sector effect nested within the time effect. The F ratio 
1n this case is of the form 
n L 
- 2 n L 2 L 2: ks(X t- X •• t) In ( L-l ) 2: L ks(~·log F t) In(L-l) 
. s J 
= t s 
J • s t s 
n L ks _ 2 L 
- 1) n L k 2 L 
- 1) 1: 2: 2: (X. t - X t) In2:(ks 2: 1: 2:s(~.log F. t) In 1:(ks 
. 1S .s . J 1S 
S t s 1 S t s 1 
Before considering the underlying model to this breakdown it is useful to 
decompose the sum of squares (4) further in order to throw light on the 
contribution ratios outlined earlier. 
n L ks 
1: 1: 2: (X. t 1S 
t s i 
= 
+ 
+ 
n ks 
.... + 2: ~ (XiLt 
t 1 
+ . . . 
The contribution ratio may now be seen to be simply a ratio of 
n ks -)2 
L L (X. t - X t 1S . s 
t i for the sth sector 
n - X)2 1: ks(X t - t 
t . s . · 
~ 
If the number of firms 1n a sector is taken to be k (the average number of 
firms in a sector )then it can be shown, on the previous assumptions, that 
129 
(6) 
(8 ) 
th for the s sector 
n k 
- 2 -L L(X. t - X.
st ) /Ln(k - 1) t i lS 
~ F , n(L-l), Ln(k-l) 
a. 
and that the expected value of the contribution ratio C2 lS approximately 
s L(k - 1) 
equal to L-l 1 
Monte Carlo methods were also used to establish the properties of the C2 
s 
ratio. The ratio contains two effects reducing its value as sector size 
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decreases. The first of these is the effect due to the better specification 
of the sectors. This may be removed by drawing companies at. random from 
the data, grouping them into sectors of size n (where n varies from 5 to 100 
companies) and conducting the analysis on these artificial sectors. The 
mean value of the Contribution Ratio for each n, then contains only the second 
effect, the effect due to the smaller number of companies, and provides a 
standard against which to judge the values obtained from analysis of the F.T. 
sectors. 2 (Random Sample C values (mean) are given in Appendix 9.) 
It is perhaps useful to review the contents of the last few pages. By 
partitioning individual share price relatives and then measuring the variability 
of the resultant components, a contribution ratio was derived. This measure lS 
an intuitively plausible attempt at estimating the relative contribution of 
the sector and firm effects to share prices (from which the market element 
has been removed.) However problems arise in the specification of the sampling 
(m th(; vaJ ur.:~; ()f the statistic when no aector effects are present and thu~ 
provide an approxirr~te standard against which at least qualitatively, if not 
quantitatively, the relative strength of the firm and sector effects may be 
judged. Such estimates are not available from more orthodox statistics. 
1. An F test is only valid if a number of assum~tions ~re made. 
important of these is th at the numerator ana denomlnator are 
It has not been po~~ible to show this. 
---,--~- -~-
..-r"'~ iiw&;~ 
lbe most lndependent. 
I . 
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The analysis of varlance to which the C2 measure is intimately related, 
s 
only provides information on overall effects. It does not provide data 
at the individual sector level. Tests of means provide information- about 
the existence of differences between sectors but provide little detail on 
the relative strength of effects. Overall one might conclude that whilst 
the contribution ratio is far from ideal, it does provide information un-
available from the analysis of VarlBnCe. It also provides a means of 
corroborating results obtained from elsewhere. 
Analysis of the Contribution Ratio would be incomplete without some discussion 
of its underlying model. Consideration of the Analysis of Variance break-
down (4) indicates that the ratio lS implicitly testing a model of the form 
x. t lS = + E. t lS 
where ~ lS a constant, a a sector effect nested within time and E. t the lS 
error. as(t) and Eist are assumed to be independent and the latter 
normally distributed. 
For each time period the model lS simply 
x. lS = ~ + a + E. S lS 
where a the sector effect lS no longer nested within time. 
s 
The change 
in log price (the rate of return) is treated as if it were composed of a 
constant factor, an effect due to the firm's sector characteristics and an 
error term. The null hypothesis is simply that the sector means are all 
equal. In sample quantities the sector effect may be written as 
(X.
st - X •• t) in (10) and (X. S - X .• ) in (11). 
Despite the original foundation of the model on prlce relatives, in order to 
abstract from movements of the market, it is evident that as it stands the 
model makes no allowance for the existence of a market effect. A more 
realistic hypothesis might be that the rate of return on an individual share 
(10) 
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lS affected by three maln factors , a ma rket effect, a sector effect ~~d 
a fi rm effect (such as its own growth rate ) . Such considerations lead to 
a model of the form 
X. t lS = 
where the variables ~,a and E. retain t heir pre VlOUS interpretation and 
s lSt 
Stan d Yi(s) a re seen as the market and firm e f f ect s respectively , both 
being independently distributed. 
1 SYi(s)t have also been postulated. 
Interact i on t erms o f the form aS
st 
and 
(12) 
Before cons idering the assumptions of thi s model it lS of interest to consider 
the identification of St with a market effect. In s ample ter ms St is of the 
form (X .. t - X ... ) and when squared and summed represent s the variat ion of 
the overall mean of firms and sectors between time periods . In other words 
it is measuring the variation between the whole market at different periods 
f . 2 o tlme. X .. t may be identified as the mean market r ate of r eturn for the 
Hence (X .. t - X )2 indicates the variat i on of the market 
rate of r e turn OVer time. 
t th . perlod. 
1. Interaction terms allow the possib i lity of n on additivity of effects to 
be spe ci fied. The models discussed so far have not include d such t errrlli. 
I n general their specification involves no problems . Note however that 
with nested terms the corresponding interaction terms di s appear. For 
example in the model 
Xist = ~ + as(t) + St + Eist 
2. 
as(t) lS formed from as + a Sst 
-
- X 
. s . 
{Letting a = (X 
s .s. 
then as(t) = (X.
st - X •. t ) is formed by swnming as and aSst } 
To throw more light on this relationship consider a :egression of the form 
X. = b + b X where X is summed over all f l rms a nd sect~rs and 
i~s~alcula~ed a~ th~ arit~eti~ aver~ge ~f . ~jlog Pist (s ee Appendlx 7). 
The regression is postulatlng (for slmpllclty) that t he rat e of return 
is a function of the market rate of return. 
Now the explained sum of squares by time in t he analysis o f variance is 
equal to 
n L - - 2 
while 
(X •• t 
L L ks ( X •• t - X ••• ) 
t s 
t he expla i ned 
- X)2 one may 
2 2 
sum of squares In the r egr esslon lS b LXt . 
. 2 2 
wrlte b £ ~ ks(X - X ) 
t s .. t ... 
Since x 
t 
If b2 equals 1, then the variance explained by time in the analysis of 
variance is equivalent to the element explained by the appropriate trans-
fD~ation tric market index i n a r egress i on . 
= 
:33 
The transformation of the basic variable to the change in the logaritGIT. of 
price, removed the need to detrend the pr1ce ser1es. It also helped reduce 
the problem of increased variance in the price series that might have been 
expected to occur 1n later periods due to the rising price level. Intuitively 
taking logarithms 1S likely to compress the scales and hence reduce the 
. M {7l} . 1ncrease 1n var1ance. . oore has shown emp1rically that on taking 
logarithms most of the problem disappears. The logarithmic transformation 
brings the data closer to that required for the analysis of variance, since 
1n general it has been found that the transformed prices are more nearly 
normally distributed than the untransformed prices. Heterogeneity in the 
error variance (but not necessarily the covariance) is also reduced. 
The model set out in (12) provides the opportunity to test a number of 
different hypotheses. These were discussed earlier and are only mentioned 
I here. The null hypotheses are firstly that all the time means are equal, 
secondly that all the sector means are equal, and thirdly that all the 
interaction term (aB
st ) means are equal. 
computational requirements limited the analysis that might be carried out 
to twenty sectors each of ten firms over the six year period. The twenty 
sectors and the time periods chosen are considered to constitute the 
population of interest with respect to these characteristics. The ten firms 
were chosen at random from within the companies assigned to each sector. 
Before considering the mean squares it seems valuable to replace the 
population parameters with their sample quantities and then derive the 
1. See discussion of hypotheses involved in replicated measures design. 
appropriate sum of 
n L k 
L (X. t -l: l: - X 
t s . lS . . . 1 
nLk - 1 
~quares 
)2 n k(X -= l: L X 
t .• t 
L 
+ l: n k(X 
. s . 
-
X 
s 
n - 1 L - 1 
L k 
)2 n L l: (X. - k(X - -+ n l: - X + L L - X - X S 1 lS. • S • .st . s . t s 
Lk - 1 (n - l)(L -1) 
n L k 
-
+ l: L E(X. t - X. 
t . lS lS. S 1 
- -)2 
- X + X 
. st . s. 
L(k -l)(n - 1) 
-
.. t + X 
1 ~4' 
->-j 
)2 
The model is of the repeated measures type involving assumptions in addition 
to those of the usual analysis. The expected values of the mean squares 
may be shown to be 
Sectors 2 a 
E 
2 
+ na y 
Firms within sectors 2 2 a + na 
E y 
Time 2 a 
E 
2 Sector X time (interaction) a 
E 
Time X firms within sectors 2 a 
E 
+ 
+ 
+ 
2 
+ kna 
a 
+ 
kLa~ 
2 
kLauS 
and the appropriate F statistics to be 
F = MS(sectors) Sector Effect MS(firms within sectors) 
F MS(time) = sectors) MS(time X firms within 
Market Effect 
F MS~3ector X timeL = MS(time firms within sectors) X 
Interaction 
Estimates of the variance components may be obtained from 
2 
a = a. 
= 
= 
MS(sectors) - MS(firms within sectors) 
kn 
MS(time) - MS(time X firms within sectors) 
kL 
MS(interaction) - MS(time X firms within sectors) 
k 
Consideration of the expected values of the mean squares reveals that 
2 
estimates of 8 cannot be made. 
£ 
The mean square used In the denominators of the F ratios represent a pooling 
of different sources of variation. Thus the variation due to firms within 
sectors is the sum of the variations due to 
Firms within sector 1 + Firms within sector 2 + .... + Firms within 
sector L each with k - 1 degrees of freedom. 
For the F ratios to actually follow an F distribution it is necessary that 
these sources of variation are homogeneous. A similar assumption is 
necessary for the MS(time X firms within sectors). The homogeneity 
assumption required for pooling in this case is equivalent to the assumption 
that the correlation between periods for all the firms is constant within 
each of the sectors. Since this is unlikely to be true modified degrees of 
freedom must be used to provide the critical F values for the interaction 
and time factors (see Winer" {lo6}) . These critical values err on the 
negative side and will yield too few significant decisions. It lS worth 
noting that the F tests are robust with respect to most violations of the 
assumptions. 
The analysis of varlance outlined above only provides information on the 
existence of overall sector effects. It tells one nothing about the 
individual sectors. In the event of a significant sector effect it is 
desirable to know which sectors were responsible for this effect. For this 
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purpose a test on means is required. A number of different tests on means 
are possible, the one adopted here is the Newman Keuls procedure. A 
number of factors governed the choice of test. If only a few meaningful 
comparisons were to be made the comparisons of interest being known In 
advance of the ANOVA results, the F test associated with individual components 
of variation would have been most appropriate. Such an a priori comparison 
is justified whether or not the overall F lS significant In contrast to the 
Newman Keuls a posteriori procedure which lS justified only if the overall 
F statistic is significant. The Newman Keuls procedure however may be applied 
to any number of comparisons and hence is more appropriate to the question 
of interest here. The level of significance for the procedure is considered 
individually with respect to each test and is always kept equal to Cl for 
all ordered pairs no matter how many steps apart the means may be. The 
general procedure is to order the means and then take differences of from 
2 to 20 steps in this case. Tabled values for the appropriate Cl and 
number of steps are then multiplied by the standard error of the mean for 
all Observations at a given level of the factor, to provide critical values 
against which the matrix of ordered differences may be compared. A set 
. .. 1 testing order precludes contradlctory declslons. 
The model specified in (12) provided for a firm effect Cli(s). The expected 
values of the MS square however fail to provide a suitable denominator for 
testing purposes and In consequence no information has been provided on this 
effect. th However it lS possible to specifY a model for the s sector 
1. If the interaction term lS significant somewhat different methods 
are necessary. 
1 ~7 
-' I 
1 
of the form 
X. t lS = 
which may provide some evidence on this subject. 2 The model relates the 
rate of return of each firm in the sector to an individual firm factor such 
as the firm's rate of growth (Yi ) and the market factor (St). A number of 
fairly strong assumptions are necessary for the model: no interaction term 
is possible; the Eit are normally distributed, uncorrelated and with 
expected value equal to zero within each of the treatment populations, and 
2 
variance equal to a . 
E' and the effect of treatment St is a constant for all 
observations within treatment population t. 
The no interaction assumption is particularly restrictive and implies that 
the covariance between all pairs of treatment levels are equal. As with 
the repeated measures design the solution turns out to be the use of 
reduced degrees of freedom. F ratios may easily be formulated from the 
expected mean squares with both firm and time effects being tested against 
1. Substi tuting . sample values, summlng and squarlng glves In 
n ks 
- )2 n )2 ks _ - )2 L: k(X t - L: n(X. - X L ~ (Xit X = X + . l . . . t . . . l t l 
nk - I n - 1 k - 1 s s 
+ 
n ks _ 
L: L: (X.
t 
- X. 
. l l. 
t l 
- -
- X + X 
.t • • 
(n - 1) (k - 1) 
s 
2. See earlier discussion of hyp otheses. 
t . 1 he resldual MS. 
this analysis. 
Individual tests on means were not carried out fo~ 
l ~'" jC 
The final approach to the problem of sector effects lS rather more direct. 2 
A regresslon of the form 
th 
for the s sector is p~oposed where ~t and as represent the market and 
sector rates of returns, and E. lS assumed to have zero mean, constant lst 
variance and zero covarlances. The rate of return is postulated as 
depending on the rate of return prevailing in the market and sector. The 
constant is expected to be zero. The data employed to represent ~t and as' 
are the appropriate transformed market and sector indices, X •. 
t 
and X.st' 
respecti vely. " 
Two important statistical problems should be noted with regard to this 
regression formulation. The first is the problem of multicollinearity 
that may exist between the sector and market indices in some of the 
regressions. The use of the trans~ormations, first differences in the 
logarithm of prices, should ameliorate the problem but does not remove it 
entirely. However warning of its appearance is available from examination 
of the correlation coefficient between the two indices. The higher this 
3 
correlation, the more severe the problem. The second important problem is 
-
the relationship between X. t and X t. Particularly for small sectors lS .s 
1. Since the quantity of data involved was small and there was no convenient 
ANOVA programme to hand for the analysis, a regression model was adopted 
with the independent variables as dummies taking the values I or o. 
The analysis then became 
Xit = bo + bZ12 + bZ13 +" .•.. + bZlk + bZ22 + bZ23 + ...• + bZ2t 
where zli represent the individual firm dummies and Z2t represent the 
time dummies. The regression coefficients may then be interpreted 
directly as the differences of each firm or time period from the base (b
o
) 
of firm 1 in time period 1. Note that zll and z21 have been dropped 
to prevent the singularity of the matrix (see SUlts {94 }). 
2. See earlier discussion of hypotheses. 
3. The problem of multi collineari ty does not however pJ"c.. 'Jent one frOM 
measuring the incremental effect of the industry influence. 
Xist may be ~ significant component of the sector index. The same 
problem although to a lesser extent also arises with X ,the market 
.. t 
mean. In an attempt to minimize the problem only large sectors (with 
one exception) were considered: so that X t was calculated Over a consider-
.s 
able number of compan1es. However some bias in the regressions may still 
be expected. 
These regressions (16) and those involving the dummies (15) were both 
estimated on a limited subset of sectors thought to be of particular interest. 
Empirical Results 
Before considering the individual sectors 1n detail it is useful to 
consider whether there is any significant difference between the sectors 
for all sectors and firms. Both the model outlined in equations (10) and 
(11) and that detailed in equation (12) provide some information for 
.. . 1 
establ1shlng th1S. Table 9.1 provides the F values for each individual 
time period derived from testing the first model on time horizons 2 of 3, 
6, and 12 months. 
The F ratio was of the form 
MS (sectors) 
MS(error) = 
L 
L: ks(X 
.s 
s 
L ks 
L: L: (X. 1S 
S 1 
- )2/(L - X - 1) 
.. 
L 
- X )2/L:(ks - 1) 
. S 
S 
L 
- 1) 'V F , L - 1, L:(ks a. 
s 
The overall F statistic (corresponding to the individual F statistic but 
with both numerator and denominator summed over t and divided by n) of 2.88 
(B2B,1~09 degrees of freedom) for the 3 month difference was overwhelmingly 
1. See discussion on hypotheses in particular that relating to the analysis 
of variance arising from the Contribution Ratio and the replicated 
measures analysis of variance. 
2. The procedure adopted is to use non-overlapping periods for significance 
testing to reduce bias, and overlapping periods when the main interest is 
in estimation. Thus in the latter case 1 year horizon price changes were 
from January 1965 to January 1966, April 1965 to April 1966 and so on as 
a result of the use of quarterly data. 
=.40 
significant at the .05 significance level. l The significant F values 
indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis that the sectors had no 
effect. 
Table 9.2 presents the results obtained from the model outlined in equation 
(12) . Two sets of results are presented: the values for 20 sectors selecteQ 
as being of particular interest from all available sectors, and the values 
for 20 sectors selected simply from the industrial sectors. Results are 
presented for a 3 month time horizon only. Both sets of results show the 
same features. The interaction term is insignificant, indicating the 
sui tabili ty of the addi ti ve model, whilst both market and sector effects are 
significant. The null hypothesis of no difference between the means is 
rejected In both cases. 2 
1. 
2. 
Too much reliance should not be placed on the overall F value since the 
error mean square is possibly biased given that the market component has 
not been removed. 
The normal degrees of freedom were used for the analysis since a partial 
test of the homogeneity of the sources of variation carried out using 
the statistic 
max.(8.8. firms w. sector i) F.max = 
min. (8. 8. fi rms w. sect or i) 
where the critical value is F max. (1 _ a)(L,k-l), indicated that the 
hypothesis that the variation is homogeneous for the S.S. (firms within 
sectors) was not contradicted. A similar test on the S.8. (Market X 
firms within sectors) did contradict the hypothesis but the violation 
was not extreme. Transformations to overcome this violation were not 
considered necessary since the F test is apparently robust for small 
violations of the assumptions. 
If modified degrees of freedom were used the market effect became 
insignificant. However there is no particular reason to think that the 
use of the modified d.f. is correct. The correct d.f. lie somewhere 
between the normai and the modified, the critical value depending on 
the extent of the heterogeneity of the covariances. Without more 
information of the extent of this heterogeneity, conclusive answers are 
difficult to arrive at. 
Differences 
Degrees of freedom 
TABLE 9.1 
Individual F statistics 
3 months 
36,483 
2.26 
2.78 
2.G4 
r ')6 C'.-> 
1.43 
2.45 
3.44 
3.35 
1.64 
3.36 
3.06 
2.84 
2.2:; 
2.73 
2.63 
6.27 
1.98 
2. cJ 4 
2.18 
2.72 
2.62 
3.85 
3.04 
6 months 
36,483 
2.64 
2.33 
2.20 
3.46 
2.98 
3.30 
1.88 
4.68 
1.59 
3.40 
4.09 
1 year 
36,483 
1.81 
1.87 
2.71 
3.34 
2.72 
All valur:::3 significant at th8 .OJ ~)ie;nif.icd.nce level 
TABLE 9.2 
a) All Sectors 
df MS F 
Between firms 199 
l(sectors) 19 0.10 2.38* 
Firms within sectors 180 0.04 
Within Firms 4,400 
2 (market) 22 0.16 2.72* 
1.2 (interaction) 418 0.06 1.00 
2 by firms within sectors 3,960 0.06 
b) Indus trials 
df MS F 
Between firms 199 
1 (sectors) 19 0.07 1.67* 
Firms within sectors 180 0.04 
Wi thin firms 4,400 
2 (market) 22 0.14 2.49* 
1.2 (interaction) 418 0.06 0.99 
2 by firms within sectors 3,960 0.06 
All but the interaction terms significant at the .05 level of significance 
(unadj usted degrees of freedom). 
* Significant at .05 level. 
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squares are 
2 
cr 
a. 
2 
(sector) 
(market) 
craS (interaction) 
All Sectors Industrials 
.00026 
.00013 
.00047 
.00001 o 
Unfortunately no estimate is available for the proportion of varlance 
accounted for by each of the other terms in (12), that lS for the error 
term, the firm effect and the market firm interaction. Approximations 
indicate that they account for a sUbstantial proportion of the total 
. 
varlance. Of the remaining variance the market appears to account for 
at least twice as much as the sector in both the Industrials and All 
Sectors analyses. 
Overall the results discussed here provide substantial evidence In favour 
of the hypothesis that a significant difference between sectors exists, and 
encourage investigation of the differences between individual sectors. 
Before considering the differences however it is useful to consider the 
interpretation of the contribution ratio outlined in equation (3). 
Remembering that 
= 
the ratio may be seen to 
of sector and individual 
indi vidual sector of the 
n ks 2 
L L (~.log F. t) 
J lS t i 
n 2 
L ks(~·log F t) 
t J . s 
l = I .••. k firms In 
s 
the sector 
be an attempt to estimate the relative importance 
firm (error) effects. C2 is the ratio for the 
s 
error sum of squares to the explained sum of 
squares. A value smaller than one indicates that the sum of squares 
explained by the sector is larger than the error sum of squares (factors 
peculiar to the individual firm). Large sector effects are indicated when 
the C
2 
measure fuli'ils two conditions, - firstly it is close to one or less, s ! 
2 
and se~on~y it is considerably below the C values for the same size of 
s 
sector with no sector effect. Appendix 9 provides a comparative table 
2 
of C values for varying sector sizes when the condition of no sector 
s 
effect is met. 
It, is perhaps worth considering one or two examples. Cons ider the 
follOwing industry where the total variability lS 0.6314 and the sector 
and individual firm characteristics 0.4164 and 0.2150 respectively. The 
contribution of the sector to variability is almost twice the contribution 
of the error term. Appendix 9 indicates that for any sector size included 
there the results would be significant. In another case however it might 
2 be that C 
s 
= 
0.7251 
0.0699 = 10.37 indicating that the sector sum of squares 
0.0699 was less than 10% of the error sum of squares. If the sector size 
was 5 companies the result would indicate no significant effect, but if 
the sector size was 40 one might attach some importance to the result. 
Clearly this need to consider two factors in the interpretation of the 
ratios is sub-optimal, since it is difficult to attach very much precision 
to the estimate. However the ratios do provide an approximate estimate 
of the strength and importance of sector effects and help augment other 
methods discussed below. 
Table 9.3 tabulates the results for the F.T. Actuaries Sectors. 
Building materials provide an example of a sector with increasing sector 
1 
influence over time. At the 3 month horizon level some 15% of the 
variability of the shares is provided by the sector influence increasing 
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to as much as 40% for the 2 year time horizon. The dominant factor affect-
lng the 3ector is likely to be the extent of building activity both public 
and private. On this, the level of interest rates, the availability of 
mortgages and even the weather are obvious influences. Many more could easily 
1. Note that whilst increasing sector influence over ti;;',,; implies non ra.ndOI;i-
ness, ~t does not necessarily imply any inefficienc in the mark 
TABLE 9.3 
Contribution Ratio for F.T. Actuaries Sectors 
Sector 
Building Materials 
contracting & Constructior, 
Electrical 
Engineering 
Machine Tools 
Misc. Capital Products 
Motors 
Household 
Electronics 
0rewing 
Entertainment 
Food Manufacturing 
Food Retailing 
Newspapers 
Paper & Packaging 
Stores 
Textiles 
Office Equipment 
Shipping 
Chemicals 
Misc. Unclassified 
Property 
Investment Trusts 
Merchant Banks 
Banks 
Insurance (Composite) 
Insurance (Li fe) 
Insurance Brokers 
No. of 
Companies 
25 
13 
("I> , 
11 
64 
14 
18 
18 
12 
13 
20 
11 
22 
11 
13 
15 
30 
22 
7 
9 
18 
37 
23 
20 
7 
4 
7 
8 
8 
3 months 
6.65 
3.70 
6.94 
33.94 
7.53 
16.13 
13.32 
4.98 
4.20 
1.28 
10.60 
12.92 
6.14 
4.99 
6.02 
5.45 
9.31 
4.47 
2.48 
15.56 
27.67 
2.76 
0.63 
1.04 
0.28 
1.64 
0.99 
1.53 
6 months 
5.30 
4.69 
10.84 
35.16 
7.34 
14.74 
13.38 
6.66 
2.97 
0.85 
11.57 
13.71 
5.54 
3.87 
5.22 
4.31 
7.37 
4.69 
2.03 
15.11 
24.64 
1.71 
0.75 
0.69 
0.23 
1.36 
0.99 
0.90 
1 year 
4.24 
6.03 
12.97 
46.47 
6.70 
18.21 
12.84 
7.46 
2.54 
0.62 
13.81 
13.48 
5.53 
3.73 
5.53 
4.12 
7.10 
4.73 
1.10 
10.88 
29.16 
1.07 
0.94 
0.46 
0.50 
5.30 
1.5(; 
0.63 
2 years 
2.45 
17.30 
12.39 
41.65 
5.48 
18.82 
13.20 
4.85 
2 r'l .c~ 
0.86 
17.08 
15.49 
6.77 
12.57 
4.79 
3.87 
5.56 ' 
2.68 
0.76 
7.40 
42.30 
0.67 
1.14 
0.28 
0.3~ 
- 71' j. I G 
1.1.4 
fj.4~ 
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be added. One would expect them to be long term forces restricting the 
firms' activities more in the long run than in the short as indeed is founi. 
How then are the ratios for Contracting and Construction to be explained? 
Far from becoming more important the sector influence declines markedly 
over longer time horizons. Surely the influences providing a sector 
effect in Building Materials should have prevailed in Contracting and 
Construction? After all if the demand for Building Materials fell, one 
would expect a corresponding fall in demand for Contracting and Construction. 
The answer might well lie in terms of risk. The risks are high with the 
possibility of large cost over-runs and substantial losses in a time of 
inflation and financial stringency. The price histories of the constituents 
reflect these divergencies. One concludes then that the economics of the 
sector are such that good management 1S more critical than the underlying 
sector influences, although it might 1n fact be that it is not good 
management that is critical but simply being in the right part of the 
Contracting market for the period concerned. If the sector were partitioned 
into appropriate sub-sectors, sector influences might become clearly 
identifiable. 
Before considering the Engineering sectors, attention must be drawn to the 
diversity of product and processes of individual firms and in consequence 
the difficulty of specifying exact divisions between sectors. The 
relatively small size of the sector effect could well be due to this. The 
results are by no means encouraging. Heavy Electricals show a very low 
and decreasing sector influence o~er ~ime. One might have expected a more 
pronounced sector influence ~articularly over longer time horizons in line 
with ideas of a plant ordering cycle. The small decline 1n the Machine 
Tools ratios might represent 'the effect of the Capital Goods cycle so 
making the sector effect more important over time. In both the Engineering 
and Miscellaneous Capital Goods group the sector influerrce is very small. 
Within the Consumey Durables group Electronics shows a substantial increase 
in the influence of the sector over longer time periods in contrast to 
Motors. The Motors result is rather surprising. Given the pronounced 
change in Car sales that occur and the consequent effect on profitability 
one might have expected a substantial sector effect particularly over 
longer time periods. It might be of course, that the demand for cars 
moves in line with the rest of the economy, so that the forces affecting 
car demand specifically are few. 
Consumer Non Durables show similar characteristics to the other sectors. 
Brewing is revealed as a group in which the sector influence is particularly 
strong. Similar products, processes, retail outlets and methods of 
financing, as well as overall price control are presumably important causes, 
not to mention taxes and weather. It would seem that good iBYestment 
performance depends on buying and selling the sector at the right time, 
rather than on buying the individual share. 
The Brewing result is in some senses surprlslng. The industry is by no 
means totally homogeneous - Guinness is an obvious misfit. Several of 
the brewers are local and subject to considerable speculation as to the 
possibility of takeovers, whilst management and the beers vary considerably. 
These individual differences are apparently secondary. The main variation 
in the shares is accounted for by the sector characteristics. 
Of the remalnlng sectors excluding the Financials, most of the results are 
unremarkable. Varying degrees of sector influence are indicated, with 
Stores and Shipping standing out, the former presumably due to the universal 
importance of the level of consumer spending and labour costs to the sector, 
whilst similarly, factors affecting shipping such as the growth of World 
trade may be particularly clear cut. Chemicals as one might expect appear 
to show sector effects over longer time horizons. 
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It is among the Financial grouplngs that the sector influences predominate. 
Most of the sectors are probably too small to attach much weight to their 
results, but the ratios for Property and Investment Trusts stand out. 
Consider first the Investment Trust ratios. The sector influence decreases 
slightly over longer time horizons but generally is the dominant factor 
affecting the variability of the shares. In the short run all the trusts 
being diversified portfolios, are likely to find it difficult to beat the 
market to any significant extent. As however the time horizon lengthens 
it would seem likely that individual characteristics of the trusts make 
some of them perform considerably better (or worse). The individual 
characteristics that seem most likely to be important, are, the degree of 
gearing, the proportion of the portfolio held in American companies, and the 
quality of management. The degree of gearing is likely to be particularly 
important in that it makes the shares much more volatile. 
Particularly marked is the increase in the sector effect of the Property 
group over longer time horizons. The maln cause of the sector effect is 
likely to have been the similarity of the capital structure of the property 
companles. The sUbstantial debt capital and the consequent leverage In 
earnings with rlslng property rents would seem to have dominated the 
individual characteristics of the shares. Of t:te rest of the Financial 
results, the three Insurance ratios are of interest in showing considerable 
di vers i ty over two year horizons. One might have expected the three ratios 
to have been more or less the same. 
One possible explanation of a low sector effect lS badly defined sectors. 
To this end several sectors were subdivided into more homogeneous components 
After allowing for the smaller sector sizes it appears that stronger sector 
influences may become apparent when the sub sectors are very homogeneous 
d and multl-ple stores, but otherwise the results were groups, such as rugs 
not encouraging. 
To cater for the poss ibility that the classification system used by t ' e F. T. 
and t he London Stock Exchange was not very satisfactory, it was decided to 
re-run the analysis using Broad Sector Groupings based on the F.T. classifi -
cation and grouping based on the Standard Industrial Classification system. 
The results indicated a smaller sector influence in general. 
It would seem overall from the Contribution Ratio results that of the 
larger sectors, Investment Trusts, Brewing and Property stand out whilst 
Stores, Paper and Packaging, Building Materials, and Contracting and 
Construction might reasonably be said to have SUbstantial sector influences. 
How far do these conclusions agree ·with the results of the Newman-Keuls 
analysis? Tables, 9.4. and 9.5 indicate the differences between the means, 
with an * denoting insignificant results (.05 level of significance), for the 
All Sectors and the Industrials analyses respectively. The number of in-
significant mean differences is seen to be very small and almost always for 
1 
adjacent (2 step) mean differences. In so far as the Investment Trusts 
and Brewing both figure as being not significantly different from Insurance 
and Household in the first case, and Printing and Publishing in the second, 
the results are slightly discouraging since one might from the previous 
analysis have expected the mean differences to be largest for all comparisons 
in these cases. The Industrials table indicates even fewer non significant 
differences, although as before the Brewing and Printing figures are 
insignificant. 
Apart from the Contribution Ratio and the replicated measures analysis of 
variance model, the earlier parts of this chapter outlined two other models. 2 
These were both tested on the same limited number of equal sized sectors. 
Table 9. 6 presents the results for (15). It 1S immediately seen that for 
all the six sectors considered the market effect is significant (at the .05 
1. ~otp that differenc~s between means could represent different loadings 
of the market factor. 
? See discu38ion on hypotheses and equations (15) and (16) ln statistical 
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Text cut off in original 
o 
If'l 
r ' t 
.Tools 
.Hld 
.Con 
.E1ec 
Pack 
----
. Stores 
Cars 
0.266 
All Sectors 
B.Mat Elec Plant Brew 
0.287 0.373 0.415 0.472 
0.021* 0.107 0.149 0.206 
0.086 0.128 0 .185 
0.043 0.099 
0.056 
TABLE 9.4 
Prnt. Text Machine Trust 
Tools 
0.495 0.686 0.772 0 . 821 
0.229 0.420 0.506 0.555 
0.208 0.399 0.485 0.534 
0.122 0.31 3 0.400 0.448 
0.079 0.271 0.357 0.406 
0 .023* 0.214 0.301 0.349 
0.192 0.278 0.327 
0.086 0.135 
0.049 
Newman Keuls (me8...71 differen ces) 
Ins. H.Hld C.Con L.Elec Mult Chern F.Ret Bank Fnt Prop 
Store 
---
0.833 0.836 0.9 79 1.010 1.085 1.155 1.191 1. 268 1.67 ') 1.993 
0 .567 0.570 0.713 0.744 0.819 0.889 0.925 1 .002 1. L~06 1 .727 
0.546 0.549 0.692 0.723 0.798 0.868 0.904 0.981 1.385 1.706 
0.460 0.463 0.606 0.637 0.712 0.782 0.818 0.89 5 1.299 1.620 
0.418 0.420 0.564 0.594 0.669 0.739 0.775 0.85~ 1.256 1.578 
0.361 0.364 0.507 0.538 0.613 0.683 0.719 0.796 1.200 1.521 
0.338 0.341 0.485 0.515 0.590 0.660 0.696 0.773 1.177 1.498 
0.147 0.150 0.293 0.324 0.399 0.468 0.505 0.582 0.985 1.307 
0.061 0.063 0.207 0.237 0.312 0.382 0.418 0.495 0.899 1.221 
o .012* 0.015* 0.158 0.189 0.263 0.333 0.370 0.446 0.850 1.172 
0.003* 0.146 0.177 0.252 0.322 0.358 0.435 0.839 1.160 
0.143 0.174 0.249 0.319 0.355 0.432 0.836 1.157 
0.031* 0.lG6 -Et-;-+7-5-- 0.212 0.289 0.692 1.014 
0.075 0.145 0.181 0.258 0.662 0.983 
0.070 0.106 0.183 0.587 0.908 
0.036* 0.113 0.517 0.838 
0.077 0.481 0.802 
0.40 4 0.725 
0.321 
* not significant at the .05 level of significance 
rl 
If"\ 
rl 
Pack 
Ind H. 
Cars 
B.Mats 
Elec 
Plant 
Brew 
Pmt 
F.Man 
Dept.S 
Text 
M.Tools 
H.Hld 
M.Eng 
C.Con 
Lt.Elec 
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.Ret 
Ent· 
Pack Ind H Cars 
0.228 0.266 
0.038 
Industrial Sectors 
B.Mat Elec Plant Bre\-, 
0.287 0.373 0.415 0.472 
0.059 0.145 0.188 0.244 
0.021* 0.107 0.149 0.206 
0.086 0.128 0.185 
0.043 0.099 
0.056 
"-
TABLE 9.5 
---=----
Newman Keuls (mean differences) 
Prot F.Man Dept S Text Machine H.Hld M.Eng C.Con L.Elec Hult Chern Fr. Ret Ent 
Tools Stores 
0.495 0.570 0.645 0.686 0.772 0.836 0.869 0.979 1.010 1.085 1.155 1.191 1.672 
0.267 0.342 0.418 0.458 0.545 0.608 0.642 0.752 0.782 0.857 0.927 0.963 1.444 
0.229 0.304 0.379 0.420 0.506 0.570 0.603 0.713 0.744 0.819 0.889 0.925 1.406 
0.208 0.283 0.358 0.399 0.485 0.549 0.582 0.692 0.723 0.798 0.868 0.904 1.385 
0.122 0.197 0.273 0.313 0.400 0.463 0.497 0.606 0.637 0.712 0.782 0.818 1.299 
0.079 0.155 0.230 0.271 0.357 0.420 0.454 0.564 0.594 0.669 0.739 0.775 1.256 
0.021 0.098 0.174 0.214 0.301 0.364 0.398 0.507 0.538 0.613 0.683 0.719 1.200 
0.075 0.151 0.192 0.278 0.341 0.375 0.485 0.515 0.590 0.660 0.696 1.177 
0.075 0.116 0.202 0.266 0.299 0.409 0.440 0.515 0.585 0.621 1.102 
0.041 0.127 0.190 0.224 0.334 0.364 0.439 0.509 0.545 1.026 
0.086 0.150 0.183 0.293 0.324 0.399 0.468 0.505 0.985 
0.063 0.097 0.207 0.237 0.312 0.382 0.418 0.899 
* 0.034 0.143 0.174 0.249 0.319 0.355 0.836 
0.110 0.140 0.215 0.285 0.321 0.802 
o . 031* o. 106 0.175 0.212 0.692 
0.075 0.145 0.181 0.662 
0.070 0.106 0.587 
0.03~ 0.517 
0.481 
* not significant at the .05 level of significance 
=--52 
TABLE 9.6 
Sector df. SS F 
Building Materials 
Market 22 4.93 5.53 (22,207) 
Firm + Market 31 5.27 4.18 ( 31,198) 
Total 229 13.32 
jJ,f':cwing 
Market 22 2.72 8.38 
Firm + Market 31 2.87 6.27 
Total 229 5.76 
ill v':: s tmen t Trust 
Market 22 I) 5 '< L. ...J C.77 
Firm + Market 31 2.68 5.07 
Total 229 f~. 04 
",~;:;t {"Jll i c s 
Market 22 4.78 4.23 
Firm + Market 31 5.03 j.1O 
Total 229 ] c 41 -) . 
~<ul ti,21e S+.ores 
Market 22 2.56 
1.81 
Firm + Market 31 3.1C) 1.55 
Total 220 15.88 
PrC)2r-~rtl. 
Market 22 3.90 
1.8f) 
Firm 31 
4 - /' 1.70 
+ Market 
• t)f:J 
Total ?29 
2 '.I r r( 
J. ) 
level of significance uSlng unadjusted degrees of freedom). As the 
results are presented no test for the firm effect is reported. However 
simple manipulation yields a suitable numerator and denominator M.S. 
1 for such a test. The firm effect is found to be insignificant. The 
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null hypothesis that the means of the individual shares do not significantly 
differ from each other is not rejected. 
Table 9·7 provides the results of the regressions using a market and sector 
index as the independent variables. The same six sectors, 23 time periods 
and ten firms reported on above were used for the analysis. 
For each sector the results are provided for a regresslon on a constant, 
sector index and the market index, and for the constant and market index 
alone. As an indicator of the extent of multicollinearity between the 
sector and market indices the simple correlations between these two 
independent variables are provided. The correlation between the two lS 
generally high and together with the change in the sign and significance 
of the coefficients of the second regression for each sector, indicates 
the presence of considerable collinearity between the independent variables. 
A frequent consequence of high collinearity between the independent variables 
is to make the variance of the estimates extremely large resulting in a low 
reliability of the estimates. 2 The R may be interpreted as the percentage 
of variation explained by the independent variable. Thus for property 
24.7% of the variation In the sector rates of return (excluding dividends) 
is explained by market and industry factors. 
1. Let 'a' be the number of variables in the market regression with error 
sum of squares of SSE1 and (a + b) be the number of variables in the 
market + firm regresslon with error sum of squares of SSE2 . Then 
(SSEI - SSE2 ) will be an unbiased estimator of 0 2 if there is no firm 
b 
. SSE It may be tested agalnst 2 effect. which is always an unbiased 
T-(a+b) 
estimator of 0 2 , where T is the total number of observations. 
Sector 
Building 1 
M&teria1s 2. 
Brewing 1. 
2. 
Stores 1. 
2. 
Property 1. 
2. 
:nvestment 1. 
Trusts 2. 
Electronic s 1. 
2. 
Constant 
0.0310 
(1.97) 
-0.0031 
(-0.21) 
0.0062 
(0.77) 
0.0075 
(0.80) 
0.0273 
(1.64) 
0.0356 
(2.09) 
0.0290 
(1.23) 
0.0738 
(3.56) 
0.0098 
(1.10) 
0.0215 
(2. 37) 
0.0180 
(1.19) 
0.0275 
(1.78) 
Sector 
Index 
1.7145 
(4. ":,0 ) 
1.2665 
(9.14) 
1.7492 
(4.13) 
1.3619 
(3.67) 
0.8279 
(5.28) 
1.1552 
(3.92) 
TABLE 9.7 
Market 
Index 
-0.6513 
(-1.73) 
0.9457 
(7.25) 
-0.0681 
(-0.63) 
0.6670 
(7.89) 
-0.5820 
(-1.93) 
0.5002 
(3.24) 
-0.2496 
(-0.82) 
0.6473 
(3.45) 
0.0824 
(0. 53 ) 
0.7966 
(9.72) 
-0.0625 
(-0.20) 
1.0470 
(7.51) 
Correlation 
between 
sector and 
market 
independent 
variables 
0.943 
0.743 
0.869 
0.801 
0.868 
0.902 
Corrected 
R2 
0.247 
0.184 
0.421 
0.211 
0.103 
0.040 
0.095 
0.045 
0.364 
0.290 
0.248 
0.195 
15l 
~o. of 
observa~ions 
for t 
st6.L i3t. ic 
227 
228 
227 
228 
227 
228 
227 
228 
227 
228 
227 
228 
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In addition to the difficulties in interpreting the regressions caused 
by ml.L_Jlcollineari ty, problems also arise from the inclusion of the 
dependent variable in the independent variables. For each sector analysed 
the dependent variable, the individual company's change in share price, 
1S a component of both the sector and market mea~s. The problem caused 
by the latter may be safely ignored since the individual company is a small 
part of the market as a whole, but the same may not be true for the sector 
mean. In an extreme example all the components of the sector mean might 
be involved in the regression. To minimize the problem efforts were made 
to use reasonbly large sectors ( with one exception - Electronics) so that 
the sector index was computed using a considerably larger number of companies 
than were involved in the sector regression, but eVen so one would still 
expect an upward bias in the regressions involving the sector index. This 
problem and that of multicollinearity indicate that considerable care must 
be taken in the interpretation of these regressions. Despite these problems 
however the regresslons do provide useful, additional estimates of the 
variation accounted for by sector and market effects. 
OVerall the conclusion, both for the regresslons outlined above and for the 
variety of other tests carried out, must be that there 1S considerable 
support for associating distinguishable sector effects with the classification 
of shares by sector. Analysis of both a large nuinber of sectors by means of 
the analysis of variance and individual sectors by means of regression indicates 
that sector and market effects are significant. Estimation of the importance 
2 .. d 
of these effects is more difficult. Consideration of the C statlst1c an 
s 
the individual regressions indicates that for a few homogeneous sectors 
market and industry factors may account for more than 25% of the variance. 
The effect for all sectors (or a large subset thereof) is probably lower, 
although lack of a suitable estimate for the error variance in the analysis 
of variance made a precise estimate by this means impossible. Investigation 
of a component corresponding to the individual firm, such as the firm's 
rate of growth, revealed little additional information. It did not appear 
to be significant for any of the sectors considered, although it was 
important for one or two individual firms. 
Tne conclusion that sectors, and ln particular homogeneous sectors, are 
influenced by an industry effect clear the way for an investigation of the 
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two further questions posed in the previous chapter. Do investment managers 
select shares by sectors? and Is sector selection a valuable investment 
technique? Attempts to answer both these question are discussed in the 
next chapter. In so far as the answer to the latter question depends 
largely on the managers' abilities to forecast relative sector rankings, 
further evidence derived from published studies is discussed in the chapter 
following that. 
l 57 
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Chapter 10 
The Contribution of Sector Selection to Performance 
Tne previous chapter established that sectors are influenced by industry 
events. This conclusion provides the foundation for the investigation of 
the questions posed earlier. Do investment managers select shares by sectors? 
and Is Sector Selection a valuable investment technique? Both questions are 
cons idered here. The first is ascertained by a comparison of the holdings of 
a portfolio selected by means of sector techniques with the holdings of a 
portfolio selected by chance. The second is answered by a comparlson of the 
performance of a portfolio, its shares selected on the basis of sector 
characteristics,with the performance of a portfolio composed of sector equivalent 
investments. 
The ideas and justifications behind these two camparlsons are easily explained. 
For convenlence they are described here. The technical problems involved in 
the implementation of the comparlsons and the results are discussed later. 
The question~do managers select shares by sectors, is examined first since its 
fulfillment is a necessary condition for ascertaining the value of sector 
selection as an investment technique. 
Consider an investment selection technique, completely uncorrelated with 
sector selection methods, that selects shares for a portfolio on the basis of 
the individual characteristics of the securities. On average, provided the 
portfolio contains a large number of individual securities, one might expect 
the distribution (by sector) of holdings in this portfolio to correspond to 
the distribution (by sector) of the population of securities from which they 
were chosen" (termed the market distribution hereafter.) By way of contrast, 
if the shares selected for the portfolio are chosen on the basis of their sector 
characteristics (or by some correlated technique) then one might expect 
substantial divergence between the distribution of shares within the portfolio 
and the market distribution. This deviation of the portfolio distribution from 
the market distribution may be considered to provide a measUre of the extent 
of sector selection. 
The comparlson of market and portfolio distributions involves the question 
of time. The simplest procedure is to compare the distributions at the s~e 
date. A portfolio may be thought to represent the Fund Manager's beliefs 
about which sectors he should be invested in, so that comparison of the 
actual portfolio with the· market should reflect any sector deviation. It 
might be however, that at any moment of time the fund manager is altering his 
policies so that remnants of some former selection decisions remain in the 
portfolio. Hence sector selection may also be thought of as the deviation of 
h f t ... 1 purc ases rom he market dlstrlbutlon. 
Thus deviation between the portfolio and the market is seen to lie at the heart 
of the investigation of whether managers select shares by sectors. In contrast 
the evaluation of the value of sector selection as an investment technique 
relies on comparisons of performance. The performance of an actual 
portfolio, its constituents selected on the basis of their sector characteristics, 
is compared with the performance of equivalent amounts invested in the 
appropriate sector indices. Performance of the portfolio close to the sector 
equivalents and substantially better than the market over several periods 
would provide prima facie evidence of the success of sector selection as 
1. Analogously one may also consider the deviation·of sales from a norm - the 
market value of each sector held in the portfolio. If sales correspond 
to' the portfolio balance (that is, the distribution of sales correspond to 
the portfolio distribution) then there would be no evidence of sector 
selection taking place. If however sales were predominantly in one, 
or a few sectors, significant deviation might occur and indicate the 
influence of sector selection. 
an investment technique. l 
To facilitate comparlson between the portfolio and the sector equivalents 
. 
the change ln \alue of the portfolio was broken down into a number of 
components such as the change in value of the shares held throughout, the 
change in value of the shares bought during the period and held until the 
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end, and the change in value of shares held at the beginning of the period 
but subsequently sold. A breakdown of this type enables the behaviour of 
the two portfolios to be compared in greater detail than might otherwise 
be possible. It may also throw some light on the particular talents of 
the fund manager. Consistent ability to select shares that perform above 
average on a short term basis may be reflected by superior performance 
relative to the sector or the market in one of the components. 
The extent of sector selection 
The technical problems involved ln measuring the deviation between the 
distribution of holdings of an actual portfolio and the distribution of 
1. In fact two interpretations of the evidence are possible. The first 
assumes that the sector deviation of the portfolio is predominantly due 
to the sector selection methods used by the managers and on this 
assumption endeavours to judge the value of sector selection as an 
investment method. In view of the managers' claims that they select 
shares by sector this interpretation is preferred here. 
The second more conservative interpretation considers that sector 
deviation could have been caused by the use of a correlated technique 
that causes substantial sector deviation and hence that the deviation 
is not necessarily a direct resultant of sector selection methods. The 
portfolio performance analysis then asks whether the shares selected 
for the portfolio were representative of their industry and selected 
for their sector characteristics, or whether the shares were unrepresen-
tative of their sector and likely to have been chosen for their individual 
characteristics. (It is possible that shares are selected for their 
sector characteristics but fail to behave according to the sector or 
alternatively that they are bought for their individual characteristics 
but behave according to the sector. These effects cannot be separated 
out but it seems reasonable to presume that on average shares selected 
for their sector characteristics behave accordingly, and vice versa.) 
The sector equivalent portfolio indicates what would have happened had 
the contribution to the portfolio been purely due to the sectors the 
portfolio was invested in. 
Text cut off in original 
" 
securities on the market, mainly revolve around the formation for each of 
the twc portf'oliosl, of a distribution of securities. 
The first step in the analysis was to classify the constituents of both the 
portfolio and the market distributions2 into sectors, since it is the sector, 
not the security deviation that is of interest. The classification scheme 
used was that of the F.T. which was thought to provide a reasonable balance 
between a classification that divided the market into a few large sectors with 
consequently l ittle sector deviation, and a classification which divided th~ 
market and the portfolio into many small sectors and hence confirmed substantial 
• . J3 
sector devlatlon. To classify the market portfolio by means of the F.T. 
classification lS a sUbstantial task. To lighten the burden the market portfolio 
was considered to consist of the 600 or so stocks that were included in the 
F.T. Actuaries indices. The effect of this restriction was to introduce a 
size bias into the analysis. However the impact of the bias was probably fairly 
small since many of the stocks excluded were small and unmarketable with little 
institutional dealing, whilst the securities of interest to fund managers were 
generally, because of time constraints, the larger more important companl es. A 
rather more important bias was that arising from the exclusion of virtually till 
foreign stocks from the data. Apart from the classification of the constituents 
of the market portfolio into sectors with each firm weighted by its market value, 
it was necessary to classify the holdings of the portfolio with which the market 
1. For convenlence all the securities in the market are considered as 
elements of a portfolio - the market portfolio. 
2. Strictly it is not the market distribution that lS of interest but the 
population from which all s ecurities are chosen by the investment managers. 
Such a population is very large and difficult to document and as an 
approximation might be restricted to the stocks quoted on the London Stock 
Market. 
3. At on e extreme is the case where the distribution of securities on the 
market and the portfolio distribution each comprise one large aggregate 
sector. In consequence there can be no sector deviation and hence no 
sector selection. At the other extreme, division of tne market and the 
portfolio into many small sectors increases the likellnood of the portfolio 
deviating from the market. For example, if each firm comprises one secto 
then to portfolio that doesn't contain all the firms 
lS being compared into their sector components. The value of each 
company's holding in the portfolio provided the weights for the distriuution. 
A large holding by value implied a large wei~lt for that company. 
large holdings in the same sector imply a large sector weight. 
Several 
Once this classification of the market and portfolio was complete, tte 
measurement of deviation between the actual portfolio and the market 
portfolio was straightforward. The distributions were simply compared at 
the same date and the deviations measured. The same claim cannot however 
be made for the more sophisticated analyses comparlng the distribution of 
a purchase portfolio. It represents the purchases made by the fund 
manager over some period of time, generally six months. l With what market 
portfolio2 should it be compared? That of the beginning date at which 
purchases were started, or that of the date when purchases were completed 
or some period in between? The procedure adopted was to compare the 
purchases with the market at the last date. Investigation of the effect 
1. Over what period should comparlsons involving purchases and sales, be 
made? Over a very long time period it might be the case that the 
distribution of purchases corresponds to the market distribution. 
Over the very short period, the discreteness of the investment procedure 
might give the appearance of a considerable deviation in the distribution 
The appropriate time period is likely to vary with the portfolio being 
considered. A high turnover is likely to require a relatively short 
period. A general problem of the analysis is that policy is constantly 
changing. The purchases and sales over a period may represent the 
views of several different fund managers who have all managed the 
portfolio. Even if this is not the case anyone fund manager is 
confronted with a changing set of expectations necessitating changes of 
policy. The basic period for purchases and sales portfolios adopted 
in this study was six months. Such a time period represented a consid-
erable turnover for the portfolios. It was also unlikely that more 
than one fund manager exercised control over such a period. 
2. It is the market portfolio with which it is compared and not the change 
in the market portfolio. A comparison such as the latter would 
provide information on the adjustment of the fund manager to changes In 
the market distribution rather than evidence of sector selection. 
of uSlng different market dates revealed little difference over short 
h . I purc ase perlods. 
A question arlslng from the analysis relates to what is meant by purchases. 
A number of means of measuring purchases are apparent. The simplest is 
to use the change In market value between two dates for each sector, convert 
this into a proportion and then compare it with the market distribution of 
the appropriate date. Such an approach is obviously only a rough 
approximation to the purchases (or sales) that have been made. A more 
sophisticated approach is to derive the change In numbers of shares for 
each security, and sector and then to multiply by the share price to bring 
. 2 
the figures back to market values. 
This second procedure indicates the purchases that haVe been made more 
accurately than the aggregate sector approach. In effect the former 
provides the net change over the period. The changes due to purchases or 
sales are included within an overall figure for capital appreciation or 
depreciation. An apparent change in purchases (sales) may be caused 
simply by an increase (decrease) in the price of the shares in the sector 
and no actual change in purchases (sales). OVer short time periods, 
however, the impact of these changes is small. Some problems still exist 
in the second approach, in that the shares are assumed to be bought at the 
last date of the portfolio. If they had been bought just after the first 
date then considerable appreciation or depreciation might have taken place 
1. The deviation of sales from the market value of the portfolio is 
compared ~ith the portfolio at the beginning of the sales period. In 
fact little attention is paid to sales in the analysis that follows. 
This is because the number of sales transactions tended to be small over 
most of the period considered. The factor mainly responsible for this 
was the fast growth of the portfolio during the bull market. New money 
coming into the portfolio removed the need for sales in order to change 
the balance of the portfolio. 
2. The price used is that of the latest balance sheet data. The price that 
ideally should be used depends on when the shares were bought. This 
information is not conveniently available and approximations were 
necessary. 
and be included In the purchase (or sales) figure. 
Sector Deviation Measures 
With the criteria for constructing both the market and sector distributions 
decided on, appropriate measures of deviation may be considered. The task 
is to compare the distributions in order to indicate whether sector selection 
takes place. Two possible results may usefully be considered to illustrate 
this procedure. The first consists of a comparison of the distributions 
and no deviation being found. The distributions in terms of proportions 
are exactly the same. The second case is where the entire portfolio is 
concentrated in the smallest sector in the market and hence the deviation 
is considerable. In this latter case sector selection (or some correlated 
technique) might reasonably be thought to have taken place. 
Two measures of deviation were adopted for comparing the dlstributions. 
The first was an absolute deviation measure of the form 
= 
1 n 
L: 
2 . 1 l= 
x. - x. 
l l 
where there are i sectors and x. represents the proportion of the market 
l 
taken up by the sector and x. the corresponding proportion of the portfolio. 
l 
This measure has certain numerical advantages since it varies linearly 
between 0 and 1. Consider the following cases. If for example x. = x. l l 
for all l then Dl = o. If on the other hand the investment in the 
portfolio is concentrated entirely in the smallest market sector n then the 
1 deviation ratio approaches one. The value of Dl 1S seen to increase, 
as the portfolio becomes more heavily concentrated in a few sectors. ThliS 
a portfolio distri1;uted in the same proportiuns as the market but confined 
to sectors compr1s1ng half of the total market value of all securities 
would have DI = 0.5 Concentrated in 40% of the total market in the same 
proportions would give a DI = 0.6 and so on. 
In terms of purchases and sales, purchases made over all sectors in 
proportion to the market distribution will involve low deviation whilst 
purchases concentrated in a few sectors will involve high deviation. 
Similarly 1n terms of sales, sales concentrated in a few sectors will 
involve high deviation whilst sales made over all sectors corresponding 
to the portfolio distribution will involve low deviation. 
The second measure for considering the portfolio deviations was of the form 
n ~ 2 
= I I ~ (x. - x.) 
n. 1 1 
1 
an ordinary least squares goodness of fit test. Interpretation of the 
squared deviation measure is not so easy. Algebraically it is akin to the 
1. 
n 1 ~ 
DI = - ~ x. - x. 2 1 1 1 
~ I n-l 10 1)+ xl } = 2{(~ - x. x -1 n n 
1 
~ n n-l 
where x = I = r x. = ~ x. + x n 1 1 n 1 
1 n-l = ( x ) - ~ x. + x 2 1 n n 1 
n-l 
= ~ x. 
1 
1 
Now as x tends to zero, n-l tends to one Slnce n 
n L x. E x. = I 1 . 1 
1 1 
portfolio's standard deviation uSlng the market as a standard of . ~ 
cOI:(par.:.. son. 
It is to be noted that the measure glves greater weight to the extreme 
differences than does the absolute deviation measure. 
Both measures suffer from a problem related to the number of companles In 
a portfolio. The assumption is made that if the shares were selected on 
the basis of their own characteristics then one might expect the portfolio 
distribution between sectors to conform to that of the market and hence to 
exhibit zero deviation. Now if many portfolios were analysed and if the 
number of companies invested in each were very large, one might expect the 
deviation to be close to zero, but in general the number of companies is 
unlikely to be sufficiently large for this to be the case. If only a few 
companies are selected then a fairly high deviation is likely to arise by 
. 2 
chance each tlme. 
It is obviously desirable to have some knowledge as to the likely value of 
each of the. measures with varying numbers of transactions. Consequently 
a large number of portfolios are constructed by random procedures (so 
implying no sector selection to be present) and the deviation measures 
calculated. The probabiiity of selection of a share was dependent on the 
proportion of its market value relative to the market values of all the 
shares from which it was selected (a population of some 520 stocks). Failure 
to weight the probabilities of selection in such a manner would have meant 
that sectors with a small number of companies, such as oils, would have 
been consistently under-represented. Constraints on the size of holding 
in anyone share were imposed with a maximum of 5% for the portfolios 
1. It is of interest to note the relationship of the meas~e to a chi-square 
test where x. represents the expected observations and Xi the observed 
l 
observations. Note however that chi-square is not applicable in this 
situation since relative frequencies are being compared. 
2. If for example the number of investments made is less than the number 
of sectors then deviation must arise even if the shares are chosen 
at random. 
involving more than 50 stocks and 10% for smaller portfolios. l 
r:rhese random portfolio calculations provide information not only on the 
influence of the number of holdings on the statistic but also suggest a 
comparison standard against which to judge the extent of deviation. 2 (see 
Appendix 10.) 
Rc:-s'Lil ts 
First attempts at measur1ng portfolio deviation concentrated on comparlng 
the actual portfolios with the market. Table 10.1 presents the results 
for the F.T. Actuaries calssification. Comparison with the randem sector 
results indicates a significant and sUbstantial sector deviation when 
measured in terms of Dl , the absolute deviation measure. 
An analysis of means corroborated this. The means of the random samples 
(denoted Dl random) and of the Dl values in Table 10.1 (denoted Dl actual) 
are significantly different. Using the random sample values for portfolios 
of 40 stocks3 the Dl actual and random mean comparison gave a t value of 
5.64 with 55 d.f. so rejecting the null hypothesis that Dl actual and Dl 
random are equal (HI : DI actual > Dl random) at the .05 level of 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Note that this constraint is in line with the max1mums found for the 
~ctual portfolios. While the Department of Trade and Industry restrict 
portfolio constituents to less than 5% of the value of the fund in 
general, this is far from the case in the portfolios analysed here, 
since foreign stocks are left out so that 5% of the total portfolio 
constituted a larger proportion of the actual analysed portfolio. 
It is difficult to construct portfolios composed of purchases (or 
sales) by random means. It is therefore necessary to use the random 
results for actual portfolios as proxies for the figures of random 
purchase portfolios. 
Use of the' random sample values for portfolios of 40 stocks 1S ln fact 
likely to underestimate the actual t value since the number of stocks in 
the actual portfolio is generally considerably more than 40. 
TABLE 10.1 
Values of the Sector Deviation Measures Derived 
from a comparison of the portfolio and market 
distributions 
Portfolio and Market Dates Dl 
April 1968 
Oct. 1968 
April 1969 
Oct. 1969 
April 1970 
Oct. 1970 
April 1971 
MEAN 
ST. DEV 
0.56 
0.57 
0.54 
0.51 
0.58 
0.51 
0.52 
0.54 
0.029 
D2 
4.40 
4.31 
3.89 
3.99 
4.26 
3.77 
3.61 
4.03 
0.298 
167 
168 
. . f" 1 Slgnl lcance. Comparison of the D2 squared deviation measure (D
2 
actual) 
and the D2 from the random samples did not look so hopeful. Early portfolio 
values looked encouraging but later values seemed little different from those 
found for random samples. Again a test on means was carried out. Using 
the random sample portfolios of 40 stocks at t value of 3.95 was obtained 
with 55 d. f. 2 Overall it seemed reasonable to conclude that there was 
evidence of sector deviation using even a relatively crude comparison such 
as actual portfolios. 
The next step was to consider the simple purchases portfolio. 3 Consideration 
was given to purchases in order to overcome the problem of finding no sector 
deviation when in fact sector selection had taken place, a result of 
portfolios containing a substantial number of stocks - remnants of former 
policies - which were relatively unmarketable and not quickly saleable. 
If this is the case greater sector deviation should be found in purchase 
portfolios since such portfolios do not represent the result of a variety 
of different philosophies. Table 10.2 provides some information. The 
12 month values are not of course independent and the tests may be biased 
1. On several occasions although not in fact this one, the two means being 
compared appeared to come from populations with different variances. 
The violations were not severe so it was not thought worthwhile to explore 
possible tests when the variances are unequal. What is of interest is 
why the variances should be unequal. One possible explanation is that 
high v~riability in the measures particularly for the purchases portfolios, 
arises from variations in portfolio behaviour over time. Different 
fund managers might be expected to use sector selection techniques to a 
lesser or greater degree with consequently, considerable variation in the 
deviation measures. In some periods there is little sector selection and 
in others a great deal, so that the deviation measures varies considerably 
more than when portfolios are simply selecte.d by random selection. 
2. However in this case the means appeared to come from populations with 
different variances. 
3. The change in market value of the sector with a positive change 
indicating a purchase and a negative change a sale. 
TABLE 10.2 
Deviation Values of Purchases Portfolios 
(first definition of purchases) 
6 months 
April 1968 to Oct. 1968 0.59 
Oct. 1968 to April 1969 0.63 
April 1969 to Oct. 1969 0.78 
Oct. 1969 to April 1970 0.67 
April 1970 to Oct. 1970 0.73 
Oct. 1970 to April 1971 0.69 
Mean 0.69 
St. Dev. 0.077 
12 months 
April 1968 to April 1969 0.59 
Oct. 1968 to Oct. 1969 0.65 
April 1969 to April 1970 0.66 
;)Ct. 1969 to Oct. 1970 0.67 
~pri1 1970 to April 1971 0.75 
Mean 0.66 
St. Dev. 0.057 
4.39 
4.85 
6.65 
5.57 
5.90 
7.28 
5.77 
1.08 
4.58 
5.35 
5.24 
5.03 
G.48 
0.70 
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. l.n consequence. A test on means between the 6 months purchases portfolio 
Dl measure and the random sample portfolio of 30 stocks D 1 produced a t 
value of 7.6 with 54 d.f. l Encouraged by this success the more refined 
calculation of purchases were computed. 2 Details of the results are given 
in Table 10.3. Calculation of t values once more give significant values 
for both the' Dl d D an 2 measures. 
To provide an indication of the reliability of these results some of the 
assumptions underlying these results were varied. The results confirmed 
their reliability. Thus using the earliest market for the 6 month comparison 
with purchases, instead of the latest market, made only a negligible 
difference to the Dl and D2 measures. The mean values also remained 
virtually the same (0.65 and 5.19 respectively.) Similarly valuing the 
change in the number of securities purchased at the earliest, rather than 
the latest price, produced only very small changes in the DI and D2 measures. 
(The new means were 0.64 and 5.28 respectively). Such results seemed to 
indicate that the purchases figures were fairly robust and indicated quite 
well the extent of sector deviation. 
1. The 30 stock random portfolios are used because the purchase portfolios 
are generally smaller in terms of number of holdings than has been the 
case in the previous comparisons. In fact all the present comparisons 
involve more than 30 stocks. Note that in this case the null hypothesis 
that the means came from populations with the same variance is not 
rejected. 
2. Figures for sales were also calculated. The results are not included 
here as it was difficult to provide any meaningful comparison standard. 
The values of the deviation ratio were in general low, indicating that 
the distribution of sales corresponded closely to the actual portfolio 
distribution at the beginning of the period over which the sales were 
calculated. Hence overall, the conclusion from consideration of sales 
seemed to be that there was little sector deviation. However the low 
number of sales that took place made these figures considerably less 
reliable than the purchases data, and it was not felt safe to place 
much weight on the sales results. This belief was confirmed when by a 
varying of the assumptions under which the analysis was made, d~ff:rent 
results could be obtained with higher values for the sector deVlatlon. 
TABLE 10.3 
Deviation Values of Purchases Portfolios 
(second definition of purchases) 
6 months 
April 1968 to Oct. 1968 0.58 
Oct. 1968 to April 1969 0.56 
April 1969 to Oct. 1969 0.62 
Oct. 1969 to April 1970 0.69 
April 19'(0 to Oct. 1970 0.70 
Oct. 19'(0 to A.pril 1971 0.68 
Mean 0.64 
St. Dev. 0.06 
12 months 
April 1968 to April 1969 0.53 
Oct. 1968 to Oct. 1969 0.50 
April 1969 to April 1970 0.62 
Oct. 1969 to Oct. 1970 0.60 
April 1970 to Aoril 1971 0.69 
Mean 0.59 
St. Dl?v. 0.07 
:71 
4.37 
4.03 
5.09 
5.62 
5.61 
". "1 o.~ 
5.21 
0.91 
3.,'35 
4.10 
4. 7~~ 
)~ . ~~ ~ 
L r-, '·l 
.) • ~ f'.. 
-_. 
4.45 
0.54 
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Overall it seemed reasonable to conclude that in the portfolio investigated 
there did appear to be considerable evidence of sector selection (or some 
correlated technique) taking place, so bearing out the assertions of the 
Managers that shares were selected on the basis of their sector characteristics. 
Portfolio Performance 
A comparison of ,portfolio performance as the introduction to this chapter 
made clear, is the basic idea behind the techniques for evaluating the value 
of sector selection. The performance of an actual portfolio, its 
constituents selected on the basis of their sector characteristics, lS 
compared with the performance of equivalent amounts invested in the 
appropriate sector and market indices. 
To establish the contributions of sector and market eClui valent investments 
it is necessary to find the change in value of the portfolio over time 
period t to t+h for both the actual portfolio and a portfolio of sector 
(market) equivalent investments. To aid the analysis the change in value 
of a portfolio (~Vt) is decomposed into a number of components. Let 
= 
where Vt 
. the value of the portfolio at 1S the beginning of the period and 
Vt +h its value at the end of the period; 
Now 
Vt = Zt + Ct 
where Zt is the value of shares in the portfolio at time t and Ct 1S the 
. t 1 cash at t1me • 
1.· Note that 
= 
m n· J 
L L 
J 1 
q. °tP • °t 1J 1J 
. .th 
where q ~s the quantity of the 1 
share 1n the jth sector held at time t, and p. 't the respective pr1ce. 1J 
There are n. shares in the m sectors. 
J 
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The value of 8hares at time t (Zt) is composed of the shares held throughout 
over the period t to t+h and the shares held at t but sold before t+h. 
Letting St be the initial value of the shares held throughout and D
t 
Ghe 
initial value of the shares subsequently sold then 
= 
and similarly 
= 
where St+h is the final value of shares held throughout. P . t+h 1S the 
final value of shares purchased .during the period and Ct +h is the cash 
held at t+h. l 
Consideration of the cash term Ct +h reveals that it consists of the initial 
cash plus or mlnus some quantity x which represents the difference between 
the value of the shares sold during the period and the value of shares 
subsequently purchased. 
x = D - P t+k t+g 
where D
t
+k is the value of shares sold during the period and Pt +g 
is the 
. . d 2 values of shares bought dur1ng the perlo • 
Thus = 
Substituting into ~Vt = 
glves 
= 
where ~St is the change in value of shares held throughout (~St = St+h - St)· 
6.P t is the cha.nge in the value of shares bought during the period and held 
1. 
2. t < t+k < t+h 
t < t+g < t+h 
m n' 
l: l:J P . 
. . qij(t+h) ij(t+h) 
J 1 
when k = g, purchases and sales are synchronised. 
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until t+h(~Pt = Pt +h - Pt +g ) and ~Dt is the change in value of shares held 
at t and sold during period t to t+h(~D = D - D ) 
t t+k t· 
Until now it has been assumed that no securities are both bought and sold 
in the period. If purchases occur at Ft +k and sales at Ft
+
g 
then one may 
analogously have a quantity y = (F F) t· . t+g - t+k represen 1ng the d1fference 
between purchases and sales during the period. 
Theh 
and 
= 
P + F F t+gt+g - t+k 
~St + ~P + ~F + liD 
t t t 
where liFt is the change in value of the purchases during the period that 
are subsequently sold before the end of the period. No account has so 
far been taken of inflows of money (M) into the portfolio, of dividends 
and interest received (I), expenses (E = aVt +h ) or taxes (T = y(Vt +h - Vt .)) 
The complete model of the change in value of a portfolio allowing for these 
1 items may be represented by 
= 
However the object of the analysis is simply to compare an actual and a 
notional sector portfolio. In consequence several simplifications are 
possible. Thus M is the same in both cases and may be ignored. It 1S 
also legitimate to ask whether E and T may be ignored. Expenses are a 
1. One may easily show this. For example, assume that new money inflows 
(M) occur and are kept as cash. Then M is simply an addition to Ct +h 
that is Ct +h = Ct + Dt +k - Pt +g + M. 
If M had been totally invested at t+g say, then Pt would include shares +g 
bought with M. Hence liP would contain all the increase (decrease) ln 
t 
value due to M. If M was actually negative - redemptions - then liDt 
would pick up the change. In both cases it is still necessary to 
include the term M since liP or ~D only record the change in value due 
to M. The portfolio also ~hangestin value by the absolute amount of M. 
The same reasoning applies to I, E and T. 
function of the end value of the portfolio, generally a percentage. 
Deduction of expenses from the change in value of the actual and sector 
equi valent portfolios vrill reduce the difference between the two Slnce a 
larger absolute amount of the more successful portfolio would have to be 
. ~ palQ. The same is true of taxes and indeed in certain circumstances the 
tax payable may be a larger proportion of the gain of the more success ful 
portfolio than of the less successful one. In consequence it would seem 
reasonable to ignore expenses and taxes and compare the portfolios on a 
gross of tax and expenses basis. It remains then to estima~the components 
of 
= 
for both portfolios, uSlng the actual values ln one case and index equivalents 
. ln the other. 
The procedures used to estimate these components has much ln common with 
the sector deviation methods outlined previously. The firms were segregated 
into sectors and the necessary exclusions of foreign (and a few other) firms 
made in order that the data was compatible with the sector indices available. 
The individual components were then estimated. For each sector an estimate 
of the value of the shares held throughout, the shares bought during the 
period and held, the shares owned at the beginning and sold before the end, 
and shares both bought and sold, were made. For any individual security 
it was quite possible that some shares were held at the beginning of the 
period, fUrther shares were subsequently added, and then all the shares were 
sold during the period. As before the number of shares held were adjusted 
for rights, scrips and divisions and then multiplied by the appropriate price 
to give an estimate both of the cost of the investments arid of their value 
when sold. The difference between the cost and the sale proceeds gave the 
change in value for each security. Summed, for each sector and for the 
portfolio, the ensuing results provide estimates for the performance 
comparison. 
It was also necessary to calculate the performance of an equivalent sector 
portfolio. To this end, the actual amount (cost) of shares in a sector was 
investea notionally in t~e appropriate sector index and the change in value 
of this amount over the period the shares were held, calCulated. Summing 
for all sectors and all the different components to be estimated yielded the 
total change in value of the equivalent sector portfolio. l 
This procedure was also carried out to construct a market index equivalent 
portfolio. This market equivalent portfolio provided another standard 
against which the portfolio could be compared. For example if the shares 
in the actual portfolio were selected on the basis of their individual 
characteristics, then on average one might expect the overall portfolio 
to be closer to the market equivalent portfolio than to the sector equivalent. 
This of course only holds true if the managers do not have, or have not used, 
superior investment skills on the portfolio. If they have such skills 
their selection of individual shares should result in performance. superior 
to both the sector and the market equivalent portfolios. 
In general it has been assumed that any individual portfolio 1S unlikely to 
show consistent super10r performance (for given risk) on the basis of 
superior individual share selection. It might show superior performance 
on the basis of the selection of the best sectors, but one would then expect 
either the portfolio performance to be similar to that of the sector 
equivalent portfolios, or for the portfolio to show that the selection of 
1. It is perhaps worth considering a problem that could arise in estimating 
the sector equivalent portfolios. The weighted arithmetic mean indices 
of the F.T. Actuaries series that were used to calculate the sector 
equivalent may be dominated in some cases by one large firm. In . 
consequence if this firm performs well, whilst the other sector const1t-
uents perform poorly, then the sector index may still be high, even 
though selection of any other share in the sector would result in poor 
performance. The effect of this is likely to be small when reasonably 
large sectors are employed but it remains a factor that might be 
important in considering the results of small sectors. 
sectors has been right, and within those sectors the selection of shares 
has been superior as well. If the portfolio did perform well solely on 
the ba~is of the indiv::'dual .;hare selection, then one would expect the 
individual share performance to be good whatever the sector performance 
was like. 
A difficUlty of the analysis was the securlng of adequate data for the 
study. At times it was necessary to make somewhat arbitrary estimates 
of some of the components. Thus since complete records of the dates of 
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purchases and sales were not available, it was necessary to use approximate 
dates for the prices of purchases and sales during the period covered. l 
Indeterminancy in the dates of purchases or sales meant a difference between 
the actual purchase price and the recorded purchase price of perhaps several 
per cent, and consequently room for considerable error. The adjustment 
for 'rights' also presented some problems since the raw data lacked 
consistency in its treatment. In some cases a 'rights' allotment had been 
credited to the portfolio immediately on announcement with a positive market 
value but rated as nil or part paid, whilst in other cases the rights were 
entered only when fUlly paid. The general procedure adopted was one of 
apportionment with the partly paid shares converted into an appropriate 
reduced number of fully paid shares. 
Further problems arose from changes In the F.T. Actuaries classification 
scheme and in particular, the deletion of old sectors and inclusion of new 
ones. This meant that sector indices were not available for some sectors 
after or before certain dates, and in consequence meant the reclassification 
. . 2 
of data In some lnstances. It was also as a result found impossible to 
1. The data was generally available monthly for the early portfolios but 
only three monthly for some of the later period. 
2. The assignment of shares to sectors necessitated three classif~cation 
schemes to cope with the addition of new sectors and the deletlon of old 
ones. The appropriate classification depended on the time period. 
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carry out a comparison of portfolios from the six months beginning 
October 1969 to April 1970. Initially comparisons were made for six 
month periods. Perusal of the results however suggested that individual 
shares might be leading or lagging the appropriate indices by varying time 
periods and that comparisons of longer duration might also be useful. 
Unfortunately a year was about the longest possible due to the classification 
l 
changes. 
Another problem arose from the estimation of dividends and interest. One 
possibility was to assume that the actual portfolio and the index portfolio 
dividends were both the same. Appealing in its simplicity, the assumption 
did not seem justified since the portfolio under investigation had been 
orientated to growth, and hence one might expect its dividend income to be 
lower than that of the sector equivalent portfolio. 2 The procedure adopted 
in fact was to calculate from sector yield indices the dividends that might 
have been expected on the sector equivalent investments. For the actual 
portfolio, estimates of the yield of each share involved in the analysis 
were aggregated. These procedures were restricted to the shares held 
throughout in the six month portfolios. It was felt that calculation of 
dividends for shares held perhaps only a month or so, was both arbitrary 
and unnecessary since in general the extra amounts involved were rather 
small. The total dividend amounts recorded are considerably less than 
the actual dividends received by the funds. This arises from the omitting 
of dividends on stocks held for a short time, from the method of estimation, 
and from the exclusion of foreign stocks and certain other specific categories 
of stocks held in the portfolio, from the analysis. No calculations 
1. Intuitively one would expect the two appropriate six month portfolio 
changes to equal the year portfolio change, although with a redistribution 
in the size of the changes between the various components. Whilst this 
is the case for the actual portfolios, it does not necessarily hold for 
the sector equivalent (see Appendix 11). 
2. In fact the portfolio was orientated toward growth sectors, so that it 
might be a reasonable assumption to assume that the dividends were equal. 
of dividends were made for the year portfolios. The appropriate SlX 
month estimates were simply aggregated. 
Results 
A summary of the respective amounts contributed to the total portfolio 
change In value is provided by Tables 10.4 and 10.5 For each six and 
twelve month period, values are provided for the actual portfolio and both 
sector and market equivalent. l 
Over the three year period as a whole it would appear the sector and actual 
portfolios behaved very similarly. Aggregating the six month figures 
gives overall changes in value of -126,700 for the actual portfolio, -133,960 
for the sector equivalent and -631,400 for the market equivalent,2 indicating 
that the portfolio performed considerably better than the market as a whole 
and closely to a portfolio composed of its sector equivalents. 
Consideration of the overall SlX monthly figures does not however bear this 
out. Table 10.4 reveals that only In the first SlX month period are the 
1. The approach in this section is to consider the results of the performance 
comparison first at a very aggregate level and then on a more dis-
aggregated basis. Clearly the aggregate figures by themselves are 
insufficient to indicate the success or otherwise of sector selection as 
an investment technique. What is required above all is consistency in 
several indicators. For example if all the major components of the 
change in value of a portfolio consistently (that is over several time 
periods) indicated the performance of the portfolio to be close to the 
performance of the sector and superior to the market; then this would 
represent prima facie evidence in favour of sector selection. It would 
also require a further investigation of performance taking risk into 
consideration. It is possible although unlikely, that the superior 
performance is due to the assumption of a higher degree of risk, arising 
as a result of the managers' selecting shares from sectors that are more 
risky than the majority of sectors. 
2. Note that these figures underestimate the true performance of the 
portfolios as they exclude the period October 1969 to April 1970, under-
estimate dividends, and exclude foreign stocks. 
6 month portfolios 
April 1968 - Oct.1968 
t.V 
Actual 829,500 I 
Sector I 
Equivalent 710,540 ! 
I 
\1arket 355,700 : Equivalent l 
'Jct .1968 - April 1969 
101,800 ! Actual 
! 
Sector I 
Equivalent -104,500 i 
Market 104,100 j~qui valent 
April 1969 - Oct.1969 
Actual 
[;ector 
Equivalent 
rIarket 
Equivalent 
-1,115,600 
I 
-680,900 I 
I 
I -1 ,1 72 , 800 
! 
April 1970 -Oct .1970 
I 
I 
I 
i , 
68 
596,400 
522,500 \ 
" I 
228,200 I 
94,600 
66,900 
97,900 
, 
; -805,100 
! 
I 
I -610,600 
i 
, 
l 
! -969,300 
r 
I 
Actual -252,800 \-202,900 
Sector 
E:qui valent -99,200 -85,800 
Market 
-55,700 -68,200 I':quivalent 
Gct.1970 - April 1971 
J\ctual 310,400 258,600 
~;ector 40,100 23,500 };qui valent 
Market 137,300 49,600 };qui valent 
TABLE 10.4 
6D 6P 6F I t 
r 
t 
52,100 1~)8, 700 I 16,100 3h, ;'00 I 
I 83,400 49,300 
1 14,800 40,500 
\ 
50,900 18,200 , 13,300 45,100 
2,400 
-32,700 -6,200 43,700 
-8,300 -214,200 ' -7,900 59,000 
89,200 -145,100 -6,800 68,900 
I I 
: -414 300 36,400 -900 I 68,300 I ' , , 
! 6)~, 800 -600 i , 90,900 i -225,400 " I 
I 
, 
! 
-259,400 -45,900 
, 
-500 i 102,300 ! 
I 
I 
I , , 
I 
\-143,300 93,300 
I 
, 
, 
!-126,600 113,300 
I 
-122,800 i 135,300 
I 
-90,300 67,200 I 74,C)()0 I 
I 
I 
:-101 800 2~) ,000 
, 89,4r)() 
I ' I I 
I 
I 
1 
-60,700 4tS ,1+00 I 102/ff) I I 
: I 
___ ---J..--___ -'----------
WhereAV = change in value of portfolio ()ver th(~ r(";~~p(";cti vr~ t 1 mr; p(~rl (Jrj:-; , 
An t . f . 1 ~ 
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0'\ = change In valu: o. shares held throughout, AD t = ch;j.n0(~ HI ~a ue 01 ~;hare~; held at the beglnnlnr~ ?-nd sold before the end of th(; per] od, Ar't = chanr r,(.' 
]0 value of ;;haresbought durlng the period and "held to the end, 6Ft = changt> lrl 
value of ~~hares bought and sold during the peri 0(1 and I represents lntc'rest and 
d 1. V.1. d cn ds~. ______ m,;;Il!!Q!'IlIlo ...... , 
l~ month portfolio 
Ap~il 1968 to ABril 1969 
Actual 931,400 
Sector 596,800 Equi valent 
Market 442,960 Equivalent 
~il 1970 to A~ril 1971 
Actual 26,500 
Sector 9,800 Equi valent 
Market 75,900 Equi valent 
TABLE 10.5 
492,300 216,500 
406,100 253,700 
1 75,700 180,500 
216,900 : -524,600 
I 
43,500 ; -303,200 I 
I 
i 
-2,200 -"204,600 
"1 r_ 
..;...C-'-
I 
82,300 60,400 79,900 
-173,400 lO,8()o 99,6()1J 
I 
I 
-78,000 50,800 !n4,OOG 
186,400 -20,500 I I 168,200 
87,200 -20,400 202,600 
I 
I 
I 
I 
55,200 -9,800 i 237,300 
I 
actual and sector overall change in values closer than the actual an1 
market values. In the periods beginning October 1968 and April 1969 the 
actual and market equivalents are closer than the actual and sector equi', =-."' 2:.(. 
whilst the other two portfolio periods do not seem to indicate a marked 
superiority of sector or market equivalent. The large actual and 
proportionate difference in the April to October 1970 period would seem to 
make decisions on similarity difficult. 
For the twelve month period the portfolio might be seen as closer to the 
sector than the market equivalent, although in the first period there is a 
substantial actual difference. 
How are these results to be interpreted? A number of possibilities present 
themselves. The first is to consider each period ln relation to the stage 
of the market. It might for example be the case that the portfolio 
illustrates sector performance over the bull stages of the market such as 
April to October 1968 and individual share performanCe over bear stages of 
the market such as April to October 1969. On the evidence presented it ~s 
difficult to generalise. The periods were not defined in terms of bull 
and bear stages of the market and in consequence represent ln some cases, 
overlapping periods. Equally with only one, or at most two periods ln each 
stage of the market, conclusions would be rash. It remains however a 
possibility that in some periods the managers are able to pick the good sectors 
and perhaps in other periods the good shares. It is also poss ible that othr::r 
1. For example, whether the individual fund manager i:; particularl.'! 
commi tted to the sector selection philos()phy or not. 
consider the individual components of the portfolios. 
again provide details of the changes in value for the sub component:;. 
simi,lar are these values? The period April to October 1968 for example 
illdicc~,tes that a large part of the difference between the actual and sector 
equivalent portfolios is due to investments bought during the period and 
held whilst the differences between the actual and market equivalent port-
folio are seen to be due both to 'this component and to the investments held 
throughout. Similarly, analysis of the October to April 1969 period reveals 
considerable divergence in the individual components. Both the change in 
value of shares sold (~Dt) and the change in value of shares purchased (~Pt) 
differ markedly. In the former case between the actual and market equivalent 
portfolio and in the latter between the actual and sector equivalent, and 
to a lesser extent the market. Such comparisons may be made for all the 
other periods as well. The over-riding conclusion is of very substantial 
diVergence between the individual components. It does not appear that any 
clear relationship. exists or that the actual portfolio results, for example, 
are always relatively more similar to the market than to the sector, or 
vlce versa. The variability of the relationships would seem to suggest 
that the possible interpretations placed on the aggregate figures must be 
treated with caution. 
Consideration of the yearly figures reinforces this conclusion. Substantial 
divergencies exist for all the main components in one or other of the periods. 
The question naturally arises as to whether this variability is important. 
It might for example be argued that the six month periods in particular begin 
and end on arbitrary dates as regards fund management. If the managers made 
their decisions for longer time horizons, then over this period the actual 
and sector equivalent results might be very similar. However it seems unlikely. 
Up to the present only aggregate component figures have been considered. 
Useful information may also be gained from a consideratia"o~ individual sectors 
and firms. Table 10.6 presents a section of tne analysis indicating tne 
results of making purchases during the period and then holding these purctases 
to the end of the period. Sector and market equivalents are also gi Vl'n. r~ llt~ 
total change in value figure indicates that the actual and sector equivalent 
portfolios were reasonably close and considerably outperformed the market 
equivalent portfolio. This conclusion is borne out by examination of the 
individual firm figures. In nearly every case the actual and sector equivalent 
portfolio outperformed the market. 
The table also indicates the possibilities of individual share analysis. One 
sees for example that the purchase of 100,000 Trafalgar in period two, performed 
poorly relative to the sector and little better than the market whilst the 
50,000 Star purchased in period eleven performed considerably better than either 
the sector or market equivalents. Such analysis allows one to come to 
conclusions about the ability of the fund managers to select shares and 
1 
sectors. Thus in the Trafalgar example the manager was ln the right sector 
(since the sector did so much better than the market( but the 'wrong share 
(since the share was well below the sector average) whilst in the Star case 
. 2 
the manager chose both the right share and the rlght sector. 
The example given ln Table 10.6 indicates a considerable diversity between the 
actual and sector outcomes. The question arises as to whether any of the 
sector results showed a consistent relationship over several periods. 
) 3 . . 1 Table 10.7 (an extract of appendix 12 table 1 indlcates the change ln va ue 
for the actual market and sector equivalent portfolios for the PToperty and 
Entertainment sectors for each of the five six month periods covered. 
1. Fox {42} provides a number of illustrations and interpretations. 
2. ,Note that the usefulness of this analysis is limited to large numbers of 
Observations. One would expect the manager to have a variety'of results 
both better and worse than the average of the sector. Over a long period 
or large number of observations, however one might expect a trend to 
emerge with the manager choosing the right sectors but the wrong shares 
consistently or some other similar possibility. 
Lr\ 
co 
r I 
~:;L' ctor 
No. 
------- _._---
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(Property) 
PROPERTY 
!\prj 1 1968 to j\pri 1 196q 
Company Period Period 
Bought Sold 
Hammerson 2 13 
Hammerson 10 13 
Town & City 3 13 
Town & City 4 13 
Town & City 13 13 
Trafalgar 2 13 
Trafalgar 3 13 
MEPC (ord.) 5 13 
Second Cov. Gdn. 5 13 
Second Cov. Gdn. 6 13 
Second Cov. Gdn. 7 13 
Second Cov.Gdn. 9 13 
Second Cov. Gdn. 12 13 
Greenhaven Secs. 9 13 
Estates Prop. 9 13 
Star 10 13 
Star 11 13 
MEPC' (Conv) 11 13 
Quantity 
6,000 
2,500 
25,000 
50,000 
40,000 
100,000 
43,750 
·75,000 
10,000 
46,000 . 
5,000 
39,000 
13,000 
36,000 
100,000 
50,000 
50,000 
350 
TABLE 10.6 
Price Price Change in Sector Sector Change in Change in 
Bought Sold Value Index Index Value Value 
(actual) Bought Sold (sector) (marh:,:,t) 
~ -----
3.137 3.950 4,878 94.07 128.97 6,982 1,729 
4.425 3.950 -1,187 141.33 128.97 - 967 - 948 
0.712 0.819 2,662 95.07 128.97 6,351 2,025 
0.762 0.819 2,825 104.28 128.97 9,026 1,556 
0.819 0.819 
° 
128.97 128.97 
° ° 0.814 0.915 10,060 94.07 128.97 30,214 7,481 
. 0. 700 0.915 9,406 95.07 128.97 10,920 3,482 
1.037 1.244 15,487 103.62 128.97 19,036 -IS 
0.942 1.350 4,083 103.62 128.97 2,303 - 2 
0.950 1.350 18,400 107.13 128.97 8,908 505 
0.944 1.350 2,030 107.52 128.97 941 114 
1.412 1.350 -2,418 134.61 128.97 -2,307 -1,970 
1.212 1.350 1,787 120.71 128.97 1,078 128 
1.262 1.462 7,182 134.61 128.97 -1,904 ·-1,626 
0.879 0.850 -2,916 134.61 128.97 -3,683 -3,145 
1.217 1.137 -3,983 141.33 128.97 -5,320 -5,217 
1.017 1.137 6,016 127.08 128.97 756 309 
93.500 93.589 31 127.08 128.97 486 199 
74~344 82,824 4,604 
Text cut off in original 
\() 
cO 
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TA.BLE 10 .7 Shares held Shares held at 
Pro:Qert;y throughout period & subs.sold 
A S M A S M 
4/68-10/68 44,790 46,650 23,060 130 430 280 
10/68- 4/69 85,760 131,710 16,050 IJ,400 13,550 3,350 
4/69- 10/69 -30, 430 -19,840-172, 510 240 -3,700 -7,840 
4/70-10/70 27,660 52 ,900 -9,970 3,250 3,480 - 660 
10/70-4/71 39,350 130 6,430-24,550 -18,390 -16,280 
Entertainment 
4/68-10/68 36,060 27,200 17,860 760 1,820 2,520 
10/68-4/69 320 9,050 3,110 -1,210 3,000 1,770 
4/69-10/69 -110,020 -32,580 -43,030 -28,720-11,960 -14,110 
4/70-10/70 2,690 
10/70-4/71 -3,400 
-22, 230 -3,220 -33,050-32,720 -31,570 
17,550 2,780 -1,130 1,220 
A = Actual Portfolio 
S = Sector Equivalent Portfolio 
M = Market Equivalent Portfolio 
-1,460 
Shares bought during Bought & Sold l1i vi dt: n ds 
period & held to end 
A S M A S M A S M 
43, 620 26,090 8,870 3,460 4,850 
4, 510 - 11 ,860 -12,270 6,390 11,320 11,6 
6,110 2,210 -3,120 10,990 14,540 18,0 
10,350 12,660 
6,230 6,530 
24,650 8,520 3,.400' 500 1,120 850 4,530 4,150 
57,880 -6,810 -5,380 5,120 - 30 -650 3,040 2,280 
6,970 9,700 1,850 5,280 4,760 
5,030 5,600 
5,660 5,810 5, 
TABLE 10.8 
a) 
4/68-
10/68 
10/68-
4/69 
4/69-
10/69 
4/70-
10/70 
10/70-
4/71 
b) 
Frcg,\UCncy J\naly:; i!. of Change -in Valw· due to ':;ha.rf·:; hpJ (j 
throul!:,hout 'Compon(:nt 
Shares Better than Sector 
I 
, 
Ss:c:tstr worse than 
Market 
I 
I 
Sector better 
than market 
Shares worse Shares better 
than Market than Market 
o 
2 
o 
o 
1 
3 
Right Shares 
Wrong Sectors 
19 
1 
5 
1 
3 
6 
16 
7 
2 
3 
4 
6 
22 
Right Shares 
Right Sectors 
22 
Shares Worse than Sector 
1 Sector better than 
• Market 
I Sector worse than ~'~arKet 
Shares worse 
than Market 
I Shares better 
than Market 
3 4 
1 2 
4 1 
2 1 
1 1 
11 15 
Wrong Shares 
Right Sectors 
26 
o 
5 
6 
7 
21 
Wrong Share::: 
Wrong 3ector~ 
21 
-00 
TABLE 10.9 
a) 
Date 
-
4/68-
Lo/68 
10/68-
4/69 
4/69-
10/69 
10/70-
4/71 
b) 
Frequency Analysis of the Change in value due to 'Purchases 
made during the period' Component 
Shares Better than Sector 
\ Sector worse than 
!·:arket 
, 
I 
Shares \ worse 
than Market 
1 
4 
0 
1 
6 
Right Shares 
Wrong Sectors 
17 
Sector better 
than Market 
Shares better 
than Market 
3 
4 
2 
2 
11 
Right 
Right 
8 
5 
5 
3 
21 
Shares 
Sectors 
21 
Shares Worse than Sector 
S~ctor better than 
Market 
Shares wors e 
than Market 
Sector -.. ror~-)e 
than ;t:ar~et 
Shares better 
than Market 
3 1 4 
2 0 5 
1 4 ") 
..J 
1 0 1 
7 5 13 
Wrong Shares Wrong ~r;'c!.r(:s 
Right Sectors Wrong Sectors 
12 13 
The Property results are particularly appealing. Both the sector eQu~vale~t 
and the actual portfolio are seen to have outperformed the market i~~ a-LL.ost 
every period and component (ignoring dividends.) Thus in the first perioci 
Property was the right sector to have chosen since the sector performed at 
least twice as well as the market. Within the sector about average shares 
were selected for the shares held throughout component, and much above 
average shares selected for the purchases component with the shares performing 
almost twice as well as the sector component. Examination of the dividend 
column indicates that the actual shares bought had a lower dividend yield 
than the market and sector equivalents reflecting perhaps the growth 
orientation of the individual shares. Consideration of subsequent periods 
reinforces these conclusions. The sector equivalent generally outperformed 
the market, whilst the individual share selection although less successful 
than the sector average was still considerably better than the market. 
Particularly noteworthy 1S the huge market decline of the shares held through-
out component in the third period but the relatively small declines in both 
the sector and actual portfolio equivalents. Generally the Property sector 
was the right sector to have been in. The final period it is true, saw the 
sector perform poorly, but above average share selection 1n the shares held 
throughout component, still gave favourable overall performance. 
The pattern within the Entertainment sector was rather different. The first 
period indicates good sector and share performance relative to the market. 
The second period results are to some extent in line with this conclusion 
with good sector and bad share performance in two of the components, and 
bad sector and good share performance in the other two (excluding dividends). 
The third period however was swamped by disastrous share selection in the 
shares held throughout component, although the overall sector selection 
result was better than-the market. The fourth period reverses this ~esult 
with a very poor sector performance and a relatively good share performance 
(given the wrong sectors). Finally the fifth period indicates poor share 
and good sector performance. Overall it would seem that the right sector 
was chosen most of the time. 
The question arlses as to whether these two results are typical of all the 
sectors. To this end a f~equency analysis of the event of picking the right 
sectors and shares was carried out. Tables 10.8 and 10.9 provide the results. 
Table 10.8 summarises the results for the shares held throughout component, 
and Table 10.9 for the purchases made during the period component, (earlier 
sections having indicated that one might expect sector decisions to be more 
obvious when purchases are considered.) Table 10.8a indicates only one 
event occurring much less frequently than the others, the cominbation of the 
shares being better than the sector, the sector being worse than the market 
and the shares being worse than the market, not a particularly interesting 
case for the analysis at present. Aggregating the appropriate columns to 
glve frequencies for right shares, wrong sectors and so on, Table 10.8b 
indicates that the right sector was chosen 54% of the time and of these 
occaslons the majority of cases involved the choice of the wrong shares. 
In terms of purchases Table 10.9b indicates the right sector to have been 
chosen 51% of the time and the right shares some 60% of the time. There 
seems to be little evidence from a frequency analysis that the managers were 
particularly good at choosing the right sectors to be In. A value of right 
decisions as low as 54% (or 51%) would require considerably more observations 
and experience of different periods before much weight could be placed on it 
occurring other than by chance. 
It seems necessary to draw rather negative conclusions from the overall 
analysis' of performance. Optimistic aggregate figures for the entire period 
1968 to 1911 indicating the actual and sector figures to be very close and 
substantially different from the market, have proved to be rather illusory. 
Consideration of sub-periods of six months and indeed further breakdown of the 
\ 
results, indicate a considerable diversity of answers but wit~1 no clear 
trends emerging to indicate that the managers had been particularly 
successful with their choice of sectors. Having said this it is necessa.:i 
to point out a number of problems with the analysis. One maJor one relates 
to the possibilities of the managers using sector selection methods 
more In a bull than a bear market, so that one would only expect it to 
show up clearly in these periods, or indeed for it to be a method that is 
best suited to certain stages of the market. The analysis presents little 
evidence on these points. 
A further fault of the analysis relates to its ex post nature. It provides 
no evidence on the ex ante intentions of the managers, so that answers as to 
whether the sector deviation was mainly due to sector selection, or only to 
some correlated measure, are necessarily cautious. The results say nothing 
about the managers' intentions. 
Of particular interest are the results for the homogeneous sectors. The 
earlier analysis indicated that sUbstantial sector effects were restricted 
to a few homogeneous sectors, so it is of interest to determine whether the 
investment associated with these sectors was close to the sector equivalent. 
Taking Property (Table 10.7) as an example the results vary from being close 
to the sector in one period and substantially different from the market 
(such as in 4/68 to 10/68), to being divergent from both sectors and market 
equivalents (such as in 10/70 to 4/71). 
Another consideration of interest relates to the number of companles In a 
sector. One might expect sectors with only one or two companies in the 
portfolio to be much more likely to produce results substantially divergent 
from the sector equivalent (even though the shares had been selected for their 
sector characteristics) than sectors with a large number of companies in the 
portfolios. This factor would seem to account for a number of the more 
192 
exceptional sector results such as Investment Trusts and Merchant Banks 
but by no means for all the discrepancies between actual and sector equivalent 
portfolio results. 
In VIew of these caveats it seems reasonable to conclude that more evidence 
IS required before a definite conclusion may be reached. On tte basis 0: 
the evidence presented here there would seem to be little reason to believe 
that the managers found the selection of shares by sectors to be a particularly 
successful investment technique. However the analysis of the portfolio 
encompasses a period noted for an abnormally severe bear market which may 
well have disturbed techniques such as sector selection that may be successful 
in other, more normal, periods. 
One means of providing further evidence on the value of sector selection is 
by the analysis of additional portfolios. Constraints of information (and 
time) however prevented this. An alternative approach discussed in the next 
chapter is to consider some of the studies that have attempted to predict 
share prices and use these as a basis for deriving implications about fore-
casting sector performance. Inability to predict the market or firm 
components of share price does not necessarily imply that it lS impossible 
to predict the sector component of share prIce. The results of this chapter 
however suggest that it is unlikely that such prediction is possible. 
Chapter 11 
The Prediction of Share Price Changes 
Tne pr=vious chapter attempted to ascertain th~ value of sector selection 
·as an investment technique. From the evidence there appeared little 
;9'"' J... :;; 
reason to believe that it is particularly valuable, but before a concl-~s::' ve 
answer can be given either additional portfolios must be examined or 
, 
alternatively, evidence of ability to predict sector performance must be 
. I 
consldered. Since the examination of additional portfolios was ruled out 
by data and time constraints, the latter question is investigated here. 
A considerable number of studies, including both tests in which the 
information set is just historical prices (weak form) and tests in which 
the concern is whether prices efficiently adjust to other information that 
lS publicly available (semi strong form), have concentrated on the prediction 
of share price changes. With few exceptions security prices appear to 
reflect fully all available information and have confirmed the efficient 
market model. 
With this background the outlook for predicting share prlce changes as a 
whole is poor. One possibility, however, not explicitly explored in the 
literature is to consider the share prlce change as being due to a market 
effect, a sector effect and an individual firm effect and to investigate 
whether it is possible to predict any of these effects. It might be that 
whilst the forecaster is illlable to predict movements of the share prlce 
1. There is also the question of whether it is worth investing a substantial 
effort in the examination of further portfolios. The advantages of the 
micro approach to the question followed in this thesis were that in 
addition to considering the value of sector selection, it offered a c~ance 
of investigating whether the managers were able to predict any component 
of a portfolio's performance either. short term (for example, purchases 
and sales) or long term (for example, holdings held throughout the period), 
and hence whether the managers had access to private information whicD 
the efficient market hypothesis indicates is necessary for success~~L:l 
prediction. Since the evidence does not confirm the managers' fore-
casting abilities, it might well be asked whether investigation of othe~ 
portfolios is likely to be justified, particularly a;=:; both the portfolios 
and the managers have an impressive record relative to other portfolios 
and managers. 
as a whole he can predict sector effects and so provide the basis for a 
profitable decision rule. With this idea in mind the rest of the chapter 
con~iders several academic studies of share price forecasting with a V1ew 
to establishing from them the possibility of forecasting market, sector 
or firm effects. 
Before evidence of investors' success ln share prlce forecasting is 
considered a paper by Treynor & Black{98} which outlines the theoretical 
implications of an analyst's ability to forecast the market and independent 
.1. 
returns deserves partlcular mention. They suggest that a portfolio may be 
thought of as having three parts; a riskless part, a highly diversified 
or paSS1ve part which contains no specific risk, and an active part which 
contains both market and specific risk. 2 They show that the amount of 
market risk in the active portfolio lS unimportant so long as one has the 
option of increasing or reducing market risk Vla the passlve portfolio. 
Optimal Selection in the active portfolio lS shown to depend on only the 
appraisal risk and appraisal premium3 and not at allan the market risk 
1. 
2. 
3. 
til''.''''] -,.,<,,--1'-' 
t-'~~ f" ~ .. 'Vlt. 
The paper. makes a considerable number of assumptions, such as no 
restrictions on borrowing or selling short; interest rate on loans 
is equal to the interest rate on short term assets; no taxes; no 
transactions costs. 
The paper distinguishes between market or systematic risk on the one 
hand and appraisal or insurable risk on the other. Treynor & Black 
indicate that optimal balancing of portfolios does not in general lead 
to either negligible levels of appraisal risk or to negligible levels 
of market risk. 
The appraisal premium is the expected value of the independent return z. 
of the ith security (the independent.return is defined to be the excess l 
return minus the explained return). The one period return on the ith 
security is _ / I' 
x. - r + b.y + Z. 
1 l m 1 
where x. 1S the market return on the ith security, r is the riskless rate 
of retu~, b. is the market sensitivity of the ith security, Ym is the 
excess retur~ on the market (excess return on the market is the actual 
return on the market less the interest paid on short term risk free assets) 
and b.y is the explained or systematic return on the ith security. 
1 m (the explained return on the security over a given time interval is Qe~ined 
to be its market sensitivity times the market's excess return over the 
interval) . 
· 1 
or prem1um; nor on investors' objectives as regards the relative import~n~e 
to him of expected return versus risk; nor on the investment manager~1 
expectations regarding the general market. Two managers with radically 
different expectations regarding the general market but the same specific 
information regarding individual securities will select active portfolios 
with the same relative proportions. 
The potential contribution of security appraisal to the portfolio is shown to 
be summarized by the appraisal ratio - the ratio of appraisal premium 
squared to appraisal varlance. This ratio depends only on the quality of 
security analysis and on how efficiently an active portfolio is balanced. 
It is independent of the relative emphasis between active and passive port-
folios and of the degree to which the risky portfolio is levered or mixed 
with debt. It is also independent of the market premium. The' ratio 
measures how far one has to depart from perfect diversification to obtain a 
given level of expected independent return. The higher the appraisal ratio 
(for a glven market ratio) the less well diversified the resulting portfolio 
will be. In short, the more attractive incurring specific risk 1S relative 
to market risk, the less well diversified an· optimally balanced portfolio will 
be. It is clear then that any improvement in the quality of security analysis 
(or in the number of securities analyzed at a given level of quality) can 
only cause an optimally balanced portfolio to become less well diversified. 
Finally the paper indicates that the security analyst's potential contribution 
to overall portfolio performance over time depends only on how well his 
forecasts of future independent returns (or analogously forecasts of the market 
return) correlate with actual independent returns and not on the magnitude 
1. The market prem1um 13 the expected value of the excess return on the 
market. 
of these returns. In th b f' kn 1 e a sence 0 prlor ow edge concernlng the aualyst's 
curren0 forecast, the potential contribution of the security in question to 
the optimum active portfolio depends solely on the correlation. The larger 
the correlation the more the security contributes to the optimal active 
portfolio. 
The role and importance of forecasting in the investment process having been 
stated, it is now possible to consider some empirical evidence on the 
possibilities of forecasting the various components of price change. If the 
oehaviour of the market component is interpreted as being equivalent to 
the movements of a market index, then considerable evidence on the possibil-
ities of forecasting this component is available for consideration. Most 
of the research has taken place within a random walk framework with the 
investigators endeavouring to ascertain whether future index (price) changes 
can be predicted using past index (price) values. A common form of the 
model is 
= 
where P = prlce at time t and t-l and Et lS a residual with zero mean and 
uncorrelated with all past Et (s ~ 0). If this model is true it follows -s 
that price changes canot be predicted from previous prices since the best 
predictor of tomorrow's price is today's price, or more generally one may 
. 1 
conclude that the best predictor of any future price is the current prlce. 
An . .. b K dall· {52} al d th ActuarlOes Index of early lnvestlgatlon y en an yze e . 
Industrial Share Prices for the years 1928-1938. Nineteen series of weekly 
figures for various industry and aggregate groupings were tested for serial 
1. See Granger & Morgenstern {46 } for a more detailed description of the 
various models and their implications. 
Note that the following account is not intended as a comprehensive account 
of the voluminous studies that have taken place of the random walk model 
but simply to point out the main conclusions. 
1 . 1 corre atlon uSlng lags of one to twenty nlne weeks. 'l'ne res·u.lts were 
not encouraging with little connection shown between price changes over 
time. Cross correlations between industries were not particularly interes:-
ing either. It proved impossible to use the prlce changes of one industry 
to predict those in another. A similar serial correlation analys~s -jy 
D· d {30} B . . . ry en on more recent rl tlsh serles has ::;upported Kendall's res·l1l ts. 
U · A . d {71} . . slng merlcan ata Moore lnvestlgated the S. & P. stock index, 
calculating serial correlations using a one week lag. He found a small 
positive relationship, but after considering the length of runs of price 
changes in the same direction he came to the conclusion that they could 
well have occurred by chance from a random walk series. Construction of 
his own price index for a randomly seiected sample of thirty stocks agaln 
showed a weak posi~ive relationship, whilst an investigation of the 
individual constituents indicated that most of these had a small (but 
significant) negative relationship. Various possible justifications for 
this were proposed by Moore although it may simply have been a SpurlOUS 
result arising from the statistical techniques used. A number of other 
similar studies have consistently shown near zero estimates of serial 
correlation. 
{2}. I t" A rather different technique, suggested by Alexander, lnvo ves ile use 
of a filter. The intention is to filter away short term movements of market 
prices, but to benefit from longer movements. A filter size of say 5% is 
selected. Then if the price rises by more than 5%, the index (stock) is 
bought and held until there is a fall of more than 5% from the highest value 
reached. The index (stock) is then sold and held short until the price 
% I t . t r ached Such a filter rises again by more than 50 from the new owes pOln e . 
1. Serial correlation measures the amount of covariation between success~v~ 
changes in price . If two variables P t and P t-l are correlated, knowl.ec.ge 
of one variable will aid in the prediction of the other variable. 
· , , 
mlnlmlzes the losses when holding the index (shares). 
to make large gains it is necessary to spec';fy a small f'l 
.L. l t e r but a .. '~,::;" ~ 
, .... "' llj, ........................ 
fil ter increase~ the number of transactions and hence brokerage costs. 
A mistake In Alexander's computations pointed out by Mandelbrotl {6fu} was 
corrected In a later paper. Thl's correctl' 1 d t . on e 0 a substantlal red~ct~0~ 
in the profitability of the filter rule. Ov 11 h f era , owever, a ter conduc~:~€ 
a number of other tests and finding that these methbds provided better 
results than buy and hold, Alexander was led to reject the random walk model. 
Subsequently Fama{ 36 } 't d t f th' ~ pOln e ou a ur er error In Alexander's computat~0~S~ 
and in a comprehensive study with Blume{38} applied the filter technique to 
the thirty Dow Jones stocks. They found little to recommend the strategy 
after commissions were taken into account. 
An interesting model of stock market behaviour related to the filter technique 
{20} has been proposed by Cootner . He suggests that stock market investors be 
viewed as being either of two types, the ill-informed part-time participant 
whose projections about stock prlces are about as likely to be wrong as right, 
and the knowledgeable professional who makes rational judgments about 
1. In his initial tests of filters Alexander assumes that purchases could 
always be executed exactly y% above lows and sales exactly y% below 
highs. Mandelbrot pointed out that whilst this assumption would do 
little harm with normally distributed price changes (since price series 
are then essentially continuous) with non normal stable distributions 
it would introduce substantial positive bias into the filter profits 
(since with such distributions price series will show many discontinuities.) 
2. "Alexander neglects dividends in computing profits for all of his 
mechanical trading rules . . . Under the buy and hold method the total 
profit is the price change for the time· period plus any dividends that 
have been paid. However all Alexander's more complicated trading rules 
involve short sales. In a short sale the borrower of the securities is 
required to reimburse the lender for any dividends that are paid while 
the short position is outstanding. Thus taking dividends into consider-
ation will always tend to reduce the profitability of a mechanical 
trading rule relative to buy and hold" Fama {36} page 83. 
justified prlces for stocks. If the actual price of a stocL is dri'!e~. 
too far away from its justified price by the ill-informed investors, the 
professional enters the market and causes actual price to move into line 
with justified price. In essence then, the professional sets up a 
barrier on either side of a stocks justified price and withi~ tnese barr:~r~ 
the price changes are random. Long term all the price changes will be 
random since the expectations of the professionals change randomly as ne'tl 
information becomes randomly available. Short term also the price changes 
will be random reflecting the influence of the ill-informed. Between the 
long and the short terms however price changes should be systematic 
reflecting the influence of professionals buying or selling at the barriers. 
The problem is of course to identify what constitutes such an intermediate 
term. Cootner suggests a number of ways in which this theory, if correct, 
could be translated into a profitable decision rule. 
Another technique of considerable importance is that known as runs tests. 
If a series of price changes is replac.ed by a serles of symbols, + when the 
price change is positive and - otherwise, then a run lS. an unbToken sequence 
of one or other of these symbols. An extensive study of runs was made by 
Fama{36} who considered the daily. logarithmic price changes of thirty 
different companles. The actual total number of runs was usually slightly 
less than the expected number (if the process had been purely random), but 
the difference was not significant. Fama concluded that his analysis of 
runs showed no indication of dependence between price changes of any 
importance. 
Attempts have also been made to break. indices and stocks into seasonal and 
{46} . Granger & Morgenstern have applled spectral cyclical components. 
. 1 
analysls to a large number of tl'me serles 
and found only s~a~l deviatiG~ 
from tt,C' random walk model. They divide their conclusions uP into t-~ cree 
periods corresponding to the high. middle 
I and low frequency ranges, In 
the middle period the random walk model was more or less totally supported, 
The long period revealed a trend and long period component (which they 
concluded was difficult to predict) whilst the short period indicated tL!at 
over 3hort time horizons, transaction price series (that is series not 
evenly spaced in time) do not follow a random walk although the data was 
consistent with the hypothesis that the series obeyed a random walk between 
reflecting barriers caused by stop limit orders. 
Spectral analysis has also been used to examlne the relation between move-
ments in one prlce serles and another, but low coherence (correlation) 
has generally been the rule. There would seem to be little evidence that 
other serles can be predicted by, or used for, predicting stock market 
prlce serles. 
So far the discussion has concentrated on mechanical techniques for 
predicting share prlces using limited information. It is also worth asking 
whether analysts having a wide range of information on which to draw have 
been able to provide accurate price forecasts, . {24 } Early st~dles by Cowles 
provide considerable evidence on this question. The first study ln 1933 
1. Rayner & Little {75} (page 108) provide the following brief account of 
spectral analysis 
"Spectral Analysis is a teChnique used to examin.e time series for period-
icity by looking at the percentage of the variation over the whole period 
than can be accounted for by cycles of differing lengths, If the time 
series follows a random walk path, it is easy to calculate how large a 
contribution to the total variance each particular cycle should make and 
therefore it is possible to see which, if any, contributes significantly 
more or less to the predicted amount. Thus if the cycle based on a 
period of one year contributes more than expected to the overall varlance, 
this means that OVer the period there is some significant annual pattern 
in prices. The teChnique shows the whole spectrum of cycles of varlOUS 
prices and their contribution to the total variation of prices; and 
therefore it is possible to separate out the significant cycles from 
amongst all the ones of differing length that add up to the observed 
. ," tlme serles. 
examined the weekly recommendations of sixteen financial serVlces over a 
41 • · 2 ye8 ':- perlod. For each service the result of investing funds e~ually 
over all recommendations was considered in relation to the movement over 
the period of the whole market. Only six services performed better than a 
201 
buy and hold strategy. Cowles suggested that there was no clear reason ~or 
believing that the best serVlce had performed well oWl-ng to d goo management 
rather than good luck. 
Covles in the srune study investigated the forecasts made by twenty four 
financial publications. He found that only a third of the publications 
did better than a buy and hold strategy, whilst following the advice of a 
prominent financial journalist over the period 1902 to 1929 would have 
earned a lower return than that yielded by the stocks composing the market 
averages. Investigation of the investment success of twenty fiVe insurance 
companles provided no better results. 
A - 44 {25} . . - . later study ln 19 lnvestlgated the performance of eleven flnanclal 
servlces over most of the 1930's. Their success was only marginally 
better than a random forecasting record . Cowles found that by far the 
overwhelming majority of forecasts were bullish despite the fact that the 
period covered" only eighty eight months of bull market, against ninety eight 
bear months. 
The results of later studies have accorded more or less with those of Cowles. 
Scott{S2} found that the comments of the F.T. had no worthwhile relationship 
with prices. 
. {IS} An analysls by Colker however, of over a thousand specific 
purchase recommendations found that on average the lssues appreciated over 
the following Yf>ar by 3.6% relative to the market index. A variety of 
explanatlons have been advanced for this result. They range from clairr~ 
that the period covered was abnormal, or that the results were inflated by 
one or two very successful stocks, to arguments that the recoITl.t.'TIendations involved 
' . , ~ 
substantial risk and that the extra return was no more than a Just rewara ~ or 
the as 
Most of the studies discussed so far have been concerned witr. abSG~-~te ~':r~ce 
changr.::.") • It is perhaps also worth considering the prediction of relative 
price changes. The information content implicit in price changes for any 
individual stock after removal of market and industry factors may have 
little value in absolute terms, but be of considerable relevance when 
compared with price information about other companies. A study by Levy {59 ~-
used such relatiVe information to examine the performance of various groups 
of stocks. Levy started from the position that a stock that is currently 
outperforming the market will probably continue to'do so. His strategy was 
1 
to devise a method involving the concept of relative strength for constantly 
checking on those stocks that were outperforming the mark.et and those that 
were under-performing, so that the investor can constantly shift his funds 
from the latter to the former. The results of the study were encouraging 
1 .. J B· {51}. d but a subsequent rep lcatlon 'by ensen & ennlngton dl not support 
1 Levy I s results 0 After allowance for transaction costs the trading rules 
did not on average earn significantly more than a buy and hold policy. 
After explicit adjustment for the level of risk it was shown that net of 
transactions costs the trading rules tested earned less on average than 
, 
an equivalent ri'sk Buy and Hold strategy. It would seem that predicting 
relative price changes is no easier than predicting absolute price changes. 
1. Levy tested a large number of trading rules on the same body of data. 
As Jensen & Bennington put it {51} (page 173) " ... given enough 
computer time, we are sure that we can find a mec~anicaltrading rule 
which 'works' on a table of random numbers - provlded of course that 
we are allowed to test the rule on the same table of numbers which we 
used to discover the rule. We realise of course that the rule would 
prove useless on any other table of random numbers, and this is exactly 
the issue with Levy's results." 
The discussion so ~ar has concentrated on prlce change prediction as s~c~. 
Price changes are to some degree at least ff t d 
a f~C e by company earnl:l,S2, [~.;u 
in the area of earnings forecasts several " studles of interest have been 
carried out. 
Consider first of all the relationship between" , t earnlngs ana s ock pr~ce0. 
Latane & m {56 } 
1. uttle correlated the percentage priee changes of forty ei€[.~ 
stocks for the period 1950 -63, with the earnings changes during the year, 
and found that whilst the proportion explained fluctuated substantially, 
on average some 17% of the variation in price changes could be explained 
by changes in earnlngs. Ball & Brown{5} in a study concerned with the 
value of firms' accounting lncome numbers, identified the effect of 
information pertaining to individual firms, separated it into an expected 
and unexpected elemen+" and then compared these elements with a forecast 
value (forecast on the basis of the firm's historical relationship with 
the average level of company earnings, it being assumed that the market 
was able to forecast the latter). The differences between the forecast 
and the expected. elements were classified into good or bad news as 
appropriate, and then the price action, (after abstracting from market 
effects) over a period of twelve months from before the publication of the 
preliminary report to six months after, examined for the cases in which 
actual earnings were better or worse than forecast. When earnings Were 
above the original forecast there was a rise in the price of the stock over 
the period. When earnlngs were below expectations, the price fell. Market 
adjustment In price to the published results were spread fairly evenly over 
the twelve months before publication although with some small price adjust-
ment up to two months after the publication of the figures also taking place. 
This and other similar studies show that earnlngs exhibit a considerable 
effect on prlces. In consequence forecasting earnings accurately might well 
provide a means by which price predictions could be improved. 
Just as with prices, one of the first questions that may be asked about 
forecasting earnings is whether earnings can be forecast simply using 
20~ 
past earnings data. One of the earlie~t studies on this question was ttat by 
Rayner & Little{75}. They concluded from a study of growth rates based on dividend 
and earnlngs figures ~xpressed as a percentage of equity capital) that in the 
short. run it was virtually impossible to find any growth consistency, due 
to bias upsetting all the investigations attempted, whilst over a longer 
period it was hard to discover any repetition of earlier behaviour. l 
"Any unbiased reader . . . . must come to the conclusion that there 
is no tendency for previous behaviour to be repeated in the future." 
(Rayner & Little {75} page 59). 
Similar studies of U. S. data by Cragg & Malkiel t26 } again found that earnings 
growth in past periods was not a useful predictor of future earnings growth. 
B " ·1 {89} rea ey used correlation techniques to examine the persistence of 
earnings progress. Correlation coefficients beteeen adj acent ~'1d lagged 
years percentage earnings changes were calculated for seven hundred companies 
and indicated a slight negative correlation between the earnings changes. 
Similar results applied to industries. These and a number of other tests 
all showed a slight tendency for a good short term earnings gain to be 
reversed. One reason advanced for these findings was that earnlngs are 
dominated in the short run by the impact of non-recurring events, and that 
in the long run coherent earnings patterns may be apparent. To test this, 
the five year trend in earnings per share were calculated for four periods 
and correlations calculated. 2 The magnitudes were very small. A variety of 
other tests . again revealed at best only slight persistence in earnings progress. 
OVerall then there would Seem substantial evidence to indicate that forecasts 
based solely on the past behaviour of a company's earnings are of little 
1. . . ." . b R dd {76 } However note crltlClsms of Rayner & Llttle y e away. 
2. Lintner & Glauber - unpublished paper quoted in BrealcJ. 
value. As with prlces it is worth considering whether forecasts by 
analysts or by techniques using considerable amounts of information, 
profi table. The maj or published study in this area by Cragg and Malkiel {2~ } 
used date from five investment firms on the expected growth of earnlngs per 
share for one hundred and eighty five corporations, as of the end of 1962 
and 1963. All the firms were attempting to yredict the same future 
the long run average (normalized) earnings level. l The definition of 
earnings varied between the investment firms. The study considered a 
number of questions such as a comparison of different predictions of future 
growth rates, a comparison of predictions with past growth rates, and with 
price earnings ratios, as well as an investigation into the accuracy of 
predictions. Only the latter lS considered here. It was of particular 
interest since the authors divided an inequality coefficient (similar to 
Theil's inequality coefficient {95 \nto three parts 
1) errors in predicting the average overall earnings growth 
of the sample firms 
2) errors in predicting the average growth rate of particular 
industries 
3) errors iri predicting the growth rate of firms within industries. 
It was found that failure to forecast the industry means correctly accounted 
for only a very small p"roportion of the" inequality coefficient. The main 
sources of inequality were the within industry errors. The authors also 
attempted to associate forecasting success with industry or company 
characteristics. They had little success. 
The overall conclusion of the study was that the forecasting performances 
of the predictors had been rather poor. The careful estimates of security 
analysts perform little better than the use of past growth rates. It might 
be that the results were peculiar to the particular period investigated, 
1. Strictly the average annual rate of growth expected to occur In the 
next five years. 
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or that shorter term predictions may be more accurate. However un-t il 
rCGul t~-, to the contrary are produced, it seem:; unlikely that the wideniLg 
of information from which forecasts are made, (unless it is private 
information) helps one to forecast changes in earn~ngs. 
The difficulty of predicting the index, or prlces, or even earnlngs, has 
it is hoped been made abundantly clear. It is easy to adduce many other 
studies. "In short, the evidence in support of the efficient markets model 
1S extensive and (somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence 
~s sparse." ( {37} Fama page 416). Overall there is little hope for 
predicting the market, industry, and individual firm effects. 
Much of the discussion about prlces has centred on the prediction of the 
market index. Other studies have examined both industry and firm fore-
casting although with little more success. It might be argued that to 
identify industry and individual" price forecasting with the problem of 
predicting the industry, and individual components of a price change is 
inappropriate. Difficulty in predicting an industry index may be due to 
the substantial element of covariation of the industry index with the market, 
or" indeed with other industry indices, and hence the amalgamation of a random 
and systematic series, the former swamping the latter. However the inability 
of techniques such as spectral analysis to piCk out systematic elements 
makes this unlikely. It is true that Cragg & Malkiel showed that the 
forecasting of the industry earnings component in earnings forecasts was 
subject to little error, but whether this conclusion may be generalised to 
the forecasting of an industry price component, remains to be answered. 
On balance the studies quoted in this chapter together with the evidence of 
the last chapter indicate that it is unlikely that knowledge of the existence 
of sector effects in the past is particularly useful as a device for 
increasing the analyst's predictive abilities. 
c.v I 
Chapter 12 
Conclusions 
The introduction to this thesl"s outll"ned t 1 wo comp ementary ob~ective3 
this study was striving to achl" eve. Th f" t th e lrs was e provlslon of more 
information about investment management. l The second was the use of Sor:e 
this information to make some strides towards a positive theory of invest~e~t" 
The intention here is to assess how far each of these goals has been met. 
The first objective, the provision of information, is the subject of almost 
all of Part I of the thesis. Each chapter examines in turn one aspect of 
investment management, moving from the more general to the more particular 
aspects of portfolio management. The coverage is necessarily selective 
and subjec\ti ve; the intention was to include those factors that are 
important for understanding how investment decisions are made. The analysis 
starts (chapter two) with an outline of the role of the institution both in 
the macro sense of its relationships to other types of financial institutions 
and in the.micro sense of the services, notably diversification and management, 
that the institution provides. To a considerable extent the organisation and 
structure ,of the institution (chapter three) follows from the institution's 
role. By organisation is meant the process by which decisions are made. 
The chapter attempts to describe who makes decisions and very broadly, the 
influences on these decisions. In addition consideration is given to the 
execution of investment decisions, as well as to the influence of the 
objectives of the investment managers on the organisational structure. Some 
of the main influences on decision making,in particular institutional 
limitations on investment, are then discussed (chapter four). The different 
investment vehicles impose a variety of constraints on investment management 
1. More correctly perhaps, this sentence should read the provision of 'some' 
information about investment managers. The finance literature 1S almost 
totally devoid of any discussion of such institutions. 
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decis ions for each port folio. These constraints vary from tLe forrr,al -
legal and official - to those imposed on the 1Jasis of past experience by 
such bodies as the board of directors. The overall effect is to reduce 
the type of securities that may be selected by the managers, an important 
factor that needs to be considered in any positive theory of investment. 
These institutional limitations on investment are all external to a , 
greater or lesser degree, to the investment management organisation. In 
contrast, the fifth chapter is concerned with what might be termed an 
internal limitation on investment behaviour - the Office Philosophy. 
Portfolio Selection, the main interest of the chapter, encompasses a wide 
variety of rules and techniques which govern the construction of portfolios. 
Emphasis between different techniques varles between institutions. In 
the firm investigated the particular rules that were employed constituted 
the maln elements of the Office Philosophy. Each element of the philosophy 
was considered, its importance for the firm discussed briefly, and then 
the implications of the rule in terms of capital market theory examined. 
For example, according to mean-variance theory, diversification generally 
requires only about twenty stocks, in contrast to the fifty or more that 
the typical portfolio of the investment managers contained. Similarly key 
concepts (according tothe firm) in the selection of portfolios, such as 
liquuity, marketability and anchor stocks, are contrasted with the require-
ments of theory. Various parts of normative portfolio theory as well as 
empirical studies are introduced In order to provide a standard against 
which institutional portfolio behaviour may be compared. The theory also 
serves to illustrate some of the conflicts apparent in the managers' 
investment philosophy as well as to stress some of its basic precepts. 
rfhe subsequent chapter (chapter six) concentr~tes on the selection of shar~~ 
for a portfolio. Its accent is on Cluanti tati ve and quali tati ve methods 
commonly used in the evaluation of shares rather than on the particular 
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for. Emphasis is placed- on the fundamental rather th t - . al an ect.rll c r mcthcri::; 
of analysis and special attention is given to Economic Analysis, intrinsi2 
value analysis - a formal model for valuing a company's shares whic~ enatl~s 
one to establish the main variables an analyst is interested in _ 
accounting sources of information and the quality of management. The rG~e 
of information is only touched upon briefly but the overall conclusion is 
that since investment analysis represents attempts to value information 
~lalysts must in general secure private information if their aim is 
successful share prediction. 
The final chapter of Part I concludes the attempt to meet the first 
objective of ~his thesis. The chapter is concerned with Portfolio Evaluation 
and entails the comparison of the ex post performance of investment portfolios 
in order both to improve the methods (and techniques) used in selecting 
particular portfolios and to assess the abilities of analysts and fund 
managers. Portfolio evaluation provides the institution with a control 
system with which it can supervise its members and check how far the objectives 
of the institution are being met. More immediately, portfolio evaluation 
provides the fund manager and analyst with a monitoring system which can be 
used to provide information on the changes to portfolios that may need to 
be made. Some of the methods that have been used or suggested for 
performance measurement are considered - in particular simple return measures, 
such as the internal rate of return, that take no account of risk, and 
composite measures, based on capital market theory, which consider both 
the risk and return of a portfolio. 
To summarlse, the chapters on the role and organisation of the institution 
as well as on the institutional limitations on investment are aimed at 
outlining the structure in which investment decisions are made. These 
chapters are not concerned with the detailed techniques of decision 
the subject of the portfolio selection and investment analysis cha~ters, b~t 
with the framework in which decisions are made and with the wider factors 
influencing the structure of portfolios. In contrast, portfolio analysis 
. lS concerned with outlining the main considerations and constraints involved 
ln the immediate task of constructing portfolios, and investment analysis 
deals with the methods used to select the securities, subject to these 
constraints. Finally, portfolio evaluation examines the overall suitability 
of the portfolio and provides the information necessary for modifying and 
revising the portfolios in the light of changing circumstances. 
Part I then has provided .some evidence about how portfolio choices are 
made by an investment management organisation. It has endeavoured to outline 
both indirect influences on portfolio decision making resulting from the 
institutional structure and the more direct influences arising from a 
particular investment philosophy. The two are of course interdependent. 
. {64 } 
The intention has eeen to go some way towards fulfilling the need Llntner 
outlined in his discussion of the priorities for further financial research: 
the requirement both for more detailed institutional knowledge and for 
information on how portfolio choices are made. In addition these chapters 
provide some evidence about the factors a positive theory of investment, 
{1E;}· . ely 
constructed on the lines suggested by Clarkson's ploneerlng stu , 
should consider. 
Interest in the factors that a positive theory of investment may consider 
lS not of course confined to Part I. The second objective of the thesis 
1S to butld on the foundations provided by Part I and make a specific 
contribution to the construction of a positive theory by examining one of 
the rules or elements of the Office Philosophy that the investment managers 
claim to use. Can their assertion that it is a valuable and useful invest-
ment technique be verified empirically? Sector selection techniques, the 
element of the Office Philosophy considered, are evaluated with tGe 
of discovering both whether the investment managers use sector selection 
techniques and whether the choice of shares by their sector characteristics 
is a rational investment strategy. 
This investigation of sector selection is the subject matter of Par~ I~. 
It is shown initially (chapter eight) that the existence of well definea 
homogeneous sectors enables the investor to secure a diversified portfolio 
easily, quickly and cheaply, simply by choosing one share from each of 
several sectors. But three important questions must be asked: Do sector 
effects exist or not?; Do the investment managers select shares on a 
sector basis for their portfolios? and Is sector selection a valuable 
investment technique? Taken as a whole the answers to these questions help 
build up a picture of sector selection teChniques. The question whether 
the classification of shares by sector is associated with clearly distinguish-
able sector effects is then considered (chapter nine) ~ There is no basis 
for selecting shares from one sector rather than another unless the 
aggregation of shares into sectors is associated with effects peculiar to 
those sectors. To test this hypothesis a number of different models are 
employed, which partition changes In share price into sector, market and 
residual components. Both tests of significance and estimates of the 
relative contributions made by these factors provide evidence that sectors, 
and in particular homogeneous sectors, are influenced by an industry effect 
and hence that the c~assification of shares by sector is, for some sectors 
at least, associated with clearly distinguishable sector effects. 
This conclusion provides the foundation for the investigation (chapter 10) 
of the other two questions outlined above. The answers to both involve the 
examination of an actual portfolio. Answers to the second question are 
ascertained by a comparison of the holdings of a portfolio selected by means 
212 
of sector techniques with the holdings of a portfolio selected by chance. 
Overall, it seemed reasonable to conclude that in the portfolio investi~teQ 
there did appear to be considerable evidence of sector selection taking 
place, so bearing out the assertions of the managers that shares for the 
portfolio were selected on the basis of their sector characteristics. 
The third question is answered by a comparison of the performance G: a 
portfolio, its shares selected on the basis of sector characteristics, 
with the performance of a portfolio composed of sector equivalent investments. 
On the basis of the evidence from this part of the investigation there 
seemed little reason to believe that the managers found the selection of 
shares by sectors to be a particularly successful investment technique. 
Portfolio performance did not appear to have benefited from the use of 
sector selection as an investment technique. 
The poor results achieved from the sectors selected ln this fund might of 
course have been unrepresentative of the results of the technique. To 
ex&~ine this question some of the studies to date that have attempted to 
forecast and predict share prices, and the likely implication for the 
possibilities of forecasting sector performance, are discussed (chapter 11). 
After considering these stuqies and the evidence of the previous chapter, 
it seemed on balance unlikely that knowledge of the existence of sector 
effects in the past is particularly useful as a device for increasing the 
an"alyst' s predictive abilities. 
Corresponding to the three questions of interest posed at the beginning of 
Part II, three conclusions emerge from the investigation ofsector selection 
techniques. The first confirms that the classification of shares is 
associated with clearly distinguishable sector effects, a conclusion in 
line with the majority of academic studies. The second, and most important 
conclusion from the point of view of constructing a positive theory of 
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investment, is that the ava1"la~le eV1"dence conf1"rms th" t t 
,U e 1nves ;;-le:-~ 
managers' statements about the methods they employ. More precisely, 
analysis of a portfolio confirmed that sector selection methods had been 
used in its construction. Thirdly, and most importantly for the 
investment managers, there 1S no evidence from the analysis of a portfolio 
or from considering a variety of empirical studies, that sector selection 
techniques confer above average returns for the risks involved. This 
finding constitutes additional evidence in favour of the efficient market 
hypothesis . Selecting shares by their industry characteristics might 
be expected to be a successful investment teChnique only in an inefficient 
market. Inability to detect such success might therefore be interpreted 
as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the- capital market is 
efficient. As a technique, sector selection's only advantage 1S that of 
information saving, and in particular securing -diversification at low 
I 
cost. 
Overall the ma1n contribution of this thesis must be seen in terms of its 
explanation of sector selection techniques. In addition, however, it 
provides a basis for further research and investigation by outlining a 
number of factors significant in determining the investment behaviour of 
a little studied, but important, type of financial institution. 
1. Even this may well be aChievable by an easier method since capital 
market theory suggests (under cer.tain assumptions) that to achieve 
a desired risk position all one requires is an appropriate combination 
of the market portfolio and the riskless asset. 
FORMAL HECHfu'\JISM OF UNIT TRUST OPERATIONS ( I) 
Unit trusts are created by trust deeds between the management company 
and the trustees. The trustee is authorised to hold a trust fund of 
securities, cash and other assets, for the benefit of tne unitholder. 
The fund 1S divided into equal and convenient sized units of no nominal 
value. It is free to expand and contract the number of units in ex-
istence, new investors being able to participate on terms exactly the 
same as present investors, the precise way in which this is done being 
specified ·in the trust deeds. 
In general, authorisation of the scheme is required by the Department of 
Trade and Industry. Qualifications for authorisation basically revolve 
around the standing of the managers and the trustees, and protection of 
the unitholders by suitable provisions in the trust deeds. 
THE TRUSTEE 
The trustee acts as the legal owner of the underlying securities in the 
fund and is their official custodian. He is also responsible for the 
collection and distribution of interest and dividends, as well as issuing 
certificates and supervising the registers. It ts up to him to make sure 
that the fund has a corresponding amount of cash or securities for each 
un it iss ue d . 
The trustee is there to safeguard the rights of the unitholders. It 1S 
I 
hi s duty to superv1se the investments of the fund and make sure that they 
are within the categories authorised by the trust deeds. He should prevent 
management manipulation and to this end he has certain rights for removing 
1. See {12, 72,73,93,lO~ 
managers. One should also note the supervisory position of the Der-LTt: .. ~_.: t 
of Trade and Industry. 
THE MANAGER 
The manager's function is to run the operation for a fee, inves ting as 
prudently and profitably as possible for the benefit of unitholders . 
. 
Tne manager 18 generally responsible for investment of the fund hri th 
which we are not concerned here) and administration and marketing. The 
1ssue of further units is an important management function. It is 
essential that the value of existing units should not be diluted by the 
issue of further units. To this end the manager must deposit with thp 
trustee, cash equal to the issue price of the new units, before they are 
issued. Large cash inflows of this kind can of course present substantial 
investment problems. It is possible for the managers to use an 
appropriation basis by which securities are deposited with the trustee 
instead of cash. This method 1S open to abuse, the main problem being 
that securities may have gone up or down 1n value before they are taken 
up by the trus tee and can result 1n sUbstantial profits for the management, 
e.g. the managers buying a line of stock at a discount on market pr1ce, 
and selling it at the market pr1ce to the trust fund. This method is 
lli1a.c~eptable for obtaining a London Stock -Exchange quotation. 
AGENCY/PRINCIPAL MODES OF OPERATION 
The managers may act as 'agents' or 'principals' for the trust. The 
essential difference is that when the flli1d expands under the principal 
system the units are 1n the first place issued to the manager~ who s~lls 
them to investors, as principal in the transa~tion, if 8.l.'lQ when they are 
in demand. He therefore takes the profits and losses from :::banges in 
the: value of the underlying securities. When the fund is contracting, 
the units are bought from the unitholders by the manager and he decides 
whether to hold or cancel them. 
Under the agency system, when the fund expands, the manager registers 
new units directly in the name of investors. The manager simplY 
acts as agent and make~ no profit or loss. 
The agency system helps prevent conflicts of interest but makes 
difficult 'block offers' of units at favourable prices. Block offers 
are an invitation to the public to buy a certain number of units at a 
stated fixed price over a given period of time. They usually occur 
at the beginning of a trust's life or when it is desired to expand it 
rapidly. If the issue price, calculated in the ordinary way, r1ses 
above the block offer price during the offer, there 1S an inducement to 
new investors to buy the units. However, existing uni tholders woul d 
suffer dilution in the value of the units if only the block offer pr1ce 
were paid into the trust fund as received. Hence the manager has to 
deposit cash (or sec~rities if on an appropriation basis) with the 
trustee and issue·an equivalent value in units to himself before it 
makes the block offer. The block offer prlce which the managers 
receive as principals will not then affect the trust fund at all. If 
during an offer the price falls below the block offer price, the manager 
sells the units offered at a lower price. 
It is advantageous to the managers to have an expanding fund. Hence 
==r 
units are almost always available, despite the impression to the contrary 
glven by block offers. 
PRICING OF UNITS 
Before considering the calculation of unit trust prlces it is worthwhile 
to clear up terminology. An "offer" price is the prlce at which a 
security may be bought by the stockbroker from the jobber. The II ... :,..;" LJ...L \-4. 
prlce lS the prlce at which a stockbroker may sell a security to a 
jobber. The difference between bid and offer prices depends on market-
ability and other influences and is known as the jobber's turn. 
Maximum and minimum prlces for units are calculated according to the 
Department of Trade and Industry (D T I ) for ul • •• m ae. Within this range, 
the trusts set their own spread. The fundamental idea is that if there 
is a demand for new units say, then the new money paid per unit should 
exactly match the value of an existing uni t (and all illli ts are equal). 
Additions or withdrawals to the fund are not to affect the value of 
each unit. In calculating the D.T.I. offer price, valuation is made 
with the purpose of determining what it would cost to constitute a new 
unit precisely equal in value to existing units. Hence the offer pr1ce 
consists of an appropriation price (investments valued at lowest 
purchase pr1ce adjusted for taxation and other liabilities per unit, and 
to which brokerage, stamp duties and cash have been added) plus an initial 
service charge and a small allowance for rounding. (An amount is also 
added for dividend equalisation - equal to the share of the amoilllt of 
dividends already declared on underlying securities, but not received as 
yet by the trust, and 1n which purchasers of new units will share at 
the next distribution of dividends.) 
Similarly the bid prlce 1S based on what each unitholder would be entitled 
to were the whole of the trust fund to be sold and distributed. Hence 
it consists of the value of investments per unit, valued at the highest 
selling prices, adjusted as necessary and to which brokerage, bank charges 
and other fees are added such as would be incurred in connection with 
a complete sale of the investments and a distribution of the proceeds in 
cash. Many of the prices and adjustments are rather arbitrary and it is 
important that the trustee keeps tabs on the manager in these calculations. 
A spread of as much as 10% between the bi d and offer pr1.ces may () rc ~Jr 
in consequence of the initial, service charge, stamp and inve?'tment rlut:t3, 
buying and selling expenses of the underlying investments, and the jobbing 
v 
turn. If the managers' transactions involve buying and reselling the s~e 
uni ts, then trading at 'J. T. I. pri ces, the manager will make a very large 
profit. He will be ma~ing in effect the buying and selling expenses of 
the underlying investments and the jobber's turn. Competitive pressur~ 
may induce him to take a narrower spread between bid and offer pr1ces than 
that allowed by the D.T.I. formulae. The problem then arises ~ to 
'-. . , .... '.1 
whether it should be bas~d on the D.T.I. offer or bid price or somewhere 
in between. The problem arises because when extra units are created 
the cost to the manager will be the D.T.I. offer price (as investments 
will have to be purchased for the fund) whilst if units are cancelled 
some investments will have to be realised with costs appropriate to the 
D.T.I. bid price to be met. 
The unitholders' position is different. Incoming unitholders want the 
offer price as low as possible and outgoing unitholders will want the 
bid price as high as possible. Two arguments would seem to indicate 
that the D.T.I. offer price IS most suitable. Firstly, one would expect 
the fund. to be expanding on balance and hence the D.T.I. offer price 1S 
most appropriate. Secondly, the manager's duty is to his outgoing 
unitholders and so prices based on the D.T.I. offer price are more appropriate. 
The wider the D.T.I. pr1ce spread, the larger the area for manoeuvre 1n 
the quoted prices and the greater the potential loss to tLi=> manager if 
he has to cancel units at the D. T. I. bi d pri ce that he has bought back at 
his price, based on the D.T.I. offer pr1ce. Th~ wider the D.T.I. prIce 
spread the bigger the potential loss. By this narrowing of the spread 
the investor may well get back most of his initial service charge Slnce 
he receives considerably more than the D.T.I. bid price. 
REMUNERATION 
It remains to consider managers' and trustees' remuneration. Charges 
fall into two categories. The initial service charge (not more than 5% 
of the value of the fund) designed to cover promotional expenses, 
commissions to agents and initial administrative expenses and periodical 
management remuneration, designed to Cover running expenses. Total 
charges must not amount to more than13a% of the value of the fund over 
a twenty year period, and since in fact, periodical remuneration lS 
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offsettable for tax purposes, the actual cost is somewhat lower. Trustee 
remuneration is usually a small portion of the periodical management fee. 
It is perhaps worth noting two other possible sources of managers' 
profits. Dealers' margins and holding profits from acting as principal. 
In general unit trusts endeavour to reduce the latter whilst dealing 
margins occur only after the unit trust has been running for some time. 
REGULATIONS AND CONTROL 
No legal provision exists for the ascertainment of the wishes of unit-
holders by holding meetings or for the imposition of their wishes on 
the manager and trustee. Unitholders are unable to veto acquisitions 
for investment or compel sales. However, if the unitholders unanimously 
direct the manager or trustee to act in a certain way, they must obey, 
since the uni tholders collecti velyare the equitable owners of the trust 
fund. Such agreement is impossible and consequently no effective control 
is exercised over the managers and trustee by the unitholders. 
GEARING 
Although there lS no reason why a trust deed should not contain a clause 
allowing borrowing, in practice difficulties arise because of the absence 
of a permanent capital to provide asset and interest cover for the loans. 
Hence unit trusts are rarely geared. {93 } 
APPENDIX 2 
INVESTME:NT TRUSTS 
The object of both unit and investment trusts is to invest funds as 
safely and profitably as possible for the benefit of the investor. 
Tney differ not in thE..: "_I' manner of doing this but simply in their iegal 
form. An investment trust is a conventional limited liabiiity company 
incorporated under the various company acts. It is a separate legal 
entity (unlike a unit trust) with memorandum, and articles of association 
laying down its interests and possible activities. In general 
participation is possible in most financial markets and property, although 
the Departm,.::nt of Trade and Industry (D. T. I.) require for approval as 
an investment trust, that most of the company's income comes from share 
or security holdings. The memorandum or articles of association also 
specify that capital"gains shall not be paid out in the form of dividends 
(although other types of capital distribution are possible) and it is 
this restriction which differentiates them from finance companles, (and 
leads in consequence to different rates of tax being applicable). 
Restrictions are placed on the proportion of the trust's assets that may 
be invested in a particular company (generally not more than 15% (when 
acquired) of the trust's assets), and on the proportion of income that 
may be retained and not distributed (15%). There are in addition a 
number of rules, understood by the investment trusts imposed on them by 
the D.T.I. Thus in the past turnover in anyone year was generally to be 
less than 15% of total assets (by value), although such restrictions 
were not imposed completely rigidly and have subsequently been lifted In this 
case. 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Investment trusts have a capital structure sirr,ilar to that of most 
companies - with perhaps ordinary, preference, debentures and loans. 
., r"?'--
The nominal capital available to the trust lS more or less fixed, 
although changes are possible by the lSsue of further shares and ot:-"er 
forms of capital. This however is by no means part of an investment 
V~J.. ... 
trust's normal business. The quotation of investment trust company shares 
on the stock market is normal. However the markets in them are usually 
The share price generally reflects asset values, plus a premium thin. 
(discount) for good or bad management records, and gearing. These and 
other such factors are not fixed in their combination but vary with 
market assessment and feeling. 
In contrast the units of a Unit trust are valued on a basis precisely 
related to the value of the underlying assets. In addition the unit 
trust is free to expand and contract the number of units at will as 
opposed to the fixed nature of the capital of an investment trust who 
are not allowed to buy and sell their own shares. 
GEARING 
Gearing 1S due to the prlor claim on both income and capital of debentures 
and preferences, over ordinary shares. It has ar1sen because of the 
ability of the investment trusts to issue fixed interest securities. 
The investment trust has a fixed amount to pay on its prior (fixed interest) 
capital out of its income. The remainder of its 1ncome represents the 
earnlngs of ordinary capital which may be distributed as dividend (ignoring 
management expenses and taxation). Increases (decreases) in total income 
will see no variation in the fixed interest costs, so that the ordinary 
shareholders take all the benefits (losses) from a change in earn1ngs. 
Hence the earnings of ordinary capital will be affected more than 
proportionately to the change in the trust's income. Naturally, the higher 
the proportion of the trust's nominal capital in fixed interest securities, 
the greater the gearlng and the greater the fluctuations in the earnlngs 
of ordinary capital when the lOnvestment tr~st's income changes. (It 
should be noted that if all the trust's ° 1nvestments were in fixed interest 
securities, then there might still be a benefit (loss) from gear1ng, 
but that the trust's income would not fluctuate). 
Calculation of gear10ng" --,-'S g all ° ener y on a cap1tal or 1ncome basis. In 
the capital case, the ratio of total assets (however valued) to total 
assets net of fixed interest capital is generally used, and 1n the income 
case, the ratio of total income of the trust, to income net of fixed 
interest/dividend charges. 
It is common for articles of association to restrict the borrowing of 
a trust. Practice var1es but generally borrowing maybe between one 
and two times paid up ordinary capital. Although most trusts exerCI se 
their borrowing rights to some extent, it 1S not uncommon for gearIng 
to "run itself off" because the growth of assets has been faster than 
the growth of share capital and hence borrowing capacity. 
EXERCISE OF CONTROL BY SHAREHOLDERS 
As with other companies, shareholders have rights to elect the board of 
directors and sanction the dividends declared. Apart from this and the 
prOVISIon of a minimal amount of information, there are few opportunities 
for shareholder control. The usual hope is that institutions who are 
large holders of the investment trust shares will exercise some control 
and supervision. The problem is compounded by the responsibility of the 
investment trusts to prod the sleepy company into life. It is unlikely 
that a poor investment trust will be able to induce changes that might 
safeguard their investments without sales (which may well be difficult 
due to the size of their holding). It may be that it is Undesirable for 
investment trusts to become involved 1n such activities, 
but there is in general little the shareholder can do either way. 
The possibility of trusts buying unquoted shares and becoming close12r 
involved in industrial company management is ever present. The results 
may be contrary to the general interests of the shareholders who are not 
informed, if at all, un+il after the event and can do little except sell 
the shares to indicate disapproval. The articles of association may 
include specific provisions for shareholder involvement and protection, 
but such provisions are by no means general. Not only is there no trustee 
to protect the shareholders' interest (although this is not to say that 
trustees are a particularly effective method of control) nor is there 
likely to be a division between administration and investment found to 
some extent in unit trust operations and which may act as some 
unitholder protection. 
MANAGEMENT FEES 
Information on management fees is not so readily available as with unit 
. {13 } However some estimates are avallable and would seem to trusts. 
indicate for 1964 at least, that very few trusts had management expenses 
greater than 0.5% of capital employed. The vast majority recorded 
expenses of less than 0.3%. From the investment trusts' nature one 
would expect their fees to be lower than for unit trusts (due to larger 
holdings, lower turnover .... ) although as turnover increases the 
differential is likely to narrow. 
APPENDIX '3 
CASE STUDY :. NEW PORTFOLIO CONf;rrRUCTION (UNIT TRUST) 
The first step in constructing a portfolio, consists of laying down the 
portfolio objectives. In this particular case the prime objective of 
the fund was to be growth. The managers were to have complete flexibility 
and to have no need tc.. :.lchieve any particular income pattern. Investment 
was generally to be in equities but the managers were empowered to switch 
into fixed interest stocks and gilts as they considered appropriate. 
The general approach was to be for the managers to take a Vlew d t . ,-an 0 f"O.J..G. 
for growth. It was described as an investment trust philosophy and was l~ 
contrast to the market orientated funds which switch between shares accor~~~g 
to market sentiment and rumour. (However it is worth noting that in a 
subsequent document arguing the case for increased fees for the investment 
managers, one argument advanced was that a more active dealing policy was 
pursued than was general and that this entailed greater costs.) In contrast 
to most investment trusts, holdin~were to be selective and small ln number. 
It was intended that a substantial part of the portfolio should be abroad 
particularly in North America. Substantial investments were to be built 
up by direct purchase where possible, and as an interim measure by the 
purchase of selected investment trusts with a substantial American content. 
('Back to Back' loans were subsequently negotiated for this fund.) The rest 
of the fund was to be spread initially over companies in industries with 
established growth patterns, operating internationally and providing the 
greatest protection against devaluation and inflation. 
In terms of investors, it was intended to attract those who could afford to 
disregard the income requirement from their investments and could go simply 
for growth. In order to attract such people a high minimum holding was 
imposed along with a low initial fee. Charges were reduced for deals in 
excess of £5,000. The buying and selling margin was also kept to a narrow 
~ 
range (about 34%). 
. ' 
....... ..L 
The arguments put forward ln favour of the trust were (i) flexible investffie:-.t. 
policy constantly seeking the areas of fastest growth, (ii) constant exper~ 
supervision, (iii) readily marketable, (iv) charges on a reducing scale, 
(v) lower rate of capital gains tax than was applicable to the private 
investor, particularly for short term gains. 
Having established the objectives of the trust and delineated the market 
of investors that was being aimed at, the procedure followed by the managers 
was to write round to a number of brokers asking for suggestions as to 
particular sectors and shares the fund should invest in. On the bas is of 
this and their own judgement various meetings were held and schemes drawn 
up to determine the weighting of funds within broad investment areas. The 
procedure followed was to construct a proposed portfolio detailing the 
individual constituents and the weights to be placed on them. This 
suggested portfolio distribution was compared against the F.T. Actuaries 
sector weights. (In this case, for example, the portfolio was underweighted 
in Financials and overweighted in Consumer Durables.) Thus particular 
sectors were weighted (such as 14% of the portfolio ln Financial Services 
and 23% ln Consumer Durables) and then the kinds of shares to be included 
listed (for example within Financial Services, 5% in Mercury Securities and 
1% in Atlantic Assets). Income and overall yield were then calculated for 
the size the portfolio was expected to reach in its first month or two (in 
this case for a portfolio of about £lm.) The portfolio was then tested to 
make sure it fitted in with all the initial requirements and constraints 
(such a yield and growth potential)., Its exposure to risk was also considered, 
the exposure being in terms of geographical spread, overall industry involve-
ment and stock exchange fashion. 
. f h' t' on Naturally This proposed portfollo was, 0 course, only a roug approXlma 1 • . 
over time expectations and preferences for sectors and shares 
whilst the amount of new money that °11 Wl be received ~s th ' ~ ra er an UI:l\.rlo·,rn 
quantity. In the event the inflow of funds was heavy. 
End of 
Growth of a Unit Trust Portfolio 
Cumulati ve amount of 
Cash paid into the .Lm 
Fund for Units £m Investments Cash 
1st month £2.219 2.003 0.257 
2nd month 2.532 2.020 0.527 
3rd month 2.701 2.492 0.4·04 
6th month 3.997 4.748 0.190 
9th month 5.228 6.417 0.152 
12 months 6.319 7.677 0.323 
15 months 7.262 10.022 0.307 
18 months 8.100 9.883 0.544 
·21 months 8.589 8.214 0.999 
24 months 8.799 9.132 0.691 
30 ~onths 8.934 10.795 1.487 
Period covered was late 1967 to early 1970 when the number of 
units. actually fell in one month. 
In order to be able to cope with such large inflows it was necessary for 
the managers to plan a Slze they expected the portfolio to become (about 
£lOm in this case) and then to use building blocks which were big enough 
to allow growth to take place. Failure to do this would have resulted 
in overstretched investments in smaller companies thereby giving rise to 
unmarketability so restricting the flexibility of the portfolio. The 
problem \-ras made more acute by the tendency of the unit trusts to grow 
in bull market conditions when stock was generally short and choice severely 
curtailed. In consequence some divergence between the proposed portfolio 
and the actual portfolio was only to be expected. 
The question arlses as to whether there is an optimal portfolio Slze. 
Intuitively one would expect there to be an optimum, but analysis of 
illli t and investment tr'lst performance charts does not immediately reveal 
one. One might reasonably have expected small portfolios to outperform 
the large on the grounds of marketability and other such factors mentioned 
before. However the evidence does not reveal any consistent pattern. 
With the growth of the unit trust the procedures described under portfolio 
selection took over. The principles remained the same as described here, 
but tended to be much less obvious in their application. 
APPENDIX 4 
SUMMARY OF MAIN PROVISIONS FOR TAXATION OF G?,;IT A.l'~D INVESTM21~T TR0STS'" 
Capital galns tax is an important element in the taxation of unit and 
investment trusts. Consequently one or two matters applicable primarily 
to this tax, are considered before the general corporation tax proble~ 
of the trusts. 
For a ga1ns tax liability to ar1se there must be (a) the disposal o~ a 
(b) chargeable asset by a (c) chargeable person within a (d) period of 
charge. (i.e. who and what is taxable, and how and when?) 
(a) A disposal is .a change in ownership of the whole or part of 
the asset whether disposal takes place inside or outside the UK. 
An exchange of shares in a takeover does not constitute a disposal; 
receipt of a cash consideration WOuld. 
(b) A chargeable asset includes most forms of goods and property, 
particularly portfolio holdings with the exception of certain 
Gilt Edged securities. 
(c) A period of charge relates to galns after April 6, 1965. Where 
securities have been held from before that date and are subsequently 
sold, the insti tution must calculate the difference between original 
cost and sale proceeds, and the difference between the 6 April, 1965 
price and sale proceeds and where both are negative or positive, 
take the lower of the two as being the chargeable gain, or allowable 
loss. Where the two methods conflict and reveal a gain and a loss 
there 1S no chargeable gain or loss. An alternative open to the 
institution is to elect that all holdings of fixed interest and/or 
of equities be treated as if acquired at the 6 April, 1965 price. 
The taxation of unit and investment trusts is generally governed by the 
same provls1ons both being treated as companies with shareholders 
subject to corporation tax at the long-term capital gains tax rate. 
Three sources of revenue for the trusts may be differentiated. 
Franked Investment Income (net distributions from UK companies 
on which both corporation and income tax have been paid. The 
income tax is reclaimable although not directly). No tax is 
payable on this as it has already borne corporation tax at 
the company level. 
(2) Unfranked Investment Income (such as debenture interest and 
on which income tax has usually been paid, but is redeemable 
direct and so is in effect gross). It will not have paid 
corporation tax at the company level. 
(3) Capital Gains 
Both (2) and (3) pay corporation tax but certain deductions, management 
expenses and charges on lncome, are allowed against either the unfranked 
income or the capital gains. Past capital losses may be set off against 
present capital gains. 
The income tax paid on (1) may be offset against income tax payable on 
dividends and interest to the trust's shareholders. Provisions exist, 
in case (1) is greater than this amount, to carry the surplus forward. 
Provisions also exist for the uSlng up of "unused management expenses" 
and for reducing a trust's chargeable capital gains (or allowable losses) 
when the total monies paid to cancel units exceeds the total monies 
received for the creation of new units. 
In order to prevent the double taxation of unit and investment trust 
holders (i.e. charged on both the galns made by the company and 
subsequently by the shareholders) the net chargeable capital gains, 
after tax may be apportioned amongst the shareholders with each share-
holder adding his apportionment to the acquisition cost of the shares, so 
that on subsequent sale his personal chargeable capital gains will be 
reduced. (B~t not~ the individual cannot set off capital galL.:' 
paid by the trust against his private capital losses.) 
This apportionment does not totally achieve its object Slnce standard 
rate tax payers pay capital ga1ns tax at half the standard rate (i.e. 
less than the trusts' 30%), or in many cases are totally exempt from 
gains since disposals 1n any year are less than £500. There is in 
addition widespread ignorance as to the 
certificates sent to shareholders. (1) 
mean1ng and use of the tax 
It would be more equitable to 
tax the individuals and not tax the trusts. As the system works at 
present, if the trust realises no capital gains the whole liability 
devolves upon the unitholders whilst if it realises all its capital 
gains as it goes along, this will exempt the unitholder from liability, 
if he pays tax at the standard rate. 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS 
Two main influences of capital gains tax on performance comparlsons 
may be distinguished. The first consists of the effect on valuation 
of assets of different ways of treating capi tal gains, two extreme 
cases being· evident - no capital gains being realised 1n a period, and 
all capital gains being realised in the period. The second effect 1S 
that resulting from the loss of capital due to the tax payment, on 
overall performance. However, this 1S not of relevance to the share-
holder who expects the trust only to switch if it can make more by 
doing so than by not switching. 
Conventional methods of compar1son 19nore all the effects of tax 
complications and consider performance as being the net change 1n the 
1. Note the rate of tax was changed to 15% in April 1972. This point 
loses some of its force in consequence, but is still valid. 
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be the s arne. However , it does help to ill~s~rate the problems i~vo~ved. 
A probleili not dealt with 1S that of the contingent tax liability - the 
unrealised gains in a portfolio. Should one reduce the values of th~ 
investments to take these into account? In so far as apportionment 0: 
capital gains is successftil it is probably unnecessary. At the moment 
a serious problem is the sUdden dip in the pr1ce of units that takes 
place annually when capital gains tax is paid. The apportionment of 
the capital gain effectively increases the price of the shares, but is 
disadvantageous particularly to small new shareholders insofar as they 
are not liable to capital" gains tax personally and have a substa...'1tial 
portion of their working capital removed~ The problem is that the new 
unitholder does not know to what extent his units will be reduced by the 
taxation of gains acquired before his ownership of the shares. The 
potential gains may be huge, and apportionment does nothing to help such 
small shareholders. In the absence of relief for such shareholders there 
may well be an excellent case for adjusting valuations. 
• l Comments so far have mainly been on a year to year bas1s. It is wortrl 
noting that any estimate of asset values must be an over valuation if' 
net gains are being realised and the accrued tax liability on them 15 not 
being takeh into account. The same is true for the $ premium. (The 
liability to surrender 25% of the $ premium on the sale of investments 
so that at any time a fund will have an actual and contingent liability.) 
. Tne extent to which unit trusts do adjust their bid and offer pr1ces on 
a daily basis for gains and $ premium liabilities is not clear. 
ARGUMENTS FUR ADJUSTMENT OF ASSETS FOR CONT INGl:NT GfJ TIT;; J.-~~TD $ PREMIUM 
LIABILITY CL~1 
Burton and Corner argue that adjusting net assf:t value :for ~he contincpnt 
gains liability could be justified in two cases: 
( i) portfolio turnover involving realisation of al~ 
capital gains 
(ii) liquidation of the company. 
In the case of (i) the contingent gains liability becomes actual 
liability and it lS reasonable to adjust the offer and bid prices of 
a unit so as not to overcharge the purchaser. In case (ii) it is argued 
that liquidation lS not a normal state of affairs and that investors are 
interested in companies as gOlng concerns and not as about to wind up. 
They then extend their argument to say that apportionment of net capital 
gains to their shareholders increases the original cost of the shares 
and so reduces shareholders' own gains tax payments so that the contin-
gent gains liability does not involve the shareholder in an inescapable 
loss of capital value. 
The argup1ent is faulty, .firstly insofar as the logic behind the pricing 
of units in the case of unit trusts is to ascertain a break up or cost 
value of each unit and in consequence to remove liabilities for taxation 
from the asset value. In the case of investment companies justification 
for adjustment may simply rest on the provision of better information 
for making investment decisions. The second point relates to the 
apportionment argument. Earlier comments have indicated that apportion-
ment is a poor solution to the gains tax problem in cases where the 
tini t/shareholder is small and would normally be exempt from capital galns 
tax. Failure to adjust for contingent gains tax liability effectively 
removes a portion of the investor's working capital. The argument 
against taxing contingent capital gains must surely rely on the 
administrative difficulties involved. 
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APPENDIX 5 
(1) CONSOLIDATED P & L 
NET SA"L2S 
(Ii o. 0 f Employees) 
Wages & Sal. 
OPERATING PROFIT 
Investment Income 
Income B.I. & T. 
Interest on Debt 
Interest on Convertible 
Profit BIT. 
Tax 
Income AlT. 
Minority Interests 
Pref. Dividend 
EQUITY EARNINGS 
Di vidend 
Retained ~arnings 
Depreciation 
CASH FLOW 
(2) OPERATING RATIOS 
Ope Profit % Net Sales 
Year to 
Ope Profit % Net Ope Assets 
Ope Profit per Employee 
Wages: Profit B/~ 
Net Sales: Wages 
Net Sales per Employee 
Net Sales: Stocks 
Net Sales: Net Ope Assets 
Net Sales: Net Fixed Assets 
Equi ty Earnings % Equi iy Cap. Funds. 
Retained Earnings % Equity Cap. Funds. 
(3) PER SHARE: NO. OF SHARES: 
(4) 
Equity Capital Funds 
Investments 
Net Sales 
Cash Flow 
Equity Earnings 
Dividend 
RELATIVE VALUE 
Date 
Price 
P/CF. 
PIE. 
Yield 
CGver 
Mkt. Cap. 
( 5) 
l •.. i .......... 
HALF YEAR FIGURES 
, 
1 Net Sales 2 , 
2 2 , 
1 Ope Profit 2 
, 
2 2 , 
-, 
Ope Profit ~ .l 
% Sales 2 2 
6) COrJ~). BALANCE SHEt:T 
(Intangible Assets) 
Land 
Plant & M/C. 
Fixed Assets 
Depreciation 
Net Fixed Assets 
Operating Net Curro Assets (1-2) 
1 (Current Assets) 
2 (Current Liabs - O/D) 
Current Liabs. 
Stocks 
Cash 
NE~ OEERATING ASSETS 
Investments 
TOTAL ASSETS 
Overdraft 
Long Term Debt 
Pref. Capital 
Future Tax 
Tax EQuilisation 
Total Borrowing 
Convertible 
Minority Interests 
EQUITY CAPITAL FUNDS 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
(7) CAPITAL RA'rIOS 
Curro Assets: Curro Liabs. 
Quick Assets: Curro Liabs. 
O/D% Net Op. Assets 
Year 
Total Borrowing % Net Op. Assets 
Net Borrowing % Total Assets 
tTB - I - C) 
Stocks % Net Op. Assets 
Net Op. Assets per Employee 
~l-J~-­
.. -. - --
:a:r: 
Appendix 6 
Let I. represent the firm index, I 1S 
.s the sector index, and I the market 
index. A multiplicative relationship of the form 
I. ~ I .L. lS = lS .s 
I I I 
. .. • S .. 
was postulated, or for convenience 
F = F. . F 
•. t 1st .st 
The change 1n pr1ce for the (t-j) to the tth period 1S denoted by 
F 
.. t F. = 1st F .st 
F •. (t-j ) F. ( . ) 1S t-J 
Taking logs glves 
= (log F. t - log F. (t .)) + (log F t - log F (t . 
1S 1 S - J . s . s - J 
which 1S equivalent to equation (1) 
In turn b.log F t = b.log I. t - b.log I J •• J 1S J .. t 
b.log F. t = b.log I. t - b.log I J 1S J 1S J .st 
b .log IiI t = b.log I t - !J. .log I t 
,) • s J • S J • • 
and b.log I t) may be shown to equal J .s 
. f . th f' . th th pr1ce 0 the 1 1rm 1n e S b.log P. t ",here P denotes the share 
J 1S 
th 
sector for the t period. (See Appendix 7 ). 
Appendix r( 
Let I ist be an index of the individual firm's share pri ce such that 
P. t lS 
P. 
lSO 
wherePist = prlce of the ith firm in the sth sector for the tth period, 
~ Pdt th . f . th f" th ana. eno es e prlce 0 the 1 lrm ln the s sector for the base lSO 
period. 
Then log I. t lS 
lliog I. t lS 
= 
= 
= . {log Pist - log Pis(t-l) - log Piso + log Piso } 
= 6 log P. t lS 
Generalising to differences of· length j gives 6.log P. t. 
J lS Similarly for 
the sector (or market) index 
I 
th . d of k companies at the t perla. 
Let I 
. st 
= (~ Pit)k 
. P . 
1 10 1 
th . d For the t+l perla I 
.s(t+l) = (~: ~ ( t+ 1) ) k 
1 10 
Hence log I.s(t+l) - log l.st 
(/k P ) 1 (k P. ) = llog IT i(t+l) - k10g ~ ~ k . P 1 P. 1 io 10 
= ~{IOg PI(t+l) - log PIO + log P2(t+l) - log P20 + ...... + 
log Pk(t+l) - log PkO - log PIt + log PIO - log P2t + log P20 ..... 
- log P + log PkO } . · · · . . kt 
- lk } 
- -/,{log P'(t+l) - log Pit k. 1 
1 
k 
Appendix 8 
Applying the second moment m t th . . 
easure a e 1nd1vidual share, produces a 
small cross product term. 
E(6. log F )2 
J •• t = 
E{(6. log F. )2 + (6.log F )2 + 2(6.log F. t. 6 .log F ) J 1st J .st J 1S J .::,t-= 
where E is the expected val'ue operator. 
For the sector as a whole this cross product is zero. 
Computing the sector index I as the geometric mean of the individual firm 
.st 
price indices I1.'st and letting 6~ log I. 
J 1st = X. t where X. t represents 1S 1S 
the change in the log of the share price of the ith firm in the 8 th sector 
for the tth period then 
I ks 
6.log I 
J . st = - E X k. ist Sl 
Now F. t 1S = 
I. t 1S 
I 
.st 
and t::.. log F. t J 1.S 
Summing over the sector 
ks ks 
= 
-
= X 
.st 
-X. t - X 1S .st 
-E 6. log F. t = L: X. t - ksX t 
, . J 1S . 1S .s 1 1 
= 0 
The cross product summed over all i shares . the sector 1n 
ks 
2 E (t::.. log F. t't::.· log F t) 
1 J 1S J • s 
= 2 6. log F t J .s 
ks 
E t::.. log F. t) 
. J 1S 
1 
= 0 
glves 
If X. t 1S distributed normally then the geometric mean is the most 
18 . {36 } 
appropriate measure of location (Work has been carried out by Fama and 
others on the distribution of changes in log price. The distributions were 
found to be significantly non normal. Considerable argument has centred 
on these results and research has generally continued to assume normality.) 
In terms of a portfolio the geometric mean is a continuous reallocation index. 
Price movements of individual stocks are continuously adjusted for to maintain 
equal pOlli~d amounts in each stock. It is equivalent to continuously selling 
off stocks that have gone up in price and adding to those that have not. 
It might be seen as similar to a portfolio with investments bought :n units 
of £10,000 say. When the value of some individual units increases sub-
stantially, the portfolio might be considered as over represente~ in those 
stocks and consequently sales made. (See Latane & Tuttle {57 }.) 
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Sector Size 
5 mean 
St.Dev. 
10 mean 
St.Dev. 
20 mean 
St .Dev. 
30 mean 
St.Dev. 
40 mean 
St.Dev. 
50 mean 
St.Dev. 
100 mean 
St.Dev. 
Random Sample C2 values 
s 
3 month 6 month 
4.63 4.60 
1.49 2.82 
12.13 11.59 
4.49 4.71 
19.37 21.38 
3.42 8.57 
33.66 36.58 
8.23 15.31 
43.63 38.74 
10.01 7.28 
63.61 75.67 
23.56 31.56 
138.10 120.04 
30.36 23.58 
1 year 2 ;years 
4.51 7.42 
3.42 8.13 
12.20 17.56 
5.41 12.51 
27.39 40.38 
12.57 27.44 
38.12 42.33 
18.23 31.76 
44.73 46.90 
13.5.0 22.43 
105.36 189.74 
76.38 219.77 
146.78 188.77 
72.36 143.55 
Note The very high variability (standard deviation) of periods longer 
than 3 months suggest the need for -considerable caution in interpreting the 
C2 ratios for these periods. The 6, 12 and 24 month values are for 
s 
overlapping time periods. 
~I .. } ..... 
.. 
• ~. "J. 10 F~ndom Sector Jev~atjo~s _ ... _- --- ._--
~:~, i '~": n P{.Jrt .:'01 i :) Dl D -) 1 
-- 2 
lOU ' , ~- t, '::, C Yo. :3 mean value 0.29 2.2J 
St. Dev. 0.04 0.33 
z:=:=_ ..:~ 
~() mean 0.31 2.39 
st. dey. 0.04 0.32 
~/) mean 0.30 2.36 
st. dey. 0.03 0.33 
70 mean 0.33 2 f'~ 
.O..L 
st. dey. 0.04 0.4(; 
I'r 0.34 2.58 i'.)' ; mean 
st. dey. 0.03 0.29 
/J mean 0.39 3.19 
st. dey. 0.05 0.48 
ItiJ mean 0.44 3.40 
st. dey. 0.04 0.48 
~() mean 0.48 3.84 
st. dey. 0.06 0.58 
--
~()rtl")lios of ~~G, 40 and 50 stocks ,constraint of 10% maxlmum on any one fi.r~~, J L 
tr,e pc)rtfolio. 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 stock portfolios, 5% maximum. 
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Intuitively one would expect the two appropriate six month portfolio changes 
to equal the year portfo1,_o change, although with a redistribution in the 
size of the changes between the various components. This is the case for 
the actual portfolios but not necessarily the case for the sector or market 
equivalent portfolios. 
Let q be the number of shares held throughout and Po' p: and P2 be the pr1ces 
at the beginning of the period, end of the first period and end of the second 
period respectively. 
(qp .- qp ) + (qp - qp ) = q(p - p ) 1 0 2 1 2 0 
~.hat is, the first period change 1n value plus the second period change in 
\'alue equals the overall change 1n value. 
rrhis may be rewri tten as 
+ = 
Substituting in the index numbers 1
0
, II and 12 representing the sector 
equivalent investment pr1ces, the change in sector value becomes 
I 12 
qp(--L - 1) + qp (-- 1) 
o I 1 11 
0 
12 
- 1) which lS not equal to qpo(r 
0 
unless I P I p (-1) = (-1:.) and (~) = (~) I Po 11 PI 0 
do not . the sector Hfnce the sumrrnng of the two sub period portfolio changes 1n 
. general,equal the overall portfolio change. value case,ln 
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10/70 - 4/71 
7 SHARES HELD THROUGHOUT SHARES HELD AT PERIOD 1 BOUGHT-DURIN G PERIOD &: DIVIDr.,NDS 
AND SUBS. SOLD HELD TO END 
ACTUAL I SECTOR 
I 1 EQUI V. MARKET EQUIV. ACTUAL I SECTOR I MA.RJ<},'T ACTUAL I SECTOR MARKET ACTUAL SECTOR ' EQUIV. I EQUIV. EQUIV. EQUIV. EQUIV . -~------~----------~--------------------~.-------~ 
34,370 -15,790 
-27,500 - 8,170 
13,810 
28 , &)0 
57,080 
-3,400 
53,590 
7,060 
-73,930 
-72,800 
-15,440 
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TABLE 9.2 
a) All Sectors 
df MS F 
Between firms 199 
l(sectors) 19 0.10 2.38* 
Firms within sectors 180 0.04 
Within Firms 4,400 
2 (market) 22 0.16 2.72* 
1.2 (interaction) 418 0.06 1.00 
2 by firms within sectors 3,960 0.06 
b) Industrials 
df MS F 
Between firms 199 
1 (sectors) 19 0.07 1.67* 
Firms within sectors 180 0.04 
Wi thin firms 4,400 
2 (market) 22 0.14 2.49* 
1.2 (interaction) 418 0.06 0.99 
2 by firms within sectors 3,960 0.06 
All but the interaction terms significant at the .05 level of significance 
(unadjusted degrees of freedom). 
* Significant at .05 level. 
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